Donna Austin filed a complaint seeking recovery for personal injuries allegedly sustained when she fell on a sidewalk as she was leaving a graduation ceremony at Peach County High School. She filed the lawsuit against the Peach County School District; Susan Clark, the superintendent of Peach County Sсhools; C. B. Mathis, the assistant superintendent of facilities of Peach County Schools; Bruce Mackey, the principal of Peach County High School; and Chad Sanders, the director of maintenance of Peach County Schools. The defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting thаt the claims against the school district are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity and that the claims against the individual defendants are barred by the dоctrine of official immunity. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss as to the school district, but granted the motion as to the individual defendants. In Case No. A13A0517, the school district appeals from the denial of its motion to dismiss; and in Case No. A13A0625, Austin appeals from the grant of the individual defendants’ motion to dismiss. Because the claims against the school district are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the claims against the individual defendants are barred by the doctrine of official immunity, we reverse the judgment of the trial court in Case No. A13A0517 and affirm its judgment in Case No. A13A0625.
Case No. A13A0517
1. Sovereign immunity.
The Georgia Constitution provides that “sovereign immunity extends to the state and all of its departments and agencies.” Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX (e); Gilbert v. Richardson,
Sovereign immunity is not an affirmative defense that must be established by the party seeking its prоtection. Instead, immunity from suit is a privilege that is subject to waiver by the [s]tate, and the waiver must be established by the party seeking to benefit from the waiver.
In this сase, Austin argues that the Peach County School District waived its sovereign immunity by purchasing liability insurance. However, this very argument that “by having liability insurance the sсhool district has waived sovereign immunity has been decided adversely to [Austin].” Dollar v. Dalton Public Schools,
The Georgia Tort Claims Act provides for a limited waiver of the state’s sovеreign immunity for the torts of its officers and employees, but it expressly excludes school districts... from the waiver.... Although the 1991 amendment to Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX does not restrict the legislature’s authority to waive sovereign immunity to the Georgia Tort Claims Act, any such waiver must be by a legislative act which specifically provides that sovereign immunity is waived and the extent of such waiver. We cannot find and appellant [ ] [does] not cite us to any promulgated legislative act which specifically provides that the sovereign immunity of school systems has been waived and the extent of such waiver. Moreover, the provisions of OCGA § 20-2-991, authorizing the purchase of liability insurance by the board of control or education of various school systems and related educational institutions, do not provide for a waiver of sovereign immunity as contemplated by the 1991 constitutional amendment. There has been no waivеr of [sovereign] immunity by the mere existence of the school system’s liability policy.
Crisp County School System v. Brown,
2. Official immunity.
Austin contends that the trial court erred in finding that the claims against the individual defendants are barred by official immunity. We disagree.
The doctrine of official immunity, also known as qualified immunity, offers public officers and employees limited protectiоn from suit in their personal capacity. Qualified immunity protects individual public agents from personal liability for discretionary actions taken within the sсope of their official authority, and done without wilfulness, malice, or corruption. Under Georgia law, a public officer or employee may be personally liable only for ministerial acts negligently performed or acts performed with malice or an intent to injure.
Cameron v. Lang,
Austin alleges in her complaint that she was on school district property when she stepped from a sidewalk into a roadway and her leg became lodged in an opening on the curb where water drains frоm the roadway. Austin argues that the individual defendants negligently performed the ministerial duties of inspecting, maintaining and repairing the sidewalk and road where she fell. Thus, the threshold issue that must be determined is whether the alleged duties to inspect, maintain and repair school district property were ministeriаl or discretionary.
A ministerial act is commonly one that is simple, absolute, and definite, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and requiring merеly the execution of a specific duty. A discretionary act calls for the exercise of personal deliberation and judgment, which in turn entails examining the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions, and acting on them in a way not specifically directed. Procedures*371 or instructions adequate to cause an act to become merely ministerial must be so clear, definite and certain as merely to require the execution of a relatively simple, specific duty.
Whitfield v. Brown,
Contrary to Austin’s argument that the alleged duties were ministerial, it has previously bеen “held that absent a specific and clear procedure or method for dealing with hazards on school property, the methods used tо eliminate or avoid a hazard are left to the discretion of the school district employees.” Scott v. Waits,
we [have] recognized that school administrators or teachers having responsibility for inspecting school property for hazards, deciding what constitutes a hazard, selecting appropriate methods for correction of hazards, and creating priorities and a schedule for corrections are involved in the exercise of discretionary functions.
Golden v. Vickery,
Judgment affirmed in Case No. A13A0625. Judgment reversed in Case No. A13A0517.