Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.
Pursuаnt to the Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act of 1988, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) “may order the suspension of any importation or exportation of a listed chemical ... on the ground that the chemical may be diverted to the clandestine manufacture of a controlled sub *1186 stance.” Petitioner, a pharmaceutical manufacturer, does not dispute that some of its products contain ephedrine and pseu-doephedrine, both “listed chemicals” and both critical in the manufacture of methamphetamine, a “controlled substance.” Nor does petitioner dispute that its ephedrine- and pseudoephedrine-containing products have been and will continue to be “diverted” to illicit methamphetamine labs. Instead, petitioner argues that when DEA suspends shipments of listed chemicals — in this case, the agency suspended two such shipments — it may act only on the basis of evidence that the raw listed chemical, not the finished product containing the listed chemical, “may be diverted.” Alternatively, petitioner argues that even if DEA may act on the basis of evidence that the finished product may be diverted, the suspension orders in this case were unsupported by substantial evidence. We disagree on both counts and deny the petition for review. DEA, acting on the basis of its law enforcement experience and expertise, reasonably interpreted the phrase “listed chemical” to include ephedrine and pseu-doephedrine contained in finished drug products. Moreover, a series of letters from DEA warning petitioner that thousands of bottles of its products had been found in some 140 methamphetamine labs in at least eighteen states provides more than enough evidence to support the suspension orders.
I.
A powerful and highly addictive synthetic stimulant, methamphetamine is a growing problem for law-enforcement and public-health officials across the country, particularly in western states. “Chronic methamphetamine abuse can lead to psychotic behavior including intense paranoia, visual and auditory hallucinations, and out-of-control rages that can result in violent episodes.” Office of Nat’l Drug Control Policy, Methamphetamine Fact Sheet 1 (2003). Rooting out the illegal manufacture and distribution of the drug has proven especially difficult because it “can be made in a portable cooler with ingredients bought at the corner drugstore.” Timothy Egan, Meth Building Its Hell’s Kitchen in Rural America, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 2002, at A14.
Cоngress’s first major effort to arm the federal government with adequate authority to stamp out homemade methamphetamine production came in the Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act of 1988 (CDTA), Pub.L. No. 100-690, tit. VI, sub-tit. A, 102 Stat. 4312. To discourage the diversion of “listed chemicals” — including two critical methamphetamine ingredients, ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, id. § 6054(3) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 802(34)(C), (K)) — the CDTA requires companies to report transactions in such chemicals to DEA, see id. § 6052(a) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 830(b)), and imposes criminal liability on individuals who import a listed chemical “knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that [it] will be used to manufacture a controlled substance,” see id. § 6053(c) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 960(d)(2)). Using language central to the issue before us, one section of the Act, now codified at 21 U.S.C. section 971(c)(1), also provides that DEA “may order .the suspension of any importation or exportation of a listed chemical ... on the ground that the chemical may be diverted to the clandestine manufacture of a controlled substance.” Id. § 6053(a) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 971(c)(1)).
As the CDTA tightened the screws on access to raw listed chemicals, illicit methamphetamine manufacturers shifted to extracting ephedrine and pseudoephedrine from common over-the-counter medications, including Sudafed and some types of Primatene. Since the two listed chemi *1187 cals are present in such medications in a chemically unchanged form, the extraction process is relatively simple. Congress sought to counter this trend with the Domestic Chemical Diversion Control Act of 1993, which (for the first time) required companies to report all transactions in FDA-approved drug products containing listed chemicals. Pub. L. No. 103-200 § 2(a)(6)(C), 107 Stat. 2333, 2333-34 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 802(39)(A)(iv)). Still dissatisfied, Congress enacted the Methamphetamine Anti-Proliferation Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106— 310, tit. XXXVI, 114 Stat. 1227, which allocated significant funding to combating methamphetamine production, id. §§ 3623(c), 3624(b)(1), 3625(c), and imposed stiffer penalties on the operators of methamphetamine laboratories, id. § 3612.
Petitioner PDK Laboratories, Inc., a large manufacturer of generic drugs containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, has long known that its products have been diverted to clandestine methamphetamine labs. In March 1998, DEA sent PDK a “warning letter” documenting the appearance of the company’s products at fifty-one methamphetamine labs in various states over an eight-month period. Two years later, another DEA warning letter informed PDK that its products had been found at forty-nine additional methamphetamine labs. And over the subsequent eleven months, DEA sent twenty-one additional warning letters informing the company that its ephedrine- and pseudoephéd-rine-containing products were still showing up at illicit drug labs across the country. In total, DEA alerted PDK to the diversion of “thousands of bottles of its previously imported [listed] chemicals to approximately 140 illicit methamphetamine laboratory-related sites located in at least 18 states.” See Indace, Inc., Suspension of Shipments, 69 Fed.Reg. 67,951, 67,959 (Nov. 22, 2004).
By January 2001, DEA had had enough. Relying on the string of warning letters, as well as on PDK’s failure to report several “regulated transactions,” DEA flexed its section 971(c)(1) authority and issued suspension orders to two foreign manufacturers preparing to ship 6,000 kilograms of raw ephedrine to PDK. PDK challenged the suspеnsion orders, and an administrative law judge (ALJ), siding with the company, concluded that the orders lacked adequate legal and factual support. In her analysis, the ALJ construed DEA’s authority to suspend importations of “listed chemicals” to extend only to cases in which the agency has evidence that bulk listed chemicals like raw ephedrine — and not finished over-the-counter drug products that contain listed chemicals — may be diverted to clandestine drug manufacturers.
On appeal, DEA’s Deputy Administrator disagreed with the ALJ. Indace, Inc., Suspension of Shipments, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,805 (Dec. 19, 2002). Reading section 971(c)(1) to permit suspension if DEA finds that finished drug products containing listed chemicals “may . be diverted,” the Deputy Administrator held that DEA could properly rely on the diversion of PDK products to justify suspending the ephedrine shipments. Id. at 77,806. Considering the “totality of the circumstances,” including both the warning letters and the reporting violations, the Deputy Administrator concluded that substantial evidence supported the suspension orders. Id. at 77,807.
PDK filed a petition for review in this court. In considering this first appeal, we saw ambiguity as to “whether, as the suspension orders assume, [the phrase] ‘the chemical may be diverted’ [from section 971(c)(1) ] includes the prospect that PDK’s ephedrine-containing pills in retail stores will be sold to, or shoplifted by, people who then use the pills to produce methamphetamine.”
PDK Labs., Inc. v.
*1188
DEA
On remand, a new Deputy Administrator explained that, in her view, “the totality of [Congress’s] progressive enactments” reflected its “intent to provide DEA the regulatory means to monitor the domestic production, manufacture and distribution of [listed] chemicals and prevent their illicit use in manufacturing methamphetamine.” 69 Fed.Reg. at 67,955. Therefore, while acknowledging that these chemicals are often found in products that have “legitimate therapeutic uses,” id. at 67,954, the Deputy Administrator held that section 971(c)(1) permits suspension of imports of listed chemicals based on evidence that finished drug products containing such chemicals “may be diverted,” id. at 67,957. Because “[s]ection 971(c)(1) is considered by DEA to be a significant component of the regulatory arsenal given it by Congress to combat this immense and growing problem,” and because “using precursor chemicals[ ] obtained by theft or purchase of listed chemical products” poses an acute law-enforcement challenge, id. at 67,956, the Deputy Administrator concluded that a narrow interpretation of the statute would unnecessarily hamper the agency’s efforts to prevent the diversion of listed chemicals. Id. at 67,595-96.
Defending her interpretation of section 971(c)(1), the Deputy Administrator asserted that her approach comported with the statute’s text, reasoning thаt “[i]f Congress wanted to make an express distinction between a bulk listed chemical and a finished product ... it could have done so.”
Id.
at 67,955. She further explained that “listed chemical ... should be construed broadly in light of that term’s use in other parts of the same statute ... enacted by Congress in 1988,”
id.
at 67,954, and pointed out that the Ninth Circuit had already interpreted “listed chemical” as used in one of the CDTA’s criminal provisions to cover the ephedrine and pseudoephedrine in finished drug products,
id.
(citing
United States v. Daas,
Turning to the second issue — whether substantial evidence supported the suspension orders — the Deputy Administrator again looked to the totality of the circumstances. Examining three categories of evidence — the warning letters and two types of reporting violations — she concluded that the orders were adequately supported, emphasizing that “the evidence of *1189 diversion reflected in the series of Warning Letters provides a sufficient independent basis” for sustaining the suspension orders. Id. at 67,961 n.9. In reaching this conclusion, the Deputy Administrator rejected PDK’s argument that DEA’s failure to compare the rate of diversion of other companies’ products to PDK’s diversion rate rendered the suspension orders invalid. She explained:
DEA recognizes that it and other law enforcement agencies are aware of and able to take action against only a small number of the total clandestine methamphetamine laboratories and dump sites in this country. Accordingly, the specific universe of PDK product diverted, vis a vis, all other manufacturers’ products, is a number which cannot be established with any specificity....
Given the quantities and diverse locations of PDK listed chemical products discovered at illicit sites reflected in the Warning Letters, DEA is able to draw a reasonable inference regarding the likelihood that the instant shipments may be diverted and to exercise its discretion as to the need to prohibit their import.
Id. at 67,959. The Deputy Administrator also pointed out that she had considered warning letters to be adequate grounds for taking adverse action against other drug manufacturers, and that in one case she had sustained a suspension order based on fewer warning letters than DEA had sent to PDK. Id.
Before addressing the two types of reporting violations (neither of which is relevant to our disposition of this case), the Deputy Administrator noted “[a]s a collateral matter” that Michael Lulkin, PDK’s former in-house counsel “responsible for implementing PDK’s operating procedures for responding to DEA Warning Letters,” had been convicted of four counts of felony fraud, one of which involved PDK. Id. Yet after his conviction, Lulkin remained at PDK, “where his dutiеs include overseeing the company’s regulatory compliance.” Id. The Deputy Administrator also observed that PDK’s former president, Michael Krasnoff, had been convicted of similar charges, yet “continued to serve as a consultant to the company,” id. — despite his statement that “it’s none of my business if someone gets high off of this stuff,” id. at 67,960 n.7. “Neither of these personnel decisions,” she concluded, “but particularly the retention of Mr. Lulkin as a key overseer of regulatory matters ..., generates confidence on the part of the Deputy Administrator that PDK is sufficiently committed to complying with the myriad of regulatory requirements designed to prevent diversion of listed chemicals.” Id. at 67,959.
PDK again petitions for review, challenging the Deputy Administrator’s interpretation of section 971(c)(1) and arguing that insufficient evidence supрorts the suspension orders. We address each contention in turn.
II.
When considering the legitimacy of an agency’s interpretation of a statute it is charged with enforcing, we first ask “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
Even at
Chevron’s,
second step, we begin with the statute’s language.
Abbott Labs, v. Young,
interpretation comports with common sense. If a methamphetamine manufacturer steals, for the purpose of making methamphetamine, a bottle containing pure ephedrine, or pure ephedrine dissolved in water, or a bottle containing 50 ephedrine pills and 50 guaifenesin pills [guaifenesin is another compound present in some of PDK’s products], we would not hear an argument that he did not divert a listed chemical because he also diverted a bottle, some water, or some guaifenesin. The presence of packaging materials or other extrаneous items does not vitiate the existence of the listed chemical. Here, a bottle of PDK Mini Two-Way Action contains pills each consisting of 25 mg of ephedrine and 200 mg of guaifenesin and binders. For purposes of Section 971(c), the decongestant and the binders are extraneous materials, no more relevant to the analysis than the bottles and boxes in which the pills are packaged.
PDK I,
Absent anything in section 971(c)(l)’s language suggesting that the Deputy Administrator’s interpretation is impermissible, PDK resorts to the assertion that Congress, committed to ensuring that popular cold medications remain readily available, could never have intended to give DEA authority to “shutter the industry.” Although citing nothing in the CDTA’s legislative history to support this contention, PDK explains that:
Given that some misuse [of ephedrine drug products] concededly is endemic to the industry, the Deputy Administrator’s interpretation ... would allow DEA to shutter the entire [listed chemicals] industry by using Section 971 to suspend imports to any and every manu- - facturer whose finished goods are misused in some amount' — -that is, every manufacturer in the United States.
Pet’r’s Br. 24-25. Invoking
PDK
I’s statement that “no one doubts that Congress did not intend to ban,
or to give DEA the authority to ban,
all sales of ephedrine-containing drugs in retail
*1191
stores,”
PDK I,
For starters, the Deputy Administrator has never suggested that section 971(c)(1) permits DEA to ban drug sales in retail stores. Nor has she claimed authority “to suspend imports to any and every manufacturer ... in the United States.” She has concluded only that in deciding whether to suspend a particular shipment of raw ephedrine, DEA may consider evidenсe that ephedrine-containing drug products are being diverted. If, as PDK asserts, DEA can readily amass evidence of diversion sufficient to warrant suspending any ephedrine shipment, that attests to the rampant nature of the diversion problem and — critically for our purposes- — to section 971(c)(l)’s breadth, not to whether the Deputy Administrator’s interpretation is unreasonable. As we have explained, “the Supreme Court has consistently instructed that statutes written in broad, sweeping language should be given broad, sweeping application.”
Consumer Elecs. Ass’n v. FCC,
Even under PDK’s narrow interpretation, moreover, DEA would still have authority, at least in principle, to “shutter the industry.” After all, there is a risk that every shipment of raw ephedrine could be diverted before delivery, just as there is a risk that finished drug products containing ephedrine could be diverted after delivery. If DEA could amass substantial evidence to support the inference that all raw ephedrine shipments “may be diverted” — a big if, of course — then no one doubts it would have the authority to suspend those shipments, thus “shuttering the industry.” When even a narrow interpretation of section 971(c)(1) would authorize DEA to “shutter the industry,” a more expansive interpretation could hardly be considered unreasonable on that basis. The relative ease with which DEA can document diversion of ephedrine- and pseudoephedrine-containing drugs goes to the quantum of evidence necessary to justify the inference that a shipment “may be diverted” (a question we shall turn to shortly), but it has little relevance to the interpretation of “listed chemical.”
Nor do we see any merit to PDK’s charge that the Deputy Administrator failed to consider the “competing interests at stake,” as
PDK I
instructs.
PDK I,
Moreover, as
PDK I
directs, the Deputy Administrator
did
interpret section 971(c)(1) in light of her experience and expertise.
See Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. v. DOT,
In reaching this conclusion, we acknowledge that DEA could someday abuse its broad section 971(c)(1) authority to reach an outcome Congress would not have approved. Yet all congressional delegations of discretionary authority — particularly broad delegations like this one— carry such a risk. Without more, the theoretical possibility that an agеncy might someday abuse its authority is of limited relevance in determining whether the agency’s interpretation of a congressional delegation is reasonable. Should DEA one day opt to “shutter the industry,” as PDK fears, the courts remain open to consider a challenge to that action pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act.
PDK’s remaining arguments likewise lack merit. The company rightly points out that
PDK I
criticizes the Deputy Administrator for relying on postCDTA legislative enactments to explicate what the CDTA plainly meant, reasoning that “the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.”
PDK I,
PDK next points to our observation in
PDK I
that the 1993 Domestic Chemical Diversion Control Act (DCDCA) “drew a distinction between, on the one hand, the finished product and, on the other hand, the listed chemical.”
PDK I,
Finally, PDK argues that the Deputy Administrator inappropriately relied on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
United States v. Daas,
In short, as directed in
PDK I,
the Deputy Administrator brought her “expertise and experience” to bear in filling the gap left by Congress when it drafted section 971(c)(1). Finding her interpretation consistent with the provision’s text, as well as with its manifest purpose of preventing the diversion of chemicals used in the illegal manufacture of a controlled substance, we shall defer to her reasonable, well-considered interpretation.
See Chevron,
III.
This leaves us with the question whether substantial evidence supports the suspension оrders. Although the parties lock horns over all three categories of evidence upon which DEA rested its suspension orders — the warning letters and the two types of reporting violations — the Deputy Administrator made clear that “the evidence of diversion reflected in the series of Warning Letters provides a suffi- *1194 dent independent basis” for sustaining the suspension orders. 69 Fed.Reg. at 67,961 n.9. We agree and shall affirm on that basis. But before explaining why the warning letters suffice, we must address PDK’s contention that the Deputy Administrator’s use of a totality-of-the-circumstances test to decide whether substantial evidence exists to suspend a shipment is so formless that her conclusion is “purely results-driven.” Pet’r’s Br. 31.
The Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test
Although we take PDK’s point that, “[i]n the absence of an explanation, the ‘totality of the circumstances’ can become simрly a cloak for agency whim — or worse,”
LeMoyne-Owen Coll. v. NLRB,
To support its challenge to the Deputy Administrator’s application of a totality test, PDK relies on
Pearson v. Shalala,
Worse still for PDK,
Chippewa
actually supports the Deputy Administrator’s decision. That case touched on the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) statutory authorization to require a reservoir operator to procure a license whenever “necessary or appropriate in the maintenance and operation” of downstream power plants. 16 U.S.C. § 796(11). Although FERC considers the totality of the circumstances when deciding whether a license is “necessary or appropriate,” over time the agency has identified “a seriеs of relevant factors” that it “balances] ... in light of the facts of the [particular] case,” the most important of which is the percentage by which the reservoir increases the power generation of downstream plants.
Chippewa,
Likе FERC, DEA applied an all-things-considered standard to implement a statute that confers broad discretionary authority. Also like FERC, in applying that standard, DEA relied on its precedent, namely,
Mediplas Innovations,
67 Fed.Reg. 41,256 (June 17, 2002), which upheld a suspension order based on less evidence of product diversion than DEA amassed against PDK.
See
69 Fed.Reg. at 67,959. And also like FERC, DEA provided no clear “line of demarcation” to define an open-ended term,
Chippewa,
The Warning Letters
This brings us to the question whether the warning-letter evidence supports DEA’s inference that the ephedrine shipments “may be diverted.” PDK argues that before suspending the two ephedrine shipments, the Deputy Administrator should have compared the percentаge of PDK products documented in the warning letters with the percentage of other companies’ products that had been diverted. Although never contesting that its products have been diverted to many illicit methamphetamine labs, PDK argues that “[t]he Deputy Administrator’s failure to compare PDK to other companies in the industry ... prevents this Court from ... assessing] ... whether DEA is treating similarly situated parties similarly.” Pet’r’s Br. 35. In other words, PDK seems to think that DEA may not suspend its shipments unless the agency also suspends shipments to other companies whose products are diverted in equal or greater rates.
PDK’s argument lacks merit. Section 971(c)(1) offers no hint that DEA must undertake a comparative analysis before issuing a suspension order. Instead, it says that DEA may suspend “any importation ... of a listed chemical” based on a finding that “the chemiсal may be diverted.” 21 U.S.C. § 971(c)(1). The rate at which other companies’ products are diverted has no bearing on whether PDK’s products “may be diverted.” As the government nicely puts it, moreover, “[a] law
*1196
enforcement agency is not limited to investigating only those companies or persons who have committed comparatively more crimes than others. In the law enforcement context, absolute amounts matter.” Resp’t’s Br. 42. And the “absolute amounts” of diverted PDK products— thousands of bottles to roughly 140 illicit labs in at least eighteen states,
see
69 Fed.Reg. at 67,959 — serve as a more-than-adequate foundation for the Deputy Administrator’s inference that PDK’s two ephedrine shipments “may be diverted” somewhere down the line. “[A]n agency’s predictive judgments about areas that are within the agency’s field of discretion and expertise,” we have held, “are entitled to particularly deferential review, so long as they are reasonable.”
Milk Indus. Found. v. Glickman,
PDK challenges the Deputy Administrator’s finding that “substantial amounts” of PDK products have been diverted. 69 Fed.Reg. at 67,959. According to PDK, the warning letters document only a “minuscule percentage” of its total distributed products. Pet’r’s Br. 34. That may be so, but PDK is a large company, and a minuscule percentage of its products is a large amount — thousands of bottles, according to the warning letters — and absolute amounts matter.
Moreover, we think that PDK’s dubious personnel decisions reinforce the Deputy Administrator’s conclusion that the warning letters support DEA’s finding that the two ephedrine shipments “may be diverted.” 69 Fed.Reg. at 67,959. Hiring Kras-noff, a convicted felon who believes “it’s none of my business if someone gets high off of this stuff,” surely demonstrates “a cavalier approach toward complying with DEA regulations.” Id. at 67,960 n.7. And retaining Lulkin, who had been convicted for fraud against PDK itself, as “a key overseer of regulatory matters,” hardly demonstrates PDK’s “committment] to complying with the myriad of regulatory requirements designed to prevent diversion of listed chemicals.” Id. at 67,959.
PDK objects to the Deputy Administrator’s consideration of a DEA employee’s statement that “PDK products were number one in terms of being seized at methamphetamine labs.”
Id.
Although PDK did refer to the employee’s statement as “hearsay” in the fact section of its opening brief, it waited until its reply to argue that the Deputy Administrator should have disregarded it. This is too late, of course, and we will not consider the claim.
See City of Nephi, Utah v. FERC,
In a footnote, PDK argues that the Deputy Administrator improperly ignored factual inaccuracies that the ALJ identified in the warning letters. In support, however, PDK cites a portion of the ALJ’s opinion that has nothing to do with factual errors. To be sure, elsewhere the opinion does contain a vague reference to some errors in a small number of warning letters.
See In re Indace, Inc.,
Nos. 01-12, 01-13, slip op. at 38-39 (Apr. 5, 2002) (included at J.A. 59-60). But judging from the citations, at most six (and probably only four) letters contained any such errors. We agree with the government that “[a]ny factual inaccuracies identified by the ALJ, even if true, are
de minimis.”
Resp’t’s Br. 41 n.ll;
see Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd.,
In a similar vein, PDK argues that the Deputy Administrator “failed to address the numerous infirmities in the warning letters that led the ALJ to conclude ‘it is difficult to determine what, if any, inference can be drawn from these warning-letter figures.’ ” Pet’r’s Br. 32. Viewed in cоntext, however, the ALJ’s statement makes clear that the only infirmity she had in mind was DEA’s failure to undertake a comparative analysis, and we have already explained why we think the Deputy Administrator’s articulated position that DEA has no obligation to do so is perfectly reasonable.
Finally, PDK alleges that, factual inaccuracies aside, the Deputy Administrator’s reliance on the warning letters was itself arbitrary because, according to the company, in deciding whether to send the letters, DEA “followed no rules, regulations, or even the most basic informal internal guidelines.” Id. at 37. PDK explains that
[t]he pertinent point here is not that it was unfair of DEA to document discoveries of PDK products in warning letters while ignoring discoveries of competitors’ products. The point is that the inconsistent treatment regarding the preparation оf warning letters shows that the Deputy Administrator’s reliance on them ... is arbitrary and capricious — largely because the record demonstrates that the decision to document a discovery of misused product, in a warning letter, is itself arbitrary and capricious.
Id. at 38. We disagree. Even assuming the standards for issuing warning letters are arbitrary, that does not automatically invalidate the suspension orders. To succeed on such a claim, PDK must identify exactly how defects in the standards for issuing warning letters tainted the suspension orders. See 5 U.S.C. § 706. A hypothetical shows why. Suppose it were DEA’s policy, upon discovering a company’s drug product at a methamphetamine lab, to send warning letters only if a coin toss came up heads. The arbitrariness of that policy would do nothing to undermine the evidence that the company’s product had been diverted to clandestine methamphetamine labs. Likewise, because PDK nowhere argues that DEA’s allegedly arbitrary issuance of warning letters impeaches the evidence of rampant product diversion — indeed, PDK acknowledges the diversion — any possible arbitrariness in the process for sending warning letters is of no moment.
IV.
In sum, we find the Deputy Administrator’s construction of “listed chemical” reasonable and her conclusion that the two ephedrine shipments “may be diverted” supported by substantial evidence. We realize the interpretation of section 971(c)(1) we validate gives DEA significant authority over shipments of listed chemicals, but the provision’s undemanding language invites such a result. Facing a persistent threat to public health and a challenging law-enforcement problem, *1198 Congress armed DEA with broad suspension authority, and only Congress, not this court, can take it away. We deny the petition for review.
So ordered.