Case Information
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA RICARDO MARTINEZ, CASE No. 1:16-cv-1658-MJS (PC) Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING CASE WITH LEAVE TO AMEND v. (ECF NO. 1)
D. DAVEY, et al., THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE Defendants.
Plaintiff is a former state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. (ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff’s June 20, 2016, Complaint is before the 19 Court for screening. [1] I. Screening Requirement
20 The in forma pauperis statute provides, “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any 21 portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if 22 the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which 23 relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 24 II. Pleading Standard
25 Section 1983 “ provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 26 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 27 28 [1] This case was transferred from the Northern District of California on November 2, 2016. (ECF Nos. 6, 7.) Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a )(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.
III. Plaintiff’s Allegations
At all relevant times Plaintiff was an inmate housed at Corcoran State Prison in Corcoran, California (“CSP”). He names the following individuals as Defendants: D. Davey, CSP Warden; the unidentified Chief Medical Officer at CSP; and (presumably) 27 John and Jane Does. These Defendants are named in their official and individual capacities.
In the complaint, Pl aintiff’s allegations are bare: “I’m under multiple violation [sic] of my right 1 st 5 th 6 th 14 th amendment hindering outgoing mail denied adequate medical care 8 th amend [sic] violation victim of assault and battery. Having problem with my back need a cane to walk. I rec eive injury breach of contract. … V ictim of assault and battery by 27 officers at [CSP].”
Attached to the complaint are nearly 150 pages of health care service request forms and medical records. A cursory review of these attachments reveals complaints concerning the provision of medical care that Plaintiff has received while housed at CSP.
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.
IV. Analysis
A. Short and Plain Statement
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” The minimal and unadorned allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint do not meet this minimum requirement.
Moreover, the Court will not examine 150 pages of attachments to the complaint to try to determine if, somewhere therein, might lay facts giving rise to a cognizable cause of action. Even if the factual elements of a cause of action are contained somewhere within those pages, Plaintiff’s failure to organize them into a “short and plain statement of the claim ” is grounds for dismissal for failure to satisfy Rule 8(a). Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1) (“ Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct”). The Rule requirements can be met within 15 or 20 typewritten pages, or equivalent handwritten pages, without attachments. (In this latter regard Plaintiff is advised that factual allegations in his complaint will be taken as true at this stage of the proceedings; he need not and shall not provide supporting evidence now.)
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed with leave to amend. The Court will, however, provide the following legal standards that must be considered if Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint.
B. Linkage and Supervisory Liability
Under Section 1983, a plaintiff bringing an individual capacity claim must demonstrate that each Defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). There must be an actual connection or link between the actions of the Defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 691, 695 (1978).
Government officials may not be held liable for the actions of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Since a government official cannot be held liable under a theory of vicarious liability in § 1983 actions, Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts showing that the official has violated the Constitution through his own individual actions by linking each named Defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of Plaintiff's federal rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
Liability may be imposed on supervisory defendants under § 1983 only if the supervisor: (1) personally participated in the deprivation of constitutional rights or directed the violations or (2) knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them. Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Defendants cannot be held liable for being generally deficient in their supervisory duties.
C. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court against a state, its agencies, and s tate officials in their official capacities.” Aholelei v. Dept. of Public Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). However, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits seeking damages against state officials in their personal capacities, Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30 (1991); Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 491 (9th Cir. 2003), or suits for declaratory or injunctive relief brought against state officials in their official capacities, Austin v. State Indus. Ins. System, 939 F.2d 676, 680 fn.2 (9th Cir. 1991).
D. John and Jane Doe Defendants
The use of Doe defendants is generally disfavored in federal court. Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 E.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980)). Plaintiff is hereby informed that the Court cannot order the Marshal to serve process on any Doe defendants until such defendants have been identified. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Foston, No. 1:12-cv-00026 WL 4816216, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2013). Plaintiff may, under certain circumstances, be given the opportunity to identify unknown defendants through discovery prior to service. Id. (plaintiff must be afforded an opportunity to identify unknown defendants through discovery unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover their identities).
E. Eighth Amendment
The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “... embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).
A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official's act or omission must be so serious such that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities; and (2) subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.
1. Medical Indifference
A claim of medical indifference requires: 1) a serious medical need, and 2) a deliberately indifferent response by defendant. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). A serious medical need may be shown by demonstrating that “fail ure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Id.; see also McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The existence of an injury that a reasonable docto r or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that a priso ner has a ‘serious’ need for medical treatment.”).
The deliberate indifference standard is met by showing: a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need, and b) harm caused by the indifference. Id. “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exis ts,’ but that person ‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the r isk.’” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Gibson v, Cnty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). “[A]n inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care” does not, by itself, state a deliberate indifference claim for § 1983 purposes. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (internal quotation marks omitted); See also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (“[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely bec ause the victim is a prisoner.”). “A defendant must purposefully ignore or fail to respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need in order for deliberate indifference to be established.” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.
2. Excessive Force
When prison officials stand accused of using excessive force, the core judicial inquiry is “... whether force was applied in a good -faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320- 21 (1986). The “malicious and sadistic” standard, as opposed to the “deliberate indifference” standard applicable to most Eighth Amendment claims, is applied to excessive force claims because prison officials generally do not have time to reflect on their actions in the face of risk of injury to inmates or prison employees. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21. In determining whether force was excessive, the court considers the following factors: (1) the need for application of force; (2) the extent of injuries; (3) the relationship between the need for force and the amount of force used; (4) the nature of the threat reasonably perceived by prison officers; and (5) efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The absence of an emergency situation is probative of whether force was applied maliciously or sadistically. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1528 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). The lack of injuries is also probative. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7-9. Finally, because the use of force relates to the prison's legitimate penological interest in maintaining security and order, the court must be deferential to the conduct of prison officials. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22.
F. First Amendment
Prisoners have a “First Amendment right to send and receive mail.” Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995). Furthermore, prison officials cannot read legal mail, although they may scan it and inspect it for contraband. Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir. 2014).
Interference with outgoing prisoner mail is justified under the First Amendment if the following criteria are met: (1) the regulation furthers “an important or substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of expression” and (2) “the limitation on First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved.” Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974) (limited by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1989),
only as test relates to incoming mail).
V. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim and must be dismissed. If Plaintiff chooses to amend his complaint, he may not rely on the contents of his attachments. He must instead assert specific facts linking his allegations to particular Defendants, as discussed supra. A first amended complaint must state what each named Defendant did that led to the deprivation of his constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. Plaintiff should carefully read this Screening Order and focus his efforts on curing the deficiencies set forth above.
Plaintiff is also advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an “amended complaint supersedes the original” complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to rais e a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).
Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff’s June 20, 2016, Complaint (ECF No. 1) is dismissed with leave to amend;
2. Plaintiff shall file a First Amended Complaint within thirty days from the date of this Order;
3. Absent further Order of this Court for good cause shown, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint shall be no longer than 20 pages and include no attachments ; and,
4. Plaintiff’s fail ure to file an amended complaint meeting the above criteria within thirty days will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with a court order.
IT IS SO ORDERED. /s/ Michael J. Seng
Dated: January 3, 2017 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE