Facts
- Ralph W. Baker, Jr. filed a lawsuit against several defendants, including author Ta-Nehisi Coates, alleging copyright infringement of his self-published memoir, Shock Exchange. Baker claimed that Coates mimicked his writing style and copied portions of his work. [lines="58-67"]
- The complaint included approximately eighty pages of comparisons between Shock Exchange and Coates' works, including The Water Dancer and various articles. [lines="68-72"]
- A magistrate judge recommended dismissing Baker's complaint due to a lack of substantial similarity as a matter of law. [lines="93-95"]
- The district court adopted the magistrate's recommendation and dismissed Baker's complaint on September 27, 2023. [lines="60-97"]
- Baker appeals the dismissal and requests action against Appellees' counsel. [lines="101-102"]
Issues
- Whether the district court erred in finding that Baker failed to demonstrate substantial similarity between Shock Exchange and the alleged infringing works. [lines="130-134"]
- Whether the district court properly dismissed Baker's copyright claims against certain defendants due to insufficient service of process. [lines="161-162"]
Holdings
- The appellate court upheld the district court's dismissal, agreeing that Baker did not demonstrate substantial similarity between the works, noting they are dramatically different in content and style. [lines="128-133"]
- Any procedural error regarding the service of process was deemed irrelevant since the lack of substantial similarity was decisive for all copyright claims. [lines="164-172"]
OPINION
Case Information
*1 Case 1:24-cv-01056-SAB Document 19 Filed 12/04/24 Page 1 of 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA JUSTIN ROMELL BREDFORD, No. 1:24-cv-01056-SAB (PC) Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL, v. WITHOUT PREJUDICE CDCR, et al., (ECF No. 18)
Defendants.
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel, filed December 3, 2024. Plaintiff requests appointment of counsel because he is a mental health inmate, indigent, has limited access to legal resources, and does not comprehend this action. (ECF No. 18.)
Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in this action, Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), and the court cannot require any attorney to represent plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Mallard v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). However, in certain exceptional circumstances the court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to section 1915(e)(1). Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525.
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*2 Case 1:24-cv-01056-SAB Document 19 Filed 12/04/24 Page 2 of 2 Without a reasonable method of securing and compensating counsel, the court will seek volunteer counsel only in the most serious and exceptional cases. In determining whether “exceptional circumstances exist, the district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success on the merits [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In the present case, the Court does not find the required exceptional circumstances. Even if it assumed that Plaintiff is not well versed in the law and that he has made serious allegations which, if proved, would entitle him to relief, his case is not exceptional. The Court is faced with similar cases almost daily. While the Court recognizes that Plaintiff is at a disadvantage due to his pro se status and his incarceration, the test is not whether Plaintiff would benefit from the appointment of counsel. See Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Most actions require development of further facts during litigation and a pro se litigant will seldom be in a position to investigate easily the facts necessary to support the case.”) The test is whether exception circumstances exist and here, they do not. Although the Court has found that Plaintiff’s complaint states cognizable claims, at this juncture, the Court cannot determine the likelihood of success on the merits of Plaintiff’s claims. The likelihood of success on the merits determination is not the same as that required at screening. Further, a review of the docket reflects that Plaintiff has adequately litigated this action to date, even if with the assistance of another inmate. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of counsel is denied, without prejudice. IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 4, 2024 STANLEY A. BOONE
United States Magistrate Judge
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