Angеla L. Payne and Glenville Payne, the plaintiffs below and appellants herein, filed suit in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County after Mrs. Payne was injured when her ear was struck by a car driven by Richard L. Weston, one of the defendants below and appellants herein. Her husband, Glen- *505 ville Payne, sought damages for loss of consortium. They appeal the June 10, 1994, order of the circuit court which granted summary judgment to Mr. Weston’s insurer, Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), a defendant below and appellee herein. The circuit court found the language of Mr. Weston’s automobile insurance policy prohibited stacking of the liability coverage. 1 On appeal, the plaintiffs assert the policy does not prohibit stacking of liability coverage when multiple vehicles are covered under the same policy.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 19, 1991, Mrs. Payne was severely injured when her car was struck head on by Mr. Weston’s car on Interstate 79 near the Elkview exit. She underwent various surgical procedures that required hospitalization for more than one month. The plaintiffs allege that to date Mrs. Payne has incurred medical bills in excess of $90,000 and has been unable to return to work.
In September of 1992, the plaintiffs filed suit against Mr. Weston and Allstate. Allstate answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration of the coverage limits available under Mr. Weston’s insurance policy with Allstate. Mr. Weston’s policy contained bodily injury liability limits of $300,000 per person and $500,000 per accident. In addition to the 1985 Chevrolet Blazer involved in the accident, Mr. Weston owned a 1986 Mercury Sable that was covered by the automobile insurance policy. In October of 1992, a settlement was reached whereby the plaintiffs received $300,000 from Allstate to cover the per person limit of thе policy. Mr. Weston was released from all personal liability for damages in excess of his insurance coverage. The plaintiffs were able to pursue recovery from Allstate for any additional money available under the policy. 2
The plaintiffs and defendants filed motions for summary judgment. On July 15, 1993, the circuit court conducted a hearing to allow the parties to present arguments on this issue. The circuit judge who conducted this hearing retired from the bench before entering an order and the case was assigned to a successor judge. Another hearing was held on June 1, 1994. Following this hearing, the circuit court found:
“[T]he separability clause and limitations of liability clause at issue herein unambiguously state that liability limits apply to each car separately and that the ‘each person’ limit is the limit of liability for all damages sustained by any one person in any one occurrence. Therefore this Court concludes that the plaintiffs cannot stack the liability coverage for both of Weston’s two vehicles, but instead, are only entitled to $300,000, the per person limit shown on the declaration sheets.”
Accordingly, summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendants.
.The sole issue in this appeal is whether the language of the policy allows the plaintiffs recovery up to the aggregated or stacked limits of the liability policy covering both of Mr. Weston’s vehicles — the 1985 Blazer involved in the accident and his 1986 Sable— which would leave Allstate with a total potential liability of $600,000 (twice the $300,000 per person limit). Before discussing the parties’ arguments, we underscore two points of utmost importance: (1) this case deals only with the liability coverage of the tortfeasor and not with uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage; and (2) Mr. Weston has one policy cоvering the two vehicles and received a multi-car discount.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.
Summary Judgment
On appeal, we conduct a
de novo
review of the circuit court’s decision to grant
*506
summary judgment on behalf of Allstate. Syl. pt. 1,
Painter v. Peavy,
On the other hand, if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party, then summary judgment will not lie. Summary judgment will be affirmed only if we are convinced, after an independent review of the record, that there is no genuine issue of any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Material facts are those necessary to the proof of a claim or defense and are determined by reference to the substantive law. Where the unresolved issues are рrimarily legal rather factual, summary judgment is particularly appropriate.
Because the material facts are not in dispute in this case, the only issue before this Court is the legal question of determining the proper coverage of the liability insurance contract. We, therefore, find the matter was ripe for summary judgment. Accordingly, if there are no genuine issues of material fact as to the policy’s coverage, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claim for additional insurance coverage.
“[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,477 U.S. 317 , 322-23,106 S.Ct. 2548 , 2552,91 L.Ed.2d 265 , 273 (1986).
The plaintiffs’ burden of рroof is easily stated. Under West Virginia law, the plaintiffs must prove both the existence of an applicable insurance contract and its material terms. It is only when the plaintiffs have established a prima facie ease of coverage that the burden of production shifts to the defendants. In this context, the plaintiffs must present sufficient evidence to show the existence of each element of their case on which they will bear the burden at trial.
B.
Insurance Contract
The pertinent provisions of the automobile liability policy at issue are set forth in the footnote.
3
The interpretation of
*507
an insurance cоntract, including the question of whether the contract is ambiguous, is a legal determination which, like the court’s summary judgment, is reviewed
de novo
on appeal.
Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc.,
The term “ambiguity” is defined as language “reasonably susceptible of two different meanings” or language “of such doubtful meaning that rеasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning[.]” Syl. pt. 1, in part,
Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
However, a court should read policy provisions to avoid ambiguities and not torture the language to create them. “ ‘If a court properly determines that the contract is unambiguous on the dispositive issue, it may then properly interpret the contract as a matter of law and grant summary judgment because no interpretive facts are in genuine issue.’”
Williams v. Precisian Coil, Inc.,
ill.
ANALYSIS
Before beginning our analysis of the liability policy at issue in this case, we believe it is helpful to summarize briefly some of our prior cases dealing with the question of combining and stacking insurance policy coverages. It is apparent that in recent times no area of the law has generated more appellate litigation than that of stacking. We intend today to detail once again when stacking is permitted and when it is not.
In
State Automobile Insurance Co. v. Yauler,
In this vein, the public policy implications undergirding our decisions in
Bell
and
Youler
are not present when the issue before us is limited to the stacking of liability coverage. In
Youler,
we emphasized that the public policy reasons behind the prohibition of anti-stacking language in the uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage context do not exist when liability coverage is at issue. “[A]ntistacking language in the case of
liability
insurance coverage ‘does not violate any applicable insurance statute or regulation[.]’ ”
Youler,
We revisited the issue of stacking of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage in
Russell, supra.
Unlike
Youler,
in which the plaintiffs held two separate policies which both provided such сoverage, the plaintiffs in
Russell
held one policy which covered two vehicles. In
Russell,
we held the application of an anti-stacking provision in the policy was not contrary to W.Va.Code, 33-6-31 (1992), when the insured received a multi-ear discount because the insured “bargained for only one policy and only one underinsurance motorist coverage endorsement.”
In summary, a careful reading of our prior cases suggest there is no common law right to stack coverage available for multiple vehicles under the same policy or under two or more insurance policies. The right to stack must arise from the insurance cоntract itself (as that is the agreement of the parties) or from a statute (as in the uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage statutes). We find no independent authority for the contention that the policy limits of an insurance policy should be multiplied by the number of vehicles covered by that policy. As to the liability coverage of an insurance policy, *509 public policy is satisfied when there is liability insurance sufficient in an amount to meet minimum requirements of our financial responsibility law. We believe the rule that evolved from our cases is that in the absence of a countervаiling public policy or statutory consideration, effect will be given to the anti-stacking provisions in policies issued to the same insured even if the policies were all issued by the same company.
The mere existence of purported ambiguity in an insurance policy does not create a right to stack liability coverage. Ambiguity must involve language in the policy that is related and material to the stacking issue. In other words, ambiguity comes into play only when the language in the policy appears to permit stacking but a clear reading of the policy is made difficult by its language. Our interpretive rules of construction regarding ambiguity require that, under such circumstances, we construe the language against the drafter, the party who had the authority and opportunity to bring about clarity. 7 Thus, in the absence of an applicable statutory provision, to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs must point to some clear language in the insurance policy that permits stacking or to some language that leaves a reasonable doubt as to whether stacking was intended by the partiеs. Outside the context of uninsured and underinsured coverage, the mere absence of anti-stacking language is insufficient to create a right to stack. In construing the policy, the relevant inquiries must always be “what has the insured purchased” and whether that agreement has been breached by the insurer’s failure to allow stacking.
Our review of the policy reveals no clear language permitting stacking nor any ambiguity sufficient to avoid the granting of summary judgment. The language in the liability provision reasonably cannot be subject to divergent interpretations. It plainly states that the policy limit “is thе total limit of Alstate’s liability for all damages as the result of any one oceurrence[.]” Furthermore, the language found in the general conditions provision clearly states “[w]hen two or more automobiles are insured by this policy, the terms of this policy shall apply separately to each[.]” The defendants assert that, applying the plain language of the policy, the plaintiffs’ stacking claim must be abandoned. We are compelled to agree. 8
The plaintiffs do not submit that the policy language is ambiguous or that it could be interpreted in a way to allow for stаcking. Instead, they argue that in the absence of clear anti-stacking language, e.g., the type of language relied upon in Shamblin, they are entitled to stack the policy limits for both vehicles owned by Mr. Weston. Thus, the precise legal question the plaintiffs posit is *510 whether the circuit court misinterpreted Shamblin in granting summary judgment.
We are quite frankly mystified by the plaintiffs’ attempt to draw support solely from our Shamblin decision. We find their interpretation of Shamblin, suggesting the decision implicitly created some (common law) right to stack liability coverage limits in the absence of anti-stacking language, is incorrect. In Shamblin, the appellant, Clarence Shamblin, d/b/a Shamblin’s Mobile Cleaning, purchased an automоbile liability insurance policy from Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (Nationwide) to cover several automobiles used in his business. On the day of the accident, three vehicles were traveling along the same route. The drivers of the vehicles were communicating via CB radios to signal each other when it was safe to pass other vehicles. One driver was advised over the radio that it was safe to pass a truck after another driver had done so. However, when he attempted to pass, he collided with the truck and another vehicle, injuring the driver and passenger of the second vehicle.
During the course of the litigation, Nationwide advised Mr. Shamblin that “the automobile liability insurance policy limits for bodily injury and property damage for
each
vehicle would
not
be available ... even if it were determined that more than one of ... [Shamblin’s] vehicles contributed to the accident.”
We affirmed the trial court’s decision in
Shamblin,
and held: “If there were two negligent acts of two of the appellant’s drivers in this case, the two acts, (1) signalling to pass and (2) passing, happened, ... at or about the time of the accident, and, due to the closeness in time, as concurrent negligence proximately caused the one ‘occurrence,’ the collision.”
The appellant in
Shamblin
essentially made two arguments in support of his entitlement to stack. First, he presented a public policy argument that an insurance company would receive unjust enrichment by limiting stacking and still receiving payment of multiple premiums. Second, he contended that an ambiguity was created in the policy merely by the fact that the insured had paid a separate premium. This Court disposed of these issues by suggesting that “[i]n light of the explicit ‘anti-stacking’ language, the payment of a separate premium for each vehicle does not create an ambiguity in the insurance policy which should be resolved against the insurer.”
“A limitation of liability clause within an automobile liability insurance policy which limits coverage for any one occurrence, regardless of the number of covered vehicles, does not violate any applicable insurance statute or regulation, and there is no judicial policy that prevents an insurer from so limiting its liability and yet collecting a premium for each covered vehicle because each premium is for the increased *511 risk of an ‘occurrence.’ ” Syl. pt. 5, Shamblin, supra.
Seen in context, the case at bar is factually distinguishable from Shamblin. 9 The appellant in Shamblin paid a separate premium for each vehicle and apparently was not given any discount for the grouping of the vehicles under one policy. 10 Moreover, the appellant in Shamblin sought coverage only for those vehicles determined to be involved in the accident. In Shamblin, the driver of the first vehicle arguably contributed to the accident when he gave the go ahead to pass to the driver of the second vehicle involved in the collision. Mr. Shamblin did not seek to stack the liability coverages for all of his vehicles covered by the policy. In this case, however, plaintiffs seek to stack the liability coverage for Mr. Weston’s 1986 Sable that was not even involved in the accident with his 1985 Blazer that was in the collision. This clarification is critical because it helps to explain why we find no authority in Shamblin for the plaintiffs’ position.
The point of this analysis is to convey that the Shamblin decision is inapposite. 11 Determining the right to stack cannot be divorced from the concept of insurance coverage. While liability insurance coverage is triggered only when the vehicle involved in the accident is covered under the poliсy, in the absence of policy language, stacking is triggered only when the insured is covered simultaneously by two or more policies providing uninsured or underinsured coverage. To be specific, where uninsured or underinsured coverage is not involved, stacking of liability coverage is permitted only when the insured can point to some specific policy language that authorizes stacking. The absence of clear cut anti-stacking language may be relevant, but it alone does not give rise to stacking especially, where, as in this case, other language limiting stacking appears. Under the typical “per occurrence” and “per injury” type policy, as in this case, liability coverage is triggered if there has been an occurrence causing injury/damage during the policy period. Thus, if the trigger of coverage is an occurrence, e.g., wrongdoing by the insured, and there is only one occurrence, then stacking should not be allowed. In our opinion, this summarizes the better reasoned approach on the legal issue before us, and, as we have suggested herein, the circuit court’s holding is consistent with the greater weight of West Virginia authority.
Having failed to establish any factual, logical or analytical link between
Shamblin
and the facts of this case, our mission draws to an end. In placing ultimate reliance on
Shamblin,
the plaintiffs misconstrue their substantive burden of proof as we have stated in this case and misapply
Shamblin
in their analysis. Accordingly, we hold that an
*512
insured is not entitled to stack liability coverages for every vehicle covered by his or her policy when the insured received a multi-car discount, when only one vehicle was involved in the accident, and when the policy contains language limiting the insurer’s liability (“when two or more, automobiles are insured by this policy, thе terms of this policy shall apply separately to each” and the bodily injury liability limit “is the total limit of ... liability for all damages as the result of any one occurrence”).
See also Helmick v. Jones,
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Notes
. "Stacking” in this context means multiplying the amount of coverage under the policy per each vehicle covered by the policy. For a general discussion of "stacking,” see 7 Am.Jur.2d Automobile Insurance % 326(1980).
. In January of 1993, the plaintiffs received $200,000 from their insurer, State Farm Insurance Company, pursuant to the stacked limits of their underinsured coverage available from their two vehicles.
See State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Youler,
. The dollar amounts applicable are listed in the declaration sheet as "$300,000 each person— $500,000 each occurrence." Section I is the "Liability Protection” section which provides, in part:
"Allstate will pay for an insured all damages which the insured shall be legally obligated to pay because of:
"1. bodily injury sustained by any person, and
"2. injury to or destruction of property[J * * * * * *
"The limit of bodily injury liability stated in the declarations for Coverage AA as applicable to:
"1. ‘each person' is the limit of Allstate’s liability for all damages arising out of bodily injury sustained by one person in any one occurrence;
"2. ‘each occurrence ’ is, subject to the above provision respecting each person, the total limit of Allstate’s liability for all such *507 damages arising out of bodily injury sustained by two or more persons as the result of any one occurrence.
"If a"single limit of bodily injury liability and property damage liability is stated in the declarations for Coverage AA and BB, such limit as applicable to 'each occurrence' is the total limit of Allstate's liability for all damages as the result of any one occurrence[.]”
The “General Conditions” section states, in pertinent part:
"When two or more automobiles are insured by this policy, the terms of this policy shall apply separately to each[.]”
. Specifically, in Youler, we held:
"[S]o-called ‘antistacking’ language in automobile insurance policies is void under W.Va. Code, 33-6-31(b), as amended, to the extent that such language is applicable purportedly to uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage, and an insured covered simultaneously by two or more uninsured or underinsured motorist policy endorsements may recover under all of such endorsements up to the aggregated or stacked limits of the same, or up to the amount of the judgment obtained agаinst the uninsured or underinsured motorist, whichever is less, as a result of one accident and injury.”183 W.Va. at 565 ,396 S.E.2d at 746 .
. The distinction between uninsured and under-insured motorist coverage versus liability coverage was noted in note 9 of
Shamblin,
.Both the factual and legal climate of the decisions in Bell and Youler are fundamentally different from the case at bar. In those decisions, this Court was examining uninsured and underinsured coverage provisions and the anti-stacking clause in light of a specific statutory requirement. Conversely, the clause at issue in this appeal deals with liability coverage and is not specifically governed by a West Virginia statute.
. Words, terms, phrases, and clauses in insurance contracts are to be given their everyday meanings, not hypertechnical or esoteric definitions, but their plain and common meaning. This follows because insureds are not expected to be wordsmiths, schooled in the craft of lexicology and, further, because the law disfavors the employment of arcane, subtle definitions of common wоrds which but promise to confuse even the educated and frustrate the unlearned.
. Our conclusion is supported in
Rosar v. General Insurance Co. of America, 41
Wis.2d 95,
"We agree with Pacific Indemnity Co. [v. Thompson,56 Wash.2d 715 ,355 P.2d 12 (1960)]. We do not find an ambiguity in the condition that ‘[w]hen two or more automobiles are insured hereunder, the terms of this policy shall apply separately to each.' There wаs one injured claimant, one owned and described vehicle involved, and one occurrence. The liability insurance purchased by the assured under these circumstances was limited to $10,000.”41 Wis.2d at 101 ,163 N.W.2d at 131 . (Footnote omitted).
See also Greer
v.
Associated Indem. Corp.,
. Even if we were to give the plaintiffs the most liberal interpretation of Shamblin, the plaintiffs still have failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. The language from Shamblin seized by the plaintiffs was merely dicta at best and was added merely to address arguments made by the parties on appeal. With this point in mind, there is no difference between Shamblin and this case. In both cases, the policy language eliminates any opportunity for liability coverage stacking. Thus, in this case, the authority of Shamblin is not appellant friendly. To be specific, we neither accept the plaintiffs’ theoretical premises, nor, after close perscrutation of the record as a whole, can we conclude that the facts would support the premises.
. We refer to "discounting” only to emphasize the factual distinction between Shamblin and the case at bar. As suggested in Shamblin, when the policy limits liability coverage to a single vehicle and a single occurrence "regardless of the number of covered vehicles,” discounting is immaterial. Even though the policy sub judice does not contain the above language, it has other sufficient limiting language to render a further discussion as to discounting irrelevant.
.The few cases we havе found from other jurisdictions that address this issue reach a similar conclusion. In
Farmers Insurance Group v. Stonik By and Through Stonik,