Donald Payne challenges the amount of restitution imposed after he pleaded no contest to one count of felony battery. We agree that the State failed to prove that the victim’s damages were caused by Payne’s offense or were directly related to
The State’s only evidence concerning the amount of the victim’s loss was a report and payment record from the Crimes Compensation Trust Fund, which showed it had paid the victim $5324 for undescribed medical and mental health treatment. Payne’s counsel objected to setting the restitution based solely on this document. He asked for a specific breakdown of the compensated medical procedures, arguing such a breakdown was necessary to determine whether the payments made were actually related to Payne’s crime. The court denied counsel’s request, finding that chapter 960, Florida Statutes (2001), which contains the provisions related to the Crimes Compensation Trust Fund, required it automatically to award the restitution sought by the Fund. But the court was concerned that its interpretation of the statute might present due process problems.
Section 960.17(1) provides:
Any payment of benefits to, or on behalf of, a victim or other claimant under this chapter creates a debt due and owing to the state by any person found, in a civil, criminal, or juvenile court proceeding in which he or she is a party, to have committed such criminal act. Such payment shall create an obligation of restitution in accordance with s. 775.089.
(emphasis supplied). Section 775.089(l)(a) states that “[pjayment of an award by the Crimes Compensation Trust Fund shall create an order of restitution to the Crimes Compensation Trust Fund, unless specifically waived in accordance with sub-paragraph (b)l.” Curiously, subparagraph (b)l. does not discuss waiver but instead provides that “[i]f the court does not order restitution, or orders restitution of only a portion of the damages, as provided in this section, it shall state on the record in detail the reasons therefor.” § 775.089(l)(b)(l). In construing two subsections of the same statute, we read the subsections in pari materia. See State v. Riley,
While Payne did receive a restitution hearing, the State’s evidence did not meet its burden of establishing that the amounts the Trust Fund paid were connected to Payne’s crime. See § 775.089(7). In this regard, we note that the Trust Fund’s documents in this case differed from the documents from the Division of Victim Services introduced in Kirk v. State,
