Aрpellant was convicted of burglary, and his punishment assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for a term of two years; hence this appeal.
By his first bill of exceptions, appellant calls in question the action of the court in permitting the State, in the cross-examination of the defendant, Larkin Payne, to prove by him that he had previously been indicted for the offense of burglary of another house than the one in question. The ground of objection urged to this testimony was that the same was immatеrial and prejudicial to defendant. This is entirely too general, and does not state any specific ground of objection to said testimony. The court, however, in a lengthy explanation, states that, out of deference to the rulings of the Court of Aрpeals on this ques
*292
tion, he admitted the testimony, but that, if it was a matter in his discretion, he should reject the testimony, on the ground that the mere indictment for a felony should not be permitted for the purpose of impeaching a witness, and that, certainly, where а witness could be impeached in this manner, it should be done by record evidence; or, if permitted by parol, when the witness denied that he had been indicted or convicted for a felony, then the State should be permitted to show the real truth, and not be bound by the answer of the witness. The learned judge in this connection states that the mere fact of indictment, where there has been no conviction, ought not to be ground or basis for injecting into a case on trial an issue or suggestion about one of the witnеsses who was testifying in the case. This question has long been settled in this State contrary to the views expressed by the judge. See Lights v. State, 21 Texas Crim. App., 308; Woodson v. State, 24 Texas Crim. App., 162; Carroll v. State,
Jack Dean was a material witness for the State; and the State was permitted to prove by Austin and Brock, in rebuttal, the general reputation for truth of said witness Dean in the community in which he lived. Defendant objected to this testimony on the ground that no such attack had been made on the witness Dean by defendant as to justify the State in inquiring into his reputation for truth. If the bill as presented by appellant stood alone, it would appear to be incomplete, and not properly raising the question relating to said testimony of Austin and Brock, supporting the witness Dean for truth. The bill should have shown in itself, as a matter of fact, the status of the witness Dean when it was attempted to support his testimony; and these matters of fact, showing the status of said witness Dean, should
*294
have been certified to by the judge. The bill did not do this, and so, as stated above, wa.s not complete. The judge, however, in approving said bill, states that he admitted said testimony of the witnesses Austin and Brock as to the reputation for truth of the witness Dean because the cross-examination of the witness Dean was lengthy, and was of a character tending to impeach him. Testimony proving or tending to prove the reputation of a witness for truth and veracity is admitted on the following grounds, and pоssibly some others, not necessary to state: (1) Where a witness is impeached or attempted to be impeached by proof that his reputation for truth in the community where he lives is bad. Wilson v. State, 17 Texas Crim. App., 525. (2) Where it is shown that the witness’ charactеr has been impeached by evidence that he had been charged with some criminal offense. Coombes v. State, Id. 258. (3) Where it is shown on the trial that the witness had made contradictory statements to that testified to by him on the trial. Burrell v. State,
Appellant, in his assignments of error, insists that the proof shows that the property, which was wheat, was the joint property of T. J. Nash and his brother William Nash, and that the State failed to prove the want of consent of William Nash. We have examined the record, and T. J. Nash testified that said property was in his exclusive control and possession. Under such circumstances, if appellant had the consent of William Bash to the taking of the wheat, it was incumbent on him to show it.
Appellant complains that the court should have chаrged on recent possession, in connection with the distinctive ownership and dominion over said property by the prosecutor, T. J. Nash. We can not agree to this contention.
He further insists that the State’s case depends solely on the testimony оf accomplices, and that there is no evidence corroborating them. The court instructed the jury on the subject of accomplice testimony; and, under the charge of the court, they may have believed that Jack Dean and Mrs. Wethers wеre not accomplices. If so, of course their testimony amply supported and corroborated the testimony of the State’s witness W. E. Wethers. Besides this, the testimony of Coleman, it would seem, tends to corroborate the witnesses whom appellant insists were accomplices, and it is not claimed that Coleman was an accomplice.
For the error of the court in permitting the State to introduce the witnesses Austin and Brock, and prove by them the good reputation of the witness Dean for truth and veracity, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
Davidson, Presiding Judge, absent.