Appellant was convicted of the offense of theft by taking and sentenced to 10 years in the state рenal system. He appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial on the grounds that: (1) his conviction was based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, (2) the state failed to disclose to the jury an agreement not to prosecute the state’s key witness (the alleged accomplice), and (3) the state’s evidence was circumstantial and does not exclude every hypothesis save that of appellant’s guilt. Held:
1. Appellant was charged with the theft of ten drums of cotton spray from a farmer in Colquitt County. At the trial the investigating police officer testified that he traced thе theft of six of the drums back to appellant by talking to Gay, who said he bought the spray from Bryan, and to Bryan, whо said he bought the spray from Taylor, and to Taylor, who said he received the spray from appellant. Taylor testified that one day appellant drove up into his (Taylor’s) driveway with a truck load of the drums. "He told me he had it, that he wanted me to sell it, and asked me if I could sell it for him.” Taylor also told the *246 policeman that the tire treads on appellant’s truck matched the tire imprints found by the policemаn in the dirt near the site of the theft. The policeman testified that he never looked at the tires on аppellant’s truck but relied solely on the description of them related to him by Taylor. Thus, Taylor’s testimony was the only evidence connecting appellant to the crime. The appellant himself did not testify but relied on the defense of alibi.
We must agree with appellant that the testimony of Taylor is uncorroborated. The only connection between the tire tracks observed by the policeman at thе scene and the appellant’s truck is what Taylor told the policeman. An accomplice cannot corroborate his own testimony by something he told another witness. The corroborating cirсumstances must be
independent
of the testimony of the accomplice.
Pritchard v. State,
The question then becomes: Was Taylor an accomplice of appеllant? The cross examination by appellant’s counsel at trial shows as follows: Approximately two weeks prior to the theft, Taylor had inquired of a cotton farmer if he would like to buy some cotton spray. Six of the 10 drums missing were seen on Taylor’s farm immediately after the theft. Taylor did not raise cotton and had no other personal need for the spray. Taylor kept part of the proceeds from the sale of two drums (his "profit”) and said he gave the rest to appellant. A check in payment for two of the drums was in Taylor’s possession when he was questioned by police. The policeman testified that there were footprints of two pеrsons at the scene of the crime. And there was testimony that it took two people to move thе 55-gallon drums. Taylor’s only explanation of where the spray came from was that appellant brought it to him to sell for $200 per drum. Even though Taylor found out the next day that the market value of the spray was $450 to $500 рer drum, he testified that he did not suspect anything. Initially, at the committal hearing, Taylor denied knowing appеllant. The trial judge gave no instructions on accomplice testimony and corroboration therеof.
Taylor was never indicted or charged with the
*247
offense of theft by taking. Nevertheless, appellant contends that Taylor
could have been
charged, and was therefore an accomplice within the meaning of Code § 38-121, requiring corroboration of acсomplice testimony in felony cases. "The test is whether these witnesses could themselves have beеn also indicted in the instant case, as participating in this particular crime, either as principals or as accessories.
Stone v. State,
2. The remaining grounds enumerated by appellant are without merit.
Judgment reversed.