[¶ 1] Charles Payne appeals from the divorce judgment entered in the District Court (West Bath, Field, J.), challenging the court’s award of spousal support, child suрport, and attorney fees to Maili Payne. We agree with Charles’s contention that the court erred in its determination of his earnings, and, becаuse that finding affected the spousal support, child support, and attorney fees awarded by the court, we vacate the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] Charles and Maili married in June of 1986. A daughter was born to them in November of 1987. They divorced in Texas in May of 1990. They later remarried in May of 1994, and another daughter was born to them in October of 1996. On February 20, 2004, Charles filed for divorce. Both parties were thirty-seven years old at the time of the divorce.
[¶ 3] Charles, a Florida resident, is a First Class Petty Officer (E-6) in the United States Navy. He is an aviation electrician by training, with over eighteen years of experience. His enlistmеnt expires in June of 2006, when he will have twenty years service time for retirement purposes, and he expects to retire from the Navy and work in thе private sector. Maili, a Maine resident, works as a certified nurse’s assistant. She is the primary caregiver of the parties’ children, and she and their youngest daughter suffer from various health problems, requiring frequent medical care. Maili takes several prescription medications tо help with these conditions.
[¶ 4] Charles’s adjusted gross income, taken from his tax returns, is approximately $33,000. His leave and earnings statements showed his monthly pay to be $2809.80, and include benefits such as $1361.46 monthly in untaxed basic allowances for housing and sustenance. Testimony also revealed that Charles rеceived $250,000 in free life insurance, free dental insurance, which covered his family, and free utilities.
[¶ 5] At trial, both parties were asserting that Charles’s inсome was approximately $50,000, inclusive of the various Navy benefits. The only reference to imputing additional income to Charles is found in the court’s statement toward the end of the trial, when the court asked Maili’s attorney, “Is there anything in the record from which I can impute to [Charles] any income whatsoever, except for the fact that as an electrician ... in the aviation industry he ought to go out west and make a lot of money?” Maili’s attorney replied, “That’s all you need.”
[¶ 6] The court found Charles’s annual income to be $70,000, noting that, with his training and experience, he should have a remunerative career in the private sector. The court found that he received $16,337.52 per year in untaxed housing and sustenancе allowances, and that, as a Florida resident, he does not pay any state income tax. On the basis of this income determination, the cоurt awarded Maili $1300 per month in transitional spousal support, to last one year, followed by general support of $1000 per month, until Maili reaches sixty-five years of age. 1 The *795 court also awarded Maili $1059.71 per month in child support, and $6524 in attorney fees. This appeal by Charles followed.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶ 7] A court’s determination of a party’s income in a divorce proceeding is a factual finding that we review for clear error.
Dargie v. Dargie,
[¶ 8] Charles contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the court’s imputation of an annual earning capacity of $70,000 to him. He argues that the court’s erroneous factual finding as to his income served as the basis for the spousal support, child support, and attorney fees awarded by the court, and, thеrefore, that these awards were beyond the court’s discretion. Maili contends that the evidence is sufficient to support the court’s finding that Chаrles’s income is $70,000, and that the court acted within its discretion in awarding her spousal support, child support, and attorney fees. Maili argues that, аlthough the divorce judgment may be less than clear, the court, pursuant to M.R. Evid. 201(b), 2 may have taken judicial notice of various Navy benefits when imputing income to Charles. She further contends that, even though the divorce judgment does not delineate the sources from which the court imputed incomе $20,000 higher than what the parties were asserting was Charles’s income, we must assume that the court found the necessary facts in support of its judgment beсause Charles never filed a motion for findings of fact pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52. 3
[¶ 9] When determining a party’s income- in a divorce proceeding, “the divorce court has a duty to make findings sufficient to inform the parties of the reasoning underlying its conclusions and to provide for • effective appеllate review.”
Powell v. Powell,
[¶ 10] Even though Charles did not request additional findings pursuant to Rule 52, there is insufficient evidence on which the court could have based its determina *796 tion that Charles had earnings of $70,000. The divorce judgment notes that Charles receives monthly housing and sustenance allowances, which can be said to justify a finding of income of $50,000. The court alsо mentions that Charles does not pay any state income tax. That fact, however, does not bring Charles’s income close to $70,000.
[¶ 11] Further, there is nо indication in the record that the court took judicial notice of any facts when imputing income to Charles. If a court takes judicial notiсe of any facts in imputing income, it should indicate that it is doing so in its findings. The court’s finding that Charles earns $70,000 is clearly erroneous.
See Dargie,
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. The court found that it would be ''inequitable" and “unjust” tо not award general spousal support, thereby rebutting the presumption against awarding general spousal support in a marriage of lеss than ten years. See 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(2)(A)(2) (2005) ("If the court finds that a spousal support award based upon a presumption established by this paragraph would be inequitable or unjust, *795 that finding is sufficient to rebut the applicable presumption.”).
. Rule 201(b) states that a court can take judicial notice of any fact "not subject to reasonable dispute” that is "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” M.R. Evid. 201(b).
. Rule 52 provides that a party may move within five days after notice of the decision for specific findings of fact. M.R. Civ. P. 52.