Payne v. LopintoPayne v. Lopinto
Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to
I. Background
A. Plaintiff‘s Allegations
Plaintiff filed his original Complaint against Defendants under
On August 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (with leave of Court). (Rec. doc. 27).1 In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that “[b]etween September 27, 2024, and February 11, 2025, [he] experienced numerous instances of cruel, discriminatory, and abusive treatment while housed at JPCC . . . .” (Id. at 1). Plaintiff alleges that he was placed in “[s]egregation due to [his] sexual orientation - as a transgender male beginning on September 27, 2024.” (Id.). Plaintiff avers that he suffered “[c]hronic neuropathy in [his] hands and feet - attributed to extreme isolation . . . without medical attention.” (Id.).
Plaintiff maintains that he was subjected to targeted assaults by another inmate, Isaac Williams, who threw urine into his cell on January 3, 2025, and thereafter doused him and his cell with human feces and urine on January 5, 2025. (Id.). Surveillance footage reportedly captured both incidents, and “criminal charges were filed as a result.” (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that because of these events, he was diagnosed with PTSD on February 11, 2025. (Id.).
B. Plaintiff‘s Classification and the Incidents at JPCC
On September 27, 2024, Defendant Silbernagel (as the Commander of the Classification Division for the Jefferson Parish Correctional Center (“JPCC“)) informed Plaintiff that he was being referred to administrative segregation “[f]or your safety as well as the safe and orderly operation of this facility. You are a homosexual male inmate that has breast implants. Therefore, for your safety as well as the safe operation of this facility I am
On October 2, 2024, Plaintiff appealed the decision of the Board and their decision to keep him on administrative segregation. (Rec. doc. 45-7). A hearing of Plaintiff‘s appeal was held on November 4, 2024. (Rec. doc. 45-8). The Board again held that Plaintiff would remain on administrative segregation, to be reviewed in 30 days. (Id.). On November 4, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a grievance, complaining that he was placed on administrative segregation against his own consent because he is homosexual with breast implants. (Rec. doc. 45-9). He also complained that he hadn‘t appeared before the Board for seven days. (Id.). In response to this grievance, Silbernagel again stated that he was placed in administrative segregation for the safety and security of the facility, as well as his personal wellbeing. Silbernagel wrote: “At this time, the facility does not have a housing area for homosexual inmates.” (Rec. doc. 45-7). On November 4, 2024, Plaintiff again appealed the decision of the Board. (Rec. doc. 45-11). On December 27, 2024, the Board again agreed with Silbernagel‘s determination to keep Plaintiff on administrative segregation. (Rec. doc.
An administrative hearing on the appeal was held on January 27, 2025. (Rec. doc. 45-14). Again, the Board agreed with Silbernagel‘s determination to keep Plaintiff on administrative segregation, with a review set in 30 days. (Id.). On January 27, 2025, Plaintiff appealed that decision of the Board. (Rec. doc. 45-15). However, on February 11, 2025, a transfer authorization was executed, sending Plaintiff to Raymond Laborde Correctional into DOC custody. (Rec. doc. 45-16).
Before the transfer, however, on January 2, 2025, Sergeant Yakaba Williams was notified that a battery had been committed in Pod 4DR. (Rec. doc. 45-17). Deputy James Mauk notified Central Control that Lynn Payne reported that inmate Isaac Williams threw urine on him from the toilet into his cell. (Id.). Surveillance video was reviewed and revealed Williams throwing liquid from his toilet into Payne‘s cell more than four times. (Id.). Payne advised that he wished to pursue criminal charges against Williams, and Williams was charged with
On January 14, 2025, Deputy Hewitt received a call from Deputy Alexander Godinez, who stated that an inmate in Pod 4D was throwing feces on another inmate (Plaintiff). (Rec. doc. 45-18). Deputy Hewitt arrived on scene and located brown liquid substances on the floor in front of Cell 5 and on the wall inside. (Id.). Officer Godinez informed Hewitt that while out at his one-hour shower, inmate Isaac Williams was seen by officer Godinez throwing feces into the cell of Inmate Payne. (Id.). Video surveillance captured the incident.
C. The Affidavit of Sgt. Silbernagel
Attached to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is the Affidavit of Sgt. Silbernagel, one of the named Defendants in this lawsuit. Silbernagel affirms in his affidavit that Plaintiff was not referred to administrative segregation based solely on the fact that he identifies as transgender. (Rec. doc. 45-19 at ¶ 5). Rather, Silbernagel maintains that Plaintiff was referred to administrative segregation for his safety as well as the safe and orderly operation of the JPCC. (Id. at ¶ 6). Silbernagel also affirms that the JPCC does not have a separate housing wing for inmates who identify as transgender. (Id. at ¶ 7). The JPCC has limited space and resources and cannot support a separate housing wing for inmates who identify as transgender. (Id. at ¶ 8). More importantly, it is crucial to recognize that it is the Parish of Jefferson, and not the JPSO - neither of which are defendants in this lawsuit - that is responsible for the construction and maintenance of the JPCC. (Id. at ¶ 9).
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing
A genuine issue of material fact exists if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The substantive law identifies which facts are material. Id. Material facts are not genuinely disputed when a rational trier of fact could not find for the nonmoving party upon a review of the record taken as a whole. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Equal Emp‘t Opportunity Comm‘n v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2014). “[U]nsubstantiated assertions,” “conclusory allegations,” and merely colorable factual bases are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50; Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1994). In ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court may not resolve credibility issues or weigh evidence. See Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008). Further, a court must assess the evidence, review the facts, and draw any appropriate inferences based on the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014); Daniels v. City of Arlington, 246 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2001). Yet a court only draws reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant “when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted
After the movant demonstrates the absence of a genuine dispute, the nonmovant must articulate specific facts and point to supporting, competent evidence that may be presented in a form admissible at trial. See Lynch Props., Inc. v. Potomac Ins. Co. of Ill., 140 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1998);
III. Law and Analysis
There are numerous reasons why Defendants should be granted summary judgment, which are outlined below.2
A. Plaintiff Fails to Assert Specific Claims Against Individual Defendants
As an initial matter, Plaintiff does not allege any facts specific to any Defendant in support of any of his claims. It is well established that “plaintiffs may not lump Defendants
B. Plaintiff‘s Dissatisfaction With his Classification Is Not a Complaint of Constitutional Dimension
To the extent that Plaintiff alleges a claim that he was misclassified and housed improperly in administrative segregation as opposed to general population due to his gender, Plaintiff‘s claim is not cognizable under the Constitution.
“Classification of inmates in Louisiana is a duty of the [jailer] and an inmate has no right to a particular classification under state law.” Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 581-582 (5th Cir. 1995). “Inmates have no protectable property or liberty interest in custodial classification. The classification of prisoners is a matter within the discretion of prison officials. Absent an abuse of discretion, federal courts are loathe to interfere with custodial classifications established by prison officials.” Whitley v. Hunt, 158 F.3d 882, 889 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 732, 735 (2001); accord Jones v. Roach, No. 05-60530, 2006 WL 2474746, at *1 (5th Cir. Aug. 28, 2006); Wilkerson v. Stalder, 329 F.3d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 2003). It is not sufficient for Plaintiff to claim that he was not classified in the group of his choice. Custodial classification is not a constitutional right.
It is also uncontested in this case that Plaintiff was referred to administrative segregation for his safety as well as the safe and orderly operation of the JPCC. (Rec. doc. 45-19 at ¶ 6). Silbernagel was within his rights to make the classification decision he made and this Court will not disturb it.
C. Plaintiff‘s Failure-to-Protect Claim Also Fails
“[T]he State owes the same duty under the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment to provide both pretrial detainees and convicted inmates with basic human needs, including . . . protection from harm, during their confinement.” Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th 1996). Thus, regardless of whether the inmate is a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner, the standard of liability is the same for episodic acts or omissions of jail officials that expose an inmate to being harmed by another inmate, such as those alleged by Plaintiff in this case. Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 104 n.3 (5th Cir. 1996); Hare, 74 F.3d at 650.
In this case, what is at issue is Plaintiff‘s Constitutional right to be protected from violence at the hands of another inmate. See Leal v. Wiles, 734 F. App‘x 905, 909 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 51 U.S. 825, 833-34 (1994)) (discussing the prison officials’ duty to protect inmates and detainees); Hare, 74 F.3d at 650. To state a Section 1983 failure-to-protect claim, Plaintiff must allege that “he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his need for protection.” Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Newton v. Black, 133 F.3d 301, 308 (5th Cir. 1998)). To satisfy the deliberate indifference element, a plaintiff must allege that the defendants “(1) were aware
An inmate pursuing a claim for failure to protect may prove it by showing that the defendants knew of a specific threat to him but failed to take measures to protect him from it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843. In the absence of a specific threat, an inmate may prove a claim of failure to protect if he can show that he was placed in a prison environment “where terror reigns.” Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds by Int‘l Woodworkers of Am., AFL-CIO and its Local No. 5-376 v. Champion Intern. Corp., 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1986). This situation arises in a jail or prison where officials allow “a pervasive risk of harm” and “fail[ ] to take reasonable steps to prevent the known risk.” Stokes v. Delcambre, 710 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding liability when the sheriff housed college students arrested on a non-violent misdemeanor charge with a dozen inmates charged with violent felonies - leading to the students’ severe beating and rape). “[I]t does not matter whether the risk comes from a single source or multiple sources, any more than it matters whether a prisoner faces excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or because all prisoners in his situation face such a risk.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843. Negligence, however, on the part
In this lawsuit, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet this stringent burden of proof. There are no facts pleaded, nor any evidence adduced, from which the Court could draw an inference that any Defendant was aware of and deliberately disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm. The opposite is true. Plaintiff was referred to administrative segregation to specifically protect him from potential harm. (Rec. doc. 45-19 at ¶ 6). In fact, in both instances in which Plaintiff complained about harassment by another inmate, JPCC immediately investigated Plaintiff‘s claims and charged the perpetrator with simple battery. As outlined above, on January 2, 2025, Yakaba Williams was notified that a battery had been committed in Pod 4DR. (Rec. doc. 45-17). Deputy James Mauk notified Central Control that Lynn Payne reported that inmate Isaac Williams threw urine on him from the toilet into his cell. (Id.). Surveillance video was reviewed and showed Williams throwing liquid from his toilet into Payne‘s cell, more than four times. (Id.). Payne advised that he wished to pursue criminal charges against Williams, and Williams was charged with Section14:35, Simple Battery. (Id.).
And then, on January 14, 2025, Deputy Hewitt received a call from Deputy Alexander Godinez, who stated that an inmate on 4D was throwing feces on another inmate (Plaintiff).
D. Plaintiff‘s Equal Protection Claim
It also appears that Plaintiff asserts a claim under the Equal Protection Clause because he is transgender. The Equal Protection Clause of the
To establish an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that “two or more classifications of similarly situated persons were treated differently.” Duarte, 858 F.3d at 353 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). If a suspect class (such as race or religion) or a fundamental right is implicated, the courts apply “strict scrutiny.” Id. at 353-
Plaintiff‘s allegations fail to state a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiff fails to provide specific allegations to indicate that JPCC officials subjected him to disparate and less favorable treatment due to his LGBTQ status, including his gender identity. See Song v. Unknown Medical Admin., No. SA-22-CV-01144-XR, 2023 WL 2386892, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2023) (holding that detainee‘s general allegations that he was subjected to different treatment based on his LGBTQ status fail to indicate how he was treated differently or otherwise show disparate treatment); Solis, 2021 WL 3434991, at *7 (holding that “the Court need not consider . . . for purposes of screening” conclusory allegations of discrimination based on inmate‘s transgender status). Plaintiff otherwise fails to show that he was the victim of intentional and purposeful discrimination due to his LGBTQ or gender status. Song, 2023 WL 2386892, at *4. Conclusory allegations do not satisfy Plaintiff‘s burden here.3
While it is unclear from both the Original and Amended Complaints, Plaintiff may also seek to assert similar claims under state law. To the extent that he does, the Court will address them below.
Under Louisiana law, “[a] penal institution is not an insurer of an inmate against attacks by other inmates. The standard is that of reasonable or ordinary care.” See Parker v. State, 282 So. 2d 483, 486 (La. 1973); Williams v. State Through Dep‘t of Corr., 351 So. 2d 1273, 1273-74 (La. Ct. App. 1977)). More specifically, “in order to hold the penal authorities liable for an injury inflicted upon an inmate by another inmate, the authorities must know or have reason to anticipate that harm will ensue and fail to use reasonable care in preventing the harm.” Williams, 351 So. 2d at 1274. As the Louisiana Supreme Court has held, “we must determine whether the penal authorities . . . had reasonable cause to anticipate harm to plaintiff and, if so, whether they failed to use reasonable care in preventing such harm.” State ex rel. Jackson v. Phelps, 672 So. 2d 665, 667 (La. 1996).
This standard is not met when the defendant was not aware of a risk threatening the plaintiff or someone closely associated with the plaintiff. For example, in State ex rel. Jackson v. Phelps, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the defendants were not liable for the plaintiff‘s injuries because they “had no reasonable cause to anticipate harm to plaintiff.” 672 So. 2d 665, 667 (La. 1996). In that case, the plaintiff was attacked unexpectedly by a fellow inmate. Id. at 667. The court noted that the attack occurred without warning to the plaintiff or to prison officials, that the plaintiff never notified the institution that he was afraid of being attacked by his assailant, and that the evidence indicated that no one expected any
F. Plaintiff‘s Opposition
Plaintiff‘s general overarching complaint in his opposition is that there are still genuine issues of disputed fact in this lawsuit. This Court finds that that is not the case. When the moving party has carried its burden under
Unsubstantiated assertions are not competent summary judgment evidence. Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). “Summary judgment, to be sure, may be appropriate, even in cases where elusive concepts such as motive or intent are at issue, . . . if the nonmoving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.” Krim v. BancTexas Group, Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1449 (5th Cir. 1993). A nonmoving party “cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or ‘only a scintilla of evidence.‘” Hathaway v. Bazany, 507 F.3d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007) (additional citation omitted)).
Plaintiff presents this Court with no evidence to support his claims. He only maintains that there remain disputed issues of fact. Moreover, the Court finds that the facts that Plaintiff believes are disputed are not so. Plaintiff states that one of the disputed facts is whether correctional officials had actual knowledge of repeated feces and urine assaults. In his Complaint and Amended Complaint, Plaintiff complains of only two such incidents, both of which were viewed by correctional officers over the surveillance video, to both of which the correctional officers acted efficiently and appropriately, and both of which resulted in a charge of simple battery to the offending inmate. (Rec. docs. 45-17, 45-18). Plaintiff complains of no other incident and provides this Court with no evidence to contradict Defendants’ evidence. As another example, Plaintiff maintains that a disputed fact exists as to whether officials failed to take reasonable measures to protect Plaintiff. But the same two documents cited above prove otherwise. (Id.). And, as noted above, there is no allegation - indeed, no evidence - that Plaintiff forewarned Defendants of any imminent attack by a fellow inmate. Plaintiff‘s complaints are no more than conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation that cannot defeat Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
Also before the Court is the Motion for Appointment of Counsel (rec. doc. 50) and the Motion to Stay Consideration of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, or Alternatively for Relief Under
As to the Motion to Defer, pursuant to
In response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff argues that he had requested surveillance footage and reports but appears to imply that he never received them. The Court finds that that is not the case. Indeed, on March 4, 2026, Plaintiff was provided with a copy of both the police reports in question for the incidents of which Plaintiff complains. (Rec. doc. 49-1).
Further, on March 27, 2026, a Dropbox link containing the relevant video footage was sent to Plaintiff via the Warden‘s Office at Dixon Correctional Institute. (Rec. doc. 49-2). On
Moreover, Plaintiff has never served Defendants with formal discovery and does not allege that he has. Yet Defendants provided the video and the reports. Plaintiff was provided with all the records attached to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, which included classification records, the only grievance filed during his period of incarceration, and all appeal board decisions. Plaintiff‘s motion is unwarranted and fails.
As to the motion to appoint counsel - and subsequent motion to reconsider that appointment of counsel5 - the Court recognizes that its power to “appoint counsel” is derived from
The evidence which must be adduced includes
- plaintiff‘s indigence and
- efforts made to secure counsel.
However, these are bare minimum threshold considerations. Additionally, the Court should consider the following factors:
- the type and complexity of the case;
- whether the indigent is capable of presenting his case adequately;
- whether he is in a position to investigate his case adequately; and
- whether the evidence will consist in large part of conflicting testimony so as to require skill in the presentation of evidence and in cross-examination.
Parker v. Carpenter, 978 F.2d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 1992); Ulmer, 691 F.2d at 213. The Court also considers whether appointment of counsel would be of service to the court and the defendant by sharpening the issues in the case. Id.
Having reviewed the pleadings related to the motion for summary judgment, this Court has concluded that summary judgment should be granted to Defendants. Plaintiff has demonstrated that he was able to enunciate the facts underlying his Section 1983 claim, and the Court does not find that counsel would be of assistance to it at this stage of the proceedings. Plaintiff has received discovery from Defendants - despite never formally propounding discovery on them - and the Court does not find that an attorney would be able
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Motion for Appointment of Counsel (rec. doc. 50) and the Motion to Stay Consideration of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, or Alternatively for Relief Under
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 5th day of August, 2026.
MICHAEL B. NORTH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE