Thеse consolidated cases arise under the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act 1 (the Act). The Paynes and the Hendersons (the Purchasers) sued various defendants for alleged false representations and fraudulent concealments in connection with the sale of condominium units at Myrtle Beach. When Memorial Investment Corporation failed to answer timely, the Purchasers moved for a default judgment against it. Memorial then moved to vacate the affidavit of default and for leave to file a late answer. The court denied Memorial’s motion and granted a default judgment on the issue of liability. After a trial on the issue of damages, the court awarded the Purchasеrs damages, which were trebled because the court found Memorial’s violations of the Act willful and knowing. The court also awarded costs and attorney’s fees. Memorial appeals. We affirm.
I.
Memorial first claims the court lacked personal jurisdiction because of a defect in the service of process. This contentiоn is without merit. If the defendant wishes to preserve an objection to personal jurisdiction, he cannot request any relief which may be granted only if the court has jurisdiction.
See Security Management, Inc. v. Schoolfield Furniture Industries, Inc.,
275 S. C. 466, 272 S. E.
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(2d) 638 (1980);
Rainwater Furniture Co. v. Blanton,
246 S. C. 172,
II.
Memorial next argues the court erred in denying it leаve to file a late answer. Under § 15-13-90, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976, the circuit court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as are just, permit an answer after the time for аnswering has expired. In order to obtain relief under this statute, the moving party must make the same showing as is required to set aside a default under Code § 15-27-130.
Worrell v. Satterfield Construction Co. Inc.,
269 S. C. 532,
The record reveals no abuse of discretion by the trial judge. Memorial’s motion to file a late answer was based solely on an alleged defect in service of process which was waived by its general appearance. Neithеr the *215 motion nor the supporting affidavit set forth a meritorious defense to the complaint. The proposed answer was unverified; it consisted of a qualified generаl denial. In these circumstances, the trial judge acted well within his discretion in denying the motion.
III.
The trial judge held an evidentiary hearing on the issue of damages. In accordance with
Howard v. Holiday Inns, Inc.,
271 S. C. 238,
Determination of fair market value is a question of fact.
Jones v. Smith,
We find evidence in the record to support thе judge’s findings of value in this case. Mr. Payne testified that the fair market value of his condominium unit was between $45,000 and $48,000. He also introduced into evidence copies of deeds rеflecting the sale of units similar to his. These units had sold for between $40,000 and $52,000. Mr. Henderson testified that the fair market value of his condominium unit
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was $65,000. This evidence is sufficient to support Judge Maring’s findings that the values of the two units are $47,000 and $65,000 respectively.
See Seaboard Coast Line R. R. v. Harrelson,
262 S. C. 38,
IV.
Memorial also asserts the trial judge erred in awarding treble damages under the Act. Section 39-5-140(a) provides in pеrtinent part:
If the court finds that the use or employment of the unfair or deceptive method, act or practice was willful or knowing violation of § 39-5-20 [prohibiting unfair or deceptive practices], the court shall award three times the actual damages sustained____
Memorial claims the Purchasers sustained no actual damages in thesе cases because they suffered no ascertainable loss of money or property. In Memorial’s words, “They paid money for a condominium; they received a condominium.”
“Actual damages” or “compensatory damages” are damages in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained.
Laird v. Nationwide Insurance Co.,
243 S. C. 388,
V.
Memorial’s final argument concerns the refusal of the trial judge tо recuse himself for bias. Memorial’s motion to recuse was made orally at the damages hearing. No affidavit or other evidence was introduced in support of the motion. Counsel for *217 Memorial stated that the motion was based on his client’s dissatisfaction with past rulings the judge had made in other cases involving Memorial and one of its stoсkholders, Mr. Wilson. For the first time on this appeal, Memorial also claims that “many” adverse discretionary rulings at the damages hearing also demonstrate clear bias of the trial judge. Memorial does not specify to which ruling it refers.
Canon 3(C)(1)(a) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 33, Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court, requires a judge tо recuse himself when “he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party----” The alleged bias must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in a decisiоn based on other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.
United States v. Grinnel Corp.,
The only “evidence” Memorial offered in support of its motion was a statement by counsel that Judge Maring had granted judgment against it in a previous action. We believe this case falls squarely within the rule in State v. Cabiness, supra.
Memorial’s additional contention that unspecified rulings during the hearing “clearly show that the trial jduge was in fact bias: was not presented to the circuit judge and, therefore, is not properly before this court.
D. A. Davis Construction Co. Inc. v. Palmetto Properties, Inc.,
Affirmed.
Notes
Section 39-5-10 through -160, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976.