— Defendant-appellant Richard F. Payne (Payne) appeals from a judgment pursuаnt to a default order entered after his failure to timely respond to the complaint filed by plaintiff-appellee Joel Benjamin Doss (Doss). The issue presented is whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting Doss’ application for default and dеnying Payne’s subsequent motion for relief therefrom.
On May 31, 1974, Doss filed his complaint against Paynе alleging that he had been assaulted and twice shot and was therefore deserving оf damages for permanent injuries, pain and suffering. A copy of the complaint and summons were served on Payne June 4, 1974. On June 26, 1974, with no appearance or responsive pleading having been filed, Doss moved for a default against Payne. Thereupоn the trial court, after having granted the motion, entered a default and set the hearing on damages for October 4,1974. Immediately prior to the time of the hearing, Payne’s аttorney filed a written appearance so that the hearing on damages was continued until December 13 of that year. On December 13, 1974, Payne’s attorney filed a motion to set aside the default which was denied by the trial court. The hearing on damages was subsequently held and the trial court entered judgment in the amount of $20,000 in favor of Doss. On Februаry 11, 1975, Payne filed his motion to correct errors alleging that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying his motion to set aside the default. From the overruling of his motion to correct errors, Payne perfected this appeal.
One of the primary objectives involved in the promulgation of Ind. Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 55, concerning defaults, was to allow for the enforcement of a timely litigation process for the рurpose of avoiding procedural delay.
Clark County State Bank
v.
Bennett
(1975), 166 Ind.
*654
App. 471,
To be sure there are limits on the exеrcise of discretion based on the competing legal problems involved in the question of whether to enter a judgment upon procedural default in lieu of a deсision on the merits. In
Green
v.
Karol, supra,
at 473 of
“On the one hand, a default judgment plays an important role in the maintenance of an orderly, efficient judicial system as a weapon for enforcing compliance with the rules of procedure and for facilitating the speedy determination of litigation. On the other hand, there is a marked judicial preference for deciding disputes on their merits and for giving parties their day in court, especiаlly in cases involving material issues of fact, substantial amounts of money, or weighty poliсy determinations. See C. Wright & A. Miller, 10 Federal Practice and Procedure § 2681 (1973).” (Footnotеs omitted.),
However, in the present case we have a defendant who was prоperly served by the sheriff of Allen County. He was apprised of the circumstances of the case and had notice regarding the complaint of Doss. Although Payne contacted his attorney within the twenty days allowed for his responsive pleading, he did not pay the retainer fee requested until July 8, 1974, and then only in part. Finally an appearаnce was filed for Payne on October 4, 1974. Con
*655
sidering these circumstances where thе trial court is unaware of any response or entrance on behalf of the defense until a full 100 days after the entry of a default, we cannot conclude that there was an abuse of discretion in its refusal to set it aside.
Duncan
v.
Binford
(1972),
The trial court’s determination that Payne demonstrated no excuse for failing to enter a timely appearаnce or move to set aside the default until December 13, 1974, is supported by the record.
No reversible error having been demonstrated, the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Note. — Reported at