44 Iowa 236 | Iowa | 1876
But the accident which caused plaintiff’s injuries, for which he sues, occurred February 15, 1872, before the above named provisions of the Code took effect, at which time his cause of action arose. The statute in force at that time, requiring railroad companies to erect signs at crossings, differs from the provision of the Code. It provides that a company neglecting or refusing to erect a sign “shall be liable in damages for all injuries occurring to persons or property by such neglect or refusal.” To this provision the Code adds these words: “and in order for the injured party to recover, it shall only be necessary for him to prove such neglect and refusal.”
Under the Code, the failure or refusal of a railroad company to erect the sign renders it absolutely liable in a case wherein it is shown that a person was injured at a crossing. Evidence of the injury and of the company’s neglect to erect
Under the corresponding section of the Eevision, the neglect to erect the sign did not render the company absolutely liable, and was only evidence of negligence. A party seeking to recover for an injury resulting from such neglect, was required to show his own care. Dodge v. B., C. R. & M. R. Co., 34 Iowa, 276.
III. The construction of the section of the Code in question, which makes it applicable to this case, gives it a retrospective effect. Its language does not require such construction and does not express such intention on the part of the lawmakers. Courts are required to so construe it that it will operate only in cases arising after its enactment. Bartruff v. Remey, 15 Iowa, 257; The State v. Squires, 26 Id., 340; Davis v. O’Ferrall, 4 G. Greene, 168; Forsyth v. Ripley, 2 Id., 181. The instruction under consideration, for these reasons, is erroneous.
Other questions presented in the case need not be considered, as the judgment, for the error pointed out, must be
Eeversed.