Philliр Pavey appeals his conviction in a jury trial of Child Molesting, a class C felony. Pavey raises seven issues for our review:
1) whether Pavey's statement was erroneously admitted into evidence because it was the fruit of an illegal search, or an illegal arrest, or because it was involuntarily given,
2) whether the 10-year-old victim was competent to testify,
3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction,
4) whether the court erred in overruling Pavey's objection to a portion of the pre-sentence investigation report, and
5) whether the court erred in imposing the maximum sentence of eight years?
Facts
On October 28, 1982, LM., nine years old at the time, was being cared for by a babysitter at her home in Portland, Indiana. While Phillip Pavey, a friend of the babysitter, was at the babysitter's house L.M. agreed to go with him in his car to the Goodyear store in Portland. Instead, Pa-vey drove to the house in which he had been living with Shirley Roser. Roser was in the hospital at the time.
L.M. accompanied Pavey into the residence. They entered the downstairs bedroom Pavey had been sharing with Roser, and Pavey locked the door. Pavey tоok off L.M.'s shirt and jeans, unzipped his pants, and had her perform fellatio. Pavey kissed her, touched her breast, and reached inside her panties to touch what the victim described as, "what I go to the restroom with." Record at 298-99.
Roser's two daughters, Teresa and Pam Franks, were in the living room when Pa-vey and L.M. entered the house. From her position on the cоuch Teresa could see through a one to two inch gap in the door frame into the downstairs bedroom. Teresa saw Pavey and the girl in various stages of undress and at one point saw Pavey nude. She also observed Pavey with his hands around the girl's waist before Pavey noticed he was being watched and moved out of the line of sight.
When her boyfriend, Fred Shultz, arrivеd at the house, Teresa told him what she had seen in the bedroom and had him look through the gap in the door frame. He observed the bare feet and ankles of a *960 person lying on a bed. He then left the house and rode his bicycle to the police station. When two county police officers arrived at the house in response to Fred's contact, Teresa told them, "[that Phil had a little girl in there and that I saw him undress with the little girl," record at 827, invited them in, and showed them the gap in the door frame. One officer observed the bedroom through the gap for a minute or two. He saw Pavey lying on the bed and the girl sitting on the edge of the bed pulling on her jeans. Pavey had his hand on her stomach. The officer then lifted the hook lock with a kitchen knife and entered the bedroom.
Approximately one hour after the arrest, Officer Grider read Pavey the Miranda warnings and asked him if he would like to make a statement. Pavey signed the Miranda waiver and agreed to answer the questions about the case. Pavey said that because he was so upset he wanted Officer Grider to write out the statement. Grider wrote Pavey's statement and read it to Pavey who then signed it before a witness.
On Septmeber 14, 1988, a jury found Pavey guilty of child molesting. He was sentenced to eight years in prison.
I.
A.
Pavey asserts the trial court erred in admitting his statement into evidence over his objection. Pavey first argues the statement was inadmissible as the product оf the illegal search conducted by the police officers when they looked through the gap in the door frame into the bedroom. Accordingly, Pavey claims their testimony should have been suppressed.
The fourth amendment and Article 1 § 11 of the Indiana Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. However, simple obsеrvations by officers standing in a place where they have a right to be
1
are not searches in the constitutional sense. Bruce v. State,
"[The Fourth Amendment protects people not places. What a persоn knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
In similar cases, courts have held that using a flashlight to look through the window of .a parked airplane was not a search, United States v. Coplen,
*961 B.
Secondly, Pavey argues his incriminating oral and written statements made to police after his arrest should have been suppressed as the products of an illegal arrest. 2
In the instant case, the officers had probable cause to make the warrantless arrest. They had credible evidence that a felony had just been committed.
3
The very real possibility of further molestation or abuse of the victim during the delay necessary to obtain a warrant created the exigent cireumstances that forced the officers to make a warrantless arrest. See Harrison v. State,
In the instant case, the officers did not have time to obtain a warrant and their entry into the bedroom was completely justified by the exigent circumstances.
4
While in most cases the facts that support a warrantless arrest on the grounds of exigent circumstances involve the potential for the destruction of evidence (particularly drugs), see e.g. United States v. Knobeloch,
C.
Pavey also argues that the oral and written statements he made while in custody "were not the product of a rational intellect but were the product of an extremely upset and irrational individual." Appellant's Brief at 25. He argues that the court erred in not suppressing the admissions he made while in custody because they were not voluntarily made.
The Indiana Supreme Court has described our standard of review:
"The question of voluntariness is one for the trial court. We review the question on appeal as we do other sufficiency matters. We do not weigh the evidence but rather determine whether there was substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's finding. Schutz v. State, (1981) [275 Ind. 9 ],413 N.E.2d 913 ."
Smith v. State,
IL
Pavey argues that the trial court erred in finding the victim competent to testify. His argument is that, based on the following colloquy, the victim could not be found to have understood the consequences of not telling the truth:
"Q. You say you understand that you could be punished if you don't tell the truth?
A. Um hum. (indicating yes)
Q. Ok. Dо you have any idea what that, being punished would mean, do you have [any] idea at all?
A. I wouldn't know what the punishment would be."
Record at 288-89.
However, Pavey's argument is irrelevant because the victim was ten years old when she testified. Indiana law presumes the competency of a ten-year old and the unnecessary voir dire did not rebut that presumption that the victim understood the obligation of an оath. See Ind.Code Anu. §§ 34-1-14-4 and 5 (West 1988). See generally Carter v. State,
HL
Pavey argues the evidence was insufficient to support a jury's finding that he had the requisite intent to arouse or satisfy his sexual desires when he touched and fondled the victim. 5
The court described the relevant law in Best v. State,
"Best claims there is insufficient evidenсe of specific intent 'to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the older person ... under Ind. Code 35-42-4-8(b)' to support the finding and judgment of the court. In Tapp v. State, (1971)256 Ind. 422 ,269 N.E.2d 367 , the court held that evidence of defendant having a child feel his 'privates,' and defendant feeling her 'privates,' was sufficient to support a conviction of tоuching with intent to satisfy sexual desires. The court may infer from the State's presentation of evidence that the touching did occur, and the intent did exist without a direct showing of both elements. McDonald v. State, (1970)254 Ind. 645 ,261 N.E.2d 852 . Where specific intent is required, it may be inferred from all of the circumstances. Smith v. State, (1979) [270 Ind. 479 ],386 N.E.2d 1193 ."
In the instant case the testimony as to the touching and fondling of the viсtim was alone sufficient to support the conviction. See Dougherty v. State,
IV. °
The last eight pages of the presentence report prepared for the court in Pavey's case include 1) a two-page sworn statement by Pam Franks detailing her claim that Pavey had raped her several times and 2) a six-page transcript of a 1982 taped inter *963 view of Donna and Carol Elliott by the Portland, Indiana police. The transcript included descriptions by Donna and Carol, ages 26 and 28 respectively, of incidents of physical abuse and forced sexual acts by Pavey.
Pavey objected to those pages being included with the presentence report arguing that the information was of unrelated, non-charged incidents, hearsay, and highly prejudicial to his sentencing and progress through Department of Corrections processing.
We find two compelling reasons to affirm the trial court's overruling of Pavey's objection. Initially, the record shows that the trial court did not consider the disputed pages in determining Pavey's sentence: "As the transcript of the sentencing hearing, and this Court's memory of the sentencing all reveal, the objected to pages were read by the court and were not used as a factor in Defendant's sentencing...." Record at 181. Secondly, if a trial court considers an improper aggravating circumstance in enhancing a sentence, there is no error if the other aggravating cireumstances are adequate to support the sentеnce imposed. Forrester v. State,
v.
Pavey argues the trial court erred in enhancing the presumptive five-year sentence by considering cireumstances that the legislature used to prohibit susрension of his sentence (a prior felony conviction) and used to increase the potential penalty for the offense (the victim's age) He claims further error in the trial court's consideration of the circumstance that the offense was a crime against the person because there is no evidence of any injury being inflicted on thе victim.
We disagree.
The nonsuspendibility of Pavey's sentence is a legislative restriction upon the trial court's discretion as to the manner in which the imposed sentence will be served. That interest is entirely distinct from the question of the length of the sentence and it is entirely appropriate that the legislature should require that the same circumstances influence еach of the two separate interests. See Inman v. State,
We also find no impediment to the trial court's consideration of the victim's age as an aggravating circumstance.
This court assumes the legislature took into consideration the serious nature of every act it defines as criminal, and that in all cases it assigned an appropriate level of punishment. The legislature, however, allowed as an aggravating circumstance the seriousness of any individual offense within the generally serious nature of the offense in the abstract. Thus, within the broad area of conduct defined as molesting a child of fewer than twelve years, individual cireumstances may show that a particularly disturbing casе warrants an enhanced sentence. See Wask-ington v. State, 422 N.BE.2d 1218 (Ind. 1981). The specific age of the victim within the range of fewer than twelve years is just such an individual circumstance.
Finally, we reject Pavey's construction of the circumstance of the offense being a crime against the person as requiring evidence of particular physical or emotional injury to the victim. Rather we construe the circumstance as allowing the trial court to consider the nature of the conduct to which the victim was subject. Thus, while the prohibited conduct is fondling or touching with the requisite intent, the specifics that fall within that conduct are varied and may range from a caress to, as here, fellatio. The specific conduct and its relative heinousness is an appropriate matter for the trial court to consider in assessing the particular punishment for the particular offense.
We find no error in the trial court's consideration of prior eriminal convictions, the age of the victim, and the nature of the *964 offense to enhance the sentence imposed on Pavey.
In addition, we note that the trial court enumerаted other bases for the aggravated sentence. These other cireum-stances, not attacked by Pavey, are sufficient to support the enhanced sentence.
6
See Anderson v. State,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. Pavey does not dispute that the officers had the right to enter the Roser living room, from where they made their observations, at the express invitation of Roser's daughter. Therefore, this court assumes that the officers were in a place where they had a right to be at the time they made their pertinent observations.
. The method and manner of the officers' entry into the bedroom is not an issue on appeal. It was not briefed, included with any specificity in the motion to correct error, or argued at the suppression hearing.
. Although not presented, the evidence supports the argument that the officers were observing a felony committed in their presence. See People v. Eichelberger,
. We note, without discussing the issue, that when the tenant, Mrs. Roser, entered the hospital, her daughter Teresa, 19, who also lived in the house, was left in charge of her sixteen year old sister and instructed to keep the house clean. This evidence may reasonably support the inference Teresa had the authority to consent to the officers' entry into the bedroom. See State v. Folkens,
. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-42-4-3(b) (West Supp. 1984-85) provides in pertinent part as follows:
"A person who, with a child under twelve (12) years of age, performs or submits to any fondling or touching, of either the child or the older person, with intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the older person, commits child molesting, a Class C felony."
. Other enumerated considerations included:
"The psychological examination reрorts filed in March and April, 1983 show that Defendant has what could be described as a hardened offender profile and that he is not mentally ill and is not likely to respond well to or be helped by counselling or therapy.
Giving a reduced sentence in this case would take away from the seriousyess of the crime as committed herein and the facts and circumstances of this case call for and strongly suggest the propriety of giving the maximum sentence in this case."
Record at 170.