Paulson v. PaulsonPaulson v. Paulson
Julie J. Nelson and Aaron Harris, Attorneys for Appellee
CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:
¶1 Christopher Paulson challenges several of the orders the trial court issued in the divorce proceedings between him and his former spouse, Trishna Paulson.1 Specifically, he contests (1) the exclusion of an expert witness, (2) a number of partial summary judgment decisions establishing that various properties are Trishna’s separate property, (3) the denial of his request for attorney fees, and (4) the denial of his motion to disqualify the
BACKGROUND
The Premarital Agreement
¶2 Christopher and Trishna were married on August 21, 1992. Prior to their marriage, they signed a premarital agreement (the Agreement), which was “to be construed and enforced under the laws of the State of California.”2 The Agreement was entered based on both the parties’ “desire to define the respective rights of each in and to the property of the other from and after the solemnization of the marriage” and the parties’ intention “to limit the application of the community property laws of the State of California or of any other community property State or country in which the parties, from time to time, may reside or be domiciled.” And one of the initial recitals of the Agreement declared, “It is mutually desired by the parties hereto that any property acquired by either of the parties hereto after the solemnization of the marriage shall be the separate property of the party so acquiring the same . . . .”
¶3 Section 3 of the Agreement, entitled “Future Ownership of Property,” further addressed property that the parties already
The property possessed by Trishna at the time of the Marriage between her and Christopher is and shall remain her sole and separate property and shall be subject entirely to her individual control and management, both before and after the Marriage, in the same manner as if she were unmarried. Christopher agrees that he does not [have] and will not, by reason of the Marriage, acquire any interest in the property, either for himself, his heirs, assigns, successors in interest, or creditors, nor does he [have] nor will he acquire any right in or to the income, rents, profits, accretions or use of such property, or any part or portion thereof, arising for any reason whatsoever . . . .
A separate provision with largely identical language addressed Christopher’s separate property and Trishna’s lack of interest in it.
¶4 Section 3 also addressed future property the parties may acquire as follows:
All of the property which either of the parties may hereafter acquire, or to which he or she shall be or become entitled, either before or after the Marriage, and the income, rents and profits of and accretions to all such property, shall be the separate property of the party so acquiring the same and shall be subject entirely to the individual control and management of such party in the same manner as if he or she were unmarried, and the other party shall have no right to or interest in said property whatsoever. In addition, it is expressly agreed that all other property acquired by either of the parties
which would, except for this . . . Agreement, be the community property of said parties by reason of the laws of the State of California or any other State or country in which the parties, from time to time, may reside, and the income, rents and profits of and accretions to all such property, shall be the separate property of the party so acquiring the same, regardless of how said property may be acquired, except as hereinafter provided.
¶5 Section 3 further provided that the “sole exception” to the separate property categorization was “that the cash ‘salary’ each of them receives shall be considered the community property of the parties.” The language went on to clarify that “‘bonuses’ received by either party or non-cash compensation of any sort” would be separate property.
¶6 Additionally, Section 3 also specified, “The separate property of each of the parties hereto shall not be liable for debts or obligations incurred by the other party, whether arising before or after the Marriage and whether now known or unknown.” Section 3 instructed that “separate bank accounts shall be maintained by each of the parties . . . with respect to the separate property cash of each,” but the Agreement did contemplate a joint bank account wherein the parties would deposit their community income and from which they would pay all their living expenses.
¶7 Section 6 of the Agreement was entitled “Transmutation” and contained the following provision specifically setting forth the circumstances whereby a party’s separate property could become community property:
Except as otherwise provided herein, property or interests now owned or hereafter acquired by the parties, which by the terms of this Agreement is classified as the separate property of one of them, can only become the separate property
of the other or the parties’ community property by a written instrument executed by the party whose separate property is thereby reclassified.
¶8 A financial statement attached to the Agreement listed Trishna’s net worth at the time of the marriage as $1,803,148, the bulk of which was attributable to the value of stock she had received from her employer, the Koosharem Corporation. Christopher, on the other hand, brought no significant assets into the marriage.
The Marriage
¶9 During the marriage, neither party earned a significant cash salary. However, at various points in the marriage, Trishna sold portions of her Koosharem Corporation stock “for a total value of $21,827,123.” Trishna “also generated other funds through real estate investments that she owned.”
¶10 As anticipated by the Agreement, the parties maintained a joint account into which their cash salaries were deposited and from which household expenses were paid. Although Trishna maintained other bank accounts to facilitate her investment activities, she also “intermittently deposited” funds from her separate accounts and funds from her real estate investments into the joint account.
¶11 Regarding expenses paid from the joint account, the trial court later found that “the parties spent $412,380 per year in household expenses,” which was “approximately $330,000 more than the highest amount of gross cash salary that the parties earned in any year between 2005 and 2017.” As a result, the payment of the household expenses was necessarily “supplemented by other funds.” The additional funds that Trishna deposited in the joint account “allowed it to be used for many purchases, including family expenses that were beyond the parties’ joint salaries, as well as purchases of personal property
¶12 After twenty-six years of marriage, Trishna petitioned for divorce in March 2018. Christopher responded, asserting, among other things, a claim for alimony. Several years of litigation have followed.
Partial Summary Judgments Regarding Property
¶13 A significant part of the subsequent litigation addressed the various assets acquired during the marriage. Trishna filed sixteen separate motions for partial summary judgment, which sought rulings that various assets were obtained with Trishna’s separate property and were therefore not marital property subject to division upon divorce. Christopher opposed all but two of the partial summary judgment motions.
¶14 The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Trishna as to each property. The court determined that there was no material dispute of fact that each piece of property was, indeed, Trishna’s separate property. The court did, however, address several legal arguments in its decisions.
¶15 The underlying feature creating complexity in the partial summary judgment determinations was the fact that Trishna had regularly deposited her personal funds into the parties’ joint bank account and then, at some point, used amounts from that account to fund other investments. Based on Trishna’s placement of her separate funds into the parties’ joint account, Christopher argued that, pursuant to the Agreement, Trishna was prevented from claiming that the funds retained their separate property status. But the trial court rejected this argument as follows:
Because [Trishna] failed to keep her separate funds separate, [Christopher] argues that she breached the Agreement and is estopped from claiming that any funds in the joint accounts were her separate funds. This argument is summarily rejected. While the Agreement does direct the parties to maintain separate funds in separate accounts, that clause does not include any penalty or waiver provision which would direct the result [Christopher] seeks. [Trishna’s] failure to keep her separate funds in a separate account necessitates the tracing of her funds, and it certainly has complicated these proceedings. But it does not support any waiver or estoppel argument.
¶16 In at least some of his objections, Christopher suggested that the transmutation provision of the Agreement was satisfied in instances where the acquired property was jointly titled in both parties’ names or where Trishna’s separate funds were put in an account with only Christopher’s name. But the court determined that more was required under the Agreement to change the nature of Trishna’s separate property and that without a specific writing acknowledging the reclassification, the ownership of the property would be unaffected.
¶17 To address the issue of Trishna’s separate funds being deposited into the joint account, the trial court, where possible, directly traced the funds for the purchase of assets back to specific separate funds that Trishna deposited in the account. And when such direct tracing was not possible, the court employed an “exhaustion tracing” methodology, wherein it reasoned that because the parties’ cash salaries did not cover their household expenses—a point which Christopher apparently conceded—the monies with which the properties were purchased must have necessarily come from additional amounts deposited by Trishna into the joint account.
The Alimony Determination
¶18 On August 3, 2020—seven days after the close of fact discovery—Christopher filed an expert disclosure revealing his intent to call a certain financial expert (Expert). The disclosure specified the following:
[Expert] will provide expert opinion testimony . . . . [Expert] is expected to testify regarding: the parties’ marital lifestyle, the parties’ financial circumstances at the time of the divorce; equal division of marital assets and liabilities; the parties’ current financial circumstances; the parties’ gross and net incomes; the Jones Utah alimony factors; [and Christopher’s] request for alimony.
After stating that Expert’s qualifications and fee schedule were provided as attachments, the disclosure set forth the following additional information regarding Expert’s testimony:
In performing his analysis, [Expert] may rely on the following documents and/or information:
- Testimony and/or interviews (to be arranged via counsel) of the parties;
- The facts as they apply to the factors set forth in Utah Code [section 81-6-203(6)(b)];
- The parties’ financial declaration(s) and/or employment and income information produced in this case;
- Pleadings filed in this case;
- The parties’ tax documents and returns produced in this case;
- Analysis and/or expert report of any of other experts; and
- Other relevant market, industry and economic data and publications as needed.
¶19 Believing that Christopher’s expert disclosure was deficient under
¶20 Despite the fact that Trishna had made no election for an expert report under
¶21 After oral arguments on both motions, the trial court granted Trishna’s motion for sanctions and her motion for partial summary judgment in February 2021. The court agreed that Christopher’s expert disclosure had not satisfied the requirements of
Christopher’s Motion to Disqualify
¶22 Prompted by several adverse rulings, including the partial summary judgment denying alimony and an unrelated contempt ruling against Christopher, Christopher’s attorney “tasked a law clerk . . . to undertake research to determine whether the over[t] hostility that [the trial judge] ha[d] displayed . . . w[as] grounds to seek her recusal.” As a result of this inquiry, Christopher’s attorney discovered that the trial judge had previously retained an attorney who belonged to the same law firm as Trishna’s attorney.3 This previous representation concerned a critical opinion column published in a local newspaper in October 2018 that urged readers to vote “no” in the judge’s upcoming retention election.
¶23 As a result of these discoveries, Christopher filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge in July 2021, pointing specifically to a demand letter threatening litigation that was sent to the newspaper by the judge’s attorney in October 2018. Christopher asserted that because the judge’s attorney and the attorney that began representing Trishna in May 2019 were members of the same law firm, this created an appearance of bias.
¶24 Christopher’s motion was certified to the presiding judge for determination, pursuant to
The Attorney Fees Determination
¶25 A trial was held in June 2022 to dispose of the remaining issues that had not been resolved by way of partial summary judgment. Relevant to this appeal are the court’s determinations as to Christopher’s request for an award of attorney fees under
¶26 In assessing Christopher’s financial need for attorney fees, the trial court considered several obligations Trishna had paid on behalf of Christopher over the previous few years while the case was pending, including insurance premiums, health-care related expenses, utilities, home maintenance expenses, tax preparation expenses, credit card payments, and expenses related to the parties’ minor child. These amounts over that period totaled $191,165. The court also highlighted that Christopher had been allowed to live rent-free in the family home for several months
¶27 Next, the trial court considered funds accessible to Christopher while the divorce was pending. These included $80,000 he spent from one of the bank accounts and $247,000 he received from the resale of sporting events tickets. The court also stated that Christopher had received “$337,998 from the sale of [a piece of real property].” In addition, the court pointed to a classic car worth over $80,000 that was Christopher’s separate property. And finally, the court imputed annual income of $54,000 to Christopher, reasoning that “if he had sought employment,” he “could have earned an additional $162,000” during the pendency of the case.
¶28 Totaling up these amounts, the trial court concluded that Christopher “had access to, or the opportunity to earn, $1,214,413 in income, available cash, and cash equivalent value during the same time that he claims he was unable to pay his attorneys.”5 The court determined that these funds were largely available to pay his attorneys because Christopher “had no living expenses to speak of, other than to pay for his own food, his own fuel, his own cellular phone, and his own travel.” Based on this analysis, the court determined that Christopher “did have financial resources
¶29 Thereafter, the trial court gave an additional reason for its conclusion that Christopher was “not entitled to seek an attorney fee award.” The court reasoned that through the Agreement, “Christopher ha[d] already agreed that Trishna [would] not use her separate property to pay for any of his obligations.” Thus, the court concluded, Christopher had “waived any entitlement that he would otherwise have to ask [the court] to order Trishna to use her separate property to pay any obligation that [he] owes to his lawyers.”
¶30 Christopher timely appealed.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶31 First, Christopher contests the trial court’s exclusion of Expert based on a failure to comply with the expert disclosure requirements of
¶32 Christopher next challenges multiple legal conclusions underlying the trial court’s various partial summary judgment rulings in which the court determined, among other things, that certain properties were Trishna’s separate property and not subject to division as part of the marital estate. When we review such orders, “the trial court’s resolution of the legal issues is accorded no deference since entitlement to summary judgment is a question of law.” Kouris v. Utah Highway Patrol, 2003 UT 19, ¶ 5, 70 P.3d 72 (quotation simplified). Accordingly, to the extent these issues are preserved for appeal, “we determine only whether the
¶33 Christopher also appeals the trial court’s denial of his request for attorney fees made pursuant to
¶34 Finally, Christopher challenges the denial of his motion to disqualify the trial judge. “Whether the district court erred in declining to disqualify the trial judge on the basis of bias is a question of law, which we review for correctness.” State v. Boyer, 2020 UT App 23, ¶ 19, 460 P.3d 569.
ANALYSIS
I. Expert Exclusion
¶35 Christopher argues that the trial court erred by excluding Expert as a sanction for the failure to comply with the disclosure requirements of
A. Compliance with the Requirements of Rule 26
¶36
¶37 Christopher’s expert disclosure stated, “[Expert] is expected to testify regarding: the parties’ marital lifestyle, the parties’ financial circumstances at the time of the divorce; equal division of marital assets and liabilities; the parties’ current financial circumstances; the parties’ gross and net incomes; the Jones Utah alimony factors; [and Christopher’s] request for alimony.” And as to the information on which Expert’s testimony would rely, the disclosure listed (1) “Testimony and/or interviews (to be arranged via counsel) of the parties”; (2) “The facts as they apply to the factors set forth in Utah Code [section 81-6-203(6)(b)]”; (3) “The parties’ financial declaration(s) and/or employment and income information produced in this case”; (4) “Pleadings filed in this case”; (5) “The parties’ tax documents and returns produced in this case”; (6) “Analysis and/or expert report of any of other experts”; and (7) “Other relevant market, industry and economic data and publications as needed.” The trial court, applying RJW Media, determined that Christopher’s
¶38 The trial court correctly interpreted
¶39 On appeal, in opposing the trial court’s decision, Christopher makes no direct argument that his expert disclosure met the specifically listed requirements of
¶40 We do not agree that the guidance of RJW Media as to the disclosure of expert opinions is inapplicable to retained experts. First, the language of the rule requiring disclosure of opinions is essentially the same for retained and non-retained experts. Compare
¶41 Christopher also argues that his expert disclosure was adequate because it “apprised Trishna of the subject matter of [Expert’s] testimony sufficiently to allow Trishna to evaluate the need for rebuttal experts and the need for a report.” But that is not the requirement set forth by the rule, which specifically requires a summary of opinions. Christopher’s disclosure simply did not meet the requirements of the rule, and any argument he wishes to make about the disclosure being nonetheless adequate would, at most, be addressed by the rule’s provision regarding harmlessness.
B. Harmlessness
¶42
¶43 Christopher argued below that the inadequacies of his disclosure were harmless under the circumstances, in large part because he had provided Trishna with a complete expert report three weeks after his expert disclosure and, in addition, was willing to allow Trishna to depose Expert after that. Nonetheless, the trial court determined that Trishna suffered harm from the inadequate disclosure because she “made the strategic decision” to respond only by seeking summary judgment on the issue (not electing either to receive an expert report or to depose Expert, and not designating her own rebuttal expert) and it was now too late to take any of those responsive actions anticipated by
¶44 Christopher provided an expert report shortly after his deficient disclosure—several weeks before Trishna moved for sanctions under
¶45 Thus, we determine that the trial court exceeded the sound exercise of its discretion in determining that the deficiencies in Christopher’s expert disclosure harmed Trishna.
C. Summary Judgment on Alimony
¶46 Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
II. Property Determinations
¶47 Christopher challenges several of the trial court’s summary judgment rulings establishing that certain property was Trishna’s separate property. His arguments contain three main assertions: (1) that Trishna’s failure to keep her separate funds in separate accounts as required by the Agreement should not be excused, (2) that the various documents Trishna signed in relation to property satisfied the transmutation requirement of the Agreement, and (3) that exhaustion tracing was not appropriately
A. Intermingling of Funds
¶48 Christopher focuses on the language of the Agreement that provided that, with some enumerated exceptions, “separate bank accounts [would] be maintained by each of the parties . . . with respect to the separate property cash of each.” He asserts that this provision was not followed but, rather, “the parties had treated their wealth as the property of both,” passing money “in and out of accounts in joint names.” And Christopher suggests that the court erred in determining that Trishna’s failure to follow this provision was, in his words, “inconsequential” and “should be excused.”
¶49 The trial court “summarily rejected” Christopher’s argument that Trishna was estopped from claiming that any of the funds in the joint account were her separate property. The court recognized that the Agreement directed the parties to keep separate funds in separate accounts, but it also determined that this provision of the Agreement did “not include any penalty or waiver provision which would direct the result [Christopher] seeks.” The court therefore concluded, “[Trishna’s] failure to keep her separate funds in a separate account necessitates the tracing of her funds, and it certainly has complicated these proceedings. But it does not support any waiver or estoppel argument.”
¶50 Christopher advances no reasoned argument on appeal as to why this determination was in error and why Trishna’s placement of her separate funds in their joint account was sufficient to override and prevent reliance on the transmutation requirement of the Agreement, which requirement Christopher concedes “was intended to prevent the accidental reclassification of property.” That is, he faults the trial court’s decision but provides no analysis as to why the trial court erred on this point.
B. Transmutation
¶52 Christopher also argues that for several items of property, transmutation was achieved via Trishna “sign[ing] documents placing the property in question in joint names or in Christopher‘s sole name.” That is, he asserts that such action was sufficient to satisfy the Agreement‘s transmutation provision, which declared that a party‘s separate property could “only become the separate property of the other or the parties’ community property by a written instrument executed by the party whose separate property is thereby reclassified.”
¶54 However, on appeal, Christopher has not engaged with the reasoning underlying the trial court‘s transmutation conclusions and explained why the court erred in its consideration of the issue. And as we have explained above, an appellant must meaningfully engage with the trial court‘s decision—providing reasoned analysis and relevant legal authority—and an appellant who fails to satisfy this burden will fail to demonstrate trial court error. See supra ¶ 50.
¶55 Consistent with the Agreement‘s provision stating that the Agreement was “to be construed and enforced under the laws of the State of California,” the trial court cited California law stating that “[a] transmutation of real or personal property is not valid unless made in writing by an express declaration that is made, joined in, consented to, or accepted by the spouse whose interest in the property is adversely affected.”
¶56 On appeal Christopher asserts that the trial court‘s conclusion was in error, but he fails to engage with the court‘s underlying reasoning and explain why it was in error.7 The transmutation provision of the Agreement establishes that a reclassification of Trishna‘s property requires “a written instrument executed by” Trishna. But as to what qualifies as a written transmutation instrument or what such an instrument must contain, the Agreement is entirely silent. And Christopher does not carry his burden to persuade us that, in the face of this silence, the court erred in relying on California law to identify
C. Exhaustion Tracing
¶57 Christopher raises issues with the trial court‘s adoption of an “exhaustion tracing” methodology to classify and divide some of the property acquired during the marriage. He argues that when the court first conducted its tracing analysis and determined that the parties’ living expenses always exceeded their salaries, the court was looking to the wrong years for its salary and expense amounts. But Christopher directs us to no location in the record where he raised such an argument before the trial court. Indeed, in the court‘s view, Christopher “acknowledged that the monthly cash salaries of the parties were exhausted in funding monthly household expenses.”
¶58 Christopher also advances a related argument that exhaustion tracing requires “documentary proof that, on the date a disputed asset was acquired, all community income was exhausted by family expenses,” and that it was error for the trial court to adopt the “cumulative approach” of tracing promoted by Trishna that more generally looked to income and expense amounts over broader periods of time. But again, Christopher points us to no location in the record below where this argument was brought to the attention of the trial court and no location in
III. Attorney Fees
¶59 Christopher contests the trial court‘s denial of his request for attorney fees pursuant to
¶60 As an initial matter, we agree with Christopher that section 81-1-203(1) is the statute applicable to this situation. The statute “authorizes courts to award attorney fees and costs in divorce cases if doing so would enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 168, 459 P.3d 276 (quotation simplified); see also
¶61 We do not agree with the trial court that the Agreement, which was entered into in an attempt “to define the [parties‘] respective rights . . . to the property of the other” and “to limit the application of the community property laws,” can be read so broadly as to prevent an award of attorney fees to Christopher under the relevant attorney fees statute. Any award under this statute would not change the nature of any of Trishna‘s separate property. And such an award would also not be based on any application of community property law but, instead, on the court‘s equitable power to award fees in order to enable a party to “defend the action.”
¶62 As to the specific issue of the trial court‘s assessment of Christopher‘s need for an award of attorney fees, Christopher argues that the court “engag[ed] in an artificial analysis that ignored the results of this case and Christopher‘s actual inability to pay his attorneys.” He asserts that certain funds considered by the court “were not available to pay fees.” We again agree.
¶63 Several amounts that the trial court considered when calculating the funds available to Christopher were incorrectly included in an assessment of Christopher‘s ability to pay. First, it was error for the trial court to both conclude that Christopher had essentially “no living expenses to speak of” due to Trishna‘s payments while also counting the same money that covered those expenses as funds that were available to Christopher to pay attorney fees. Those funds were paid to satisfy Christopher‘s actual expenses and, therefore, were not available to him to pay
¶64 Thus, the trial court exceeded the sound exercise of its discretion by considering these items as amounts available to Christopher for the payment of his attorney fees. We therefore reverse the denial of Christopher‘s request for attorney fees, and we remand to the trial court for it to reconsider Christopher‘s request without counting any of the foregoing amounts as available to Christopher when determining his financial need for an award of attorney fees.
IV. Recusal
¶65 “A judge should be disqualified when circumstances arise in which the judge‘s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 49, 459 P.3d 276 (quotation simplified). However, “[j]udges are presumed to be qualified and a party alleging bias on the part of the judge has the burden of demonstrating that the judge is not qualified.” Id. “Moreover, parties claiming bias must demonstrate that the alleged bias stems from an extrajudicial source,” id.; “adverse rulings alone are insufficient to establish the existence of judicial bias,” id. ¶ 52.
¶66 But even an “appearance of bias may be grounds for reversal if actual prejudice is shown.” State v. Boyer, 2020 UT App 23, ¶ 77, 460 P.3d 569 (quotation simplified). A judge should be
¶67 Here, Christopher alleged that an appearance of bias existed with respect to the trial judge because the judge had an attorney-client relationship with a lawyer that belonged to the same law firm as did the attorney representing Trishna. The presiding judge who reviewed the motion to disqualify determined both that the motion was untimely and that Christopher had failed to show an appearance of bias. Christopher contests both determinations on appeal. But even assuming, without deciding, that the presiding judge was incorrect regarding the timeliness of Christopher‘s motion, we affirm the presiding judge‘s decision because we agree that there was no appearance of bias in this case. And because we determine that there was no appearance of bias, we need not examine whether Christopher was prejudiced.
¶68 The presiding judge largely based her decision to deny the motion to recuse on an informal opinion issued by the Utah Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee that addressed “cases in which the prosecuting attorney is in the same law firm as the judge‘s personal attorney.” See Utah Jud. Ethics Advisory Comm., Informal Op. No. 99-9 (1999), https://www.utcourts.gov/en/court-records-publications/publications/judicial-ethics-opinions/ethics-opinions/1999/99-9.html [https://perma.cc/8978-EXZ4]. The opinion looked to the ethics opinions of several other states and agreed with “the majority of states” that a judge “presiding in a case involving a member of the law firm of the judge‘s attorney creates a situation in which the judge‘s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Id. (quotation simplified). Nonetheless, the opinion concluded,
The Committee thinks that, as a general rule, once the attorney-client relationship ceases the judge need not disclose the former relationship when a member of the former attorney‘s law firm appears. The Committee does not think that a reasonable person would find an appearance of bias. First, no on-going relationship with the law firm exists. Second, the relationship between the judge and the member of the former attorney‘s law firm is always more tenuous than between the judge and the judge‘s attorney.
Id. While this informal opinion is not binding on this court, we agree with the advisory committee‘s reasoning and conclusions on this point and choose to apply them to the facts here.
¶69 Although this case commenced before the issues related to the November 2018 retention election arose, Trishna was represented by different counsel during that time frame. The law firm in question did not become involved in this case until May 2019. And because Christopher has failed to show that the attorney-client relationship between the trial judge and a different attorney at the firm was still ongoing at that stage (and it seems it was not ongoing because it concerned a successful retention election held six months earlier), we agree with the presiding judge‘s conclusion that the trial judge need not have disclosed the former relationship at that point. Thus, Christopher has not established an appearance of bias in this case, and we affirm the denial of his motion to disqualify.
¶70 Christopher pushes back, arguing that the situation addressed by the informal opinion upon which the presiding judge relied contained “important factual distinctions” from the situation here. Specifically, he notes that the question posed in that case was in reference to a justice court judge and not a district court judge. But we see nothing in the reasoning of the informal
CONCLUSION
¶71 Christopher has not carried his burden to demonstrate error on the part of the trial court in its many summary judgment awards establishing that certain items of property were Trishna‘s separate property. We therefore affirm each of those determinations. Additionally, we see no error in the presiding judge‘s denial of Christopher‘s motion to disqualify the trial judge, and we therefore also affirm that decision.
¶72 We do, however, agree with Christopher that the trial court exceeded its discretion in determining that deficiencies in his expert disclosure were not harmless. We therefore reverse the exclusion of Expert and the resulting grant of summary judgment against Christopher as to his alimony request. Further, we determine that the trial court exceeded its discretion in its attorney fees determination, and we reverse that determination. We therefore remand this case for further proceedings and consideration of the alimony and attorney fees issues as may now be appropriate.