Paulsen v. PeoplePaulsen v. People
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Boggs
delivered the opinion of the court:
On the 3d day of October, 1896, being one of the judicial days of the September term, 1896, of the criminal court of Cook county, the grand jury within and for said county returned an indictment against the plaintiff in error,
On the 16th day of March, 1899, the plaintiff in error was furnished with a copy of the indictment, a list of the names of the witnesses, also a list of the jurors, was duly arraigned, and for plea said he was not guilty. On the same day the plaintiff in error filed a written statement that he waived trial by jury and submitted the cause to the court for trial without the intervention of a jury. The State’s attorney consented that a jury might be waived, and an order was entered of record that the cause be submitted to the court for trial and that the intervention of a jury was waived. On a later day of the same term, as appears from the record of the court, the People, by the State’s attorney, and the plaintiff in error in his own proper person and by counsel, appeared in said criminal court, the Hon. Charles G. Neely presiding, and entered upon
The cause was placed on the trial calendar of the said criminal court at the July term, 1900, and on the 9th day of July, 1900, was called for trial before the Hon. Theodore Brentano, the then presiding judge of said court. The plaintiff in error interposed a special plea, in which he set forth the facts appearing in the record relative to the submission of the cause for trial to the Hon. Charles G. Neely as presiding judge of the criminal court, without a jury, and the hearing of witnesses under such submission, and averred that “said trial of this defendant upon said indictment continued until the 20th day of March, 1899, when, after the said William A. Paulsen had completed the introduction of his testimony, upon the representation of the State’s attorney that he needed time in which to produce testimony in rebuttal, and at the request of the State’s attorney, said court continued the further hearing of said matter without fixing any time when it would resume the hearing thereof, and although the said William A. Paulsen, through his attorney, has requested the Hon. Charles G. Neely, judge of this court, to complete the hearing of this case and render a final judgment therein, the said court has failed to do so, as by the records thereof in said court remaining more fully and at large appears; and the said William A. Paulsen further says that the William A. Paulsen so indicted and placed upon trial are one and the same person and not other or different persons, and that the indictment upon which he was placed upon trial, as aforesaid,-is the same indictment on which he is now arraigned; and this the said William A. Paulsen is ready to verify.” The plea concluded with a prayer for judgment if the People ought to be
After the evidence in behalf of the State had been submitted to the jury, the plaintiff in error tendered in evidence the records relative to the submission of the cause to his honor, Judge Neely, for tidal without a jury, hereinbefore stated, and also the written waiver of trial by jury by him signed at the time the proceedings referred to were had, and by his counsel offered to produce testimony as follows: “I offer to prove by the witness Paulsen that he was put upon trial in this case under this indictment before Judge Neely in the criminal court of Cook county, Illinois; that a jury was waived in writing and filed with the clerk; that the trial proceeded by the prosecuting witness, Jacob Rice, giving his testimony, and such other testimony as the State desired, and that the State rested, and afterwards the defendant placed witnesses on the stand who testified in the case, and the defendant rested; that these proceedings took several days of the court, at which times the State’s attorney asked to have the case continued for the purpose of procuring further evidence, to-wit, certain books that were then not available, and from that time on the case was continued from time to time, and that this was the last proceedings had in the case, and that there was no reáson why the trial should not have proceeded to completion so far as the defendant was concerned or the court was concerned, to
The holding of the court that the special plea purporting to set up the defense that the plaintiff in error had once been “in jeopardy” was obnoxious to a demurrer, and the ruling that the evidence so offered to be produced by the plaintiff in error relative to the proceedings before Judge Neely was incompetent to be heard, will be considered and disposed of together.
It is unnecessary to advert to the question whether the defense that the plaintiff in error had been once placed in jeopardy must be specially pleaded, or whether the testimony in support of the defense is receivable in evidence under the oral plea of not guilty entered at the time of the arraignment of the plaintiff in error, for the reason that it is our opinion neither the facts alleged in the special plea nor the facts sought to be proven by the evidence which was rejected were sufficient to establish the defense.
Section 10 of article 2 of the constitution of 1870 forbids that any one charged with a criminal offense shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. If the Hon. Charles G. Neely, so presiding as judge of the said criminal court, sitting without a jury, had lawful authority and jurisdiction to try the said issue of the guilt of the plaintiff in error of the charge made in the indictment against him and to proceed to final judgment of acquittal or conviction, then it is clear, the indictment being valid, the plaintiff in error was in jeopardy. If, however, a jury of twelve men was essential to a legally constituted tribunal to try the offense with which the plaintiff in error stood charged, then the plaintiff in error was not in jeopardy, no matter how far the said judge of the criminal court proceeded in the matter of hearing the evidence produced under the submission
The argument of counsel for plaintiff in error is, that the offense of which the plaintiff in error stands indicted is punishable, under the statute, (Starr & Cur. Stat. chap. ’ 38, sec. 168,) by the imposition of a fine only, or by the imposition of a fine and in addition thereto imprisonment in the penitentiary of the State, and that this court has held in Lamkin v. People, 94 Ill. 501, Baits v. People, 123 id. 428, and Herman v. People, 131 id. 594, that offenses so punishable by fine only, or by imprisonment in the penitentiary and also by fine, are misdemeanors and not felonies; and that we have held in Zarresseller v. People, 17 Ill. 101, and Darst v. People, 51 id. 286, that in prosecutions for a misdemeanor a trial by jury may be waived by the consent of the parties, and if so waived the trial may legally proceed to a final determination before the court sitting without the intervention of a jury. Hence the position of counsel for plaintiff in error is, that in the case at bar, a trial by jury having been waived by the plaintiff in error and by the People, said Charles G. Neely, sitting as a judge of the criminal court of Cook county, became vested with full jurisdiction and power to hear and determine the issue made under the indictment against the plaintiff in error, and that such judge did take such steps in the matter of hearing and determining said cause as to put the plaintiff in error legally in .jeopardy of a valid and enforceable judgment of conviction against him. This contention, while plausible, is not, we think, sound or well grounded in legal principles. Section 5 of article 2 of the
Our General Assembly has never adopted a statute .authorizing the elimination of a jury from any tribunal authorized to try any criminal offenses, other than the act of June 17, 1893, (Laws of 1893, p. 96,) which authorized waiver of a jury in cases where a “fine or a money judgment” only may be assessed. It follows, then, that as to all other criminal offenses trial by jury, as enjoyed prior to and at the time of the adoption of the constitution of
In George v. People, 167 Ill. 447, we considered the provisions of the constitutions of 1818, 1848 and 1870, with reference to the right of trial by jury, and said (p. 455): “We do not think there is any substantial difference between the provisions incorporated in the three constitutions. The right of trial by jury was the same under one constitution as under the other. The right protected by each constitution was the right of trial by jury as it existed at common law.”
At the common law, trial by jury was enjoyed only by those against whom the accusation was made by indictment and who had been arraigned and pleaded to the indictment. (Brewster v. People, supra.) It is to this common law right of trial by jury to which our constitution refers, and in the class of cases in which that right existed at the common law an essential part of the tribunal for the trial of such accusations is a jury, and the defendant cannot, by his acts, eliminate the jury from such tribunal and create another tribunal for the trial of the charge against him. In principle this is declared in Harris v. People, supra. It follows, then, that in all criminal accusations which can only be prosecuted upon indictment a jury is an essential part of the court which may lawfully try and render judgment of acquittal or conviction.
Section 8 of article 2 of the constitution of 1870 is as follows: “No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense, unless on indictment of a grand jury, except in cases in which the punishment is by fine, or imprisonment otherwise than in the penitentiary, in cases of impeachment, and in cases arising in the army and navy, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger: Provided, that the grand jury may be abolished by law in all cases.” Grand juries have not been abolished, and consequently no person can be held in this State to answer for a criminal offense which may be punished by
The misdemeanors to which we then referred in which a trial by jury might be waived, were such, only, as could be prosecuted otherwise than by indictment, as is clearly indicated in the concluding clause of the quotation. Though offenses punishable either by fine or by fine and imprisonment in the penitentiary have been classed as misdemeanors when it was necessary to determine as to the application of the Statutes of Limitations prescribing a period for beginning prosecutions for such offenses, (as in the Lamkin case, supra,) or to determine whether judgments of conviction in such cases should be removed for review from the trial court to the Appellate or direct to the Supreme Court, (as in the Baits case, supra,) or whether counts for such offenses and for offenses punishable only by imprisonment in the penitentiary may be joined in one indictment, (as in the Herman case, supra,) still such offenses must, in obedience to the command of said section 8 of article 2 of our constitution, be prosecuted only on indictments preferred and returned by a grand j ury. As to cases of that character the question whether they may be tried by the court without the intervention of a jury does not depend upon their classification as misdemeanors. The tribunal which may lawfully try that class of cases is one, as we have seen, which, according to the course of the common law, had jurisdiction to try the guilt or innocence of persons who stood charged, by indictment, with the violation of the criminal law. A jury was an essential branch of such tribunal, and it is not within the power of one accused, by indictment, of an offense which can only be lawfully prosecuted by an indictment, even with the consent of the
The defendant was not, therefore, in jeopardy of a legal conviction as the result of the attempted trial of the case before the Hon. Charles G. Neely, sitting as a judge of said criminal court, and the proceeding before that judge did not constitute a bar to the trial of the cause before the Hon. Theodore Brentano, judge of said court, and a jury.
We think the judgment of conviction was amply supported by the evidence. In 1891 the firm of Paulsen & Sparre, (of which the plaintiff in error was a member,) which was engaged in some species of banking in the city of Chicago, and the Western Trust and Savings Bank, of the same city, desired to merge or consolidate their business and assets. The Central Trust and Savings Bank was incorporated under the general laws of this State for the real purpose of accomplishing this merger or consolidation. Its capital stock was subscribed for in the sum of $200,000 by those who held stock or interests in the said firm of Paulsen & Sparre and said Western Trust and Savings Bank, with the understanding the stock subscriptions were not to be paid in cash, but in the assets of said two banking institutions which it was designed to consolidate. It was known, or at least feared, the Auditor of Public Accounts would not permit the payment of stock subscriptions in such assets, but would require the stock payments to be made in cash before he would authorize the issuance of a charter to the proposed new corporation. It was
On the 2d day of March, 1896, the Central Trust and Savings Bank made an assignment for the benefit of its creditors. The plaintiff in error, Paulsen, was its president, and had succeeded to that position about December, 1894. Prior thereto he had been prominent in the management and control of the affairs of the bank, and, as it was clearly shown, had full knowledge of its transactions and financial condition. The liquidation of the bank resulted in the payment of seventeen cents on the dollar to its depositors. It was abundantly shown the plaintiff in error had knowledge of the insolvency of the bank at the time and before the deposit was received from the prosecuting witness, Rice, on the 25th day of February, 1896. It is unnecessary we should recite in detail the items constituting the resources and liabilities of the institution. ’ The insolvent condition of the bank was otherwise clearly demonstrated. It had been forced to borrow money on different occasions to meet the demands of depositors. A loan to procure §2000 for that purpose was negotiated with a Mr. Sampson only by hypothecating bills receivable and other securities of the face value of §13,000, thus indicating not only the financial stress of the institution but also the very doubtful character of its assets. About the same time §15,000 was borrowed from the Atlas National Bank, secured by assets of the borrowing bank. The expedient of having real estate, which the bank had been forced to take in the collection of debts due to it,
Oh the 10th day of December, 1895, the Auditor of Public Accounts called for a statement of the condition of the bank, and to prevent disclosure of the true condition of the bank, the plaintiff in error, its president, drew his personal draft on the National Steamship Company of London for §38,000, and placed it in the vaults of the bank as so much cash and so reported it as a “cash item” to the Auditor. The following is an extract from the minutes of the proceedings at a meeting of the board of directors of the bank held December 17, 1895: “Mr. Paulsen also reported that he had deposited to the credit of W. A. Paulsen, special, an account not to be checked against, a draft on London, secured by sterling drafts for a like amount, for the sum of §38,000; that this draft was carried as cash in our own accounts, for the reason that if deposited and returned protested it might cause an injury. Also that the Auditor had called for a statement on the 10th of December, and that, owing to the deposit above named, the statement compared favorably . with the statement
In 1895 some of the stockholders became dissatisfied, and one of them instituted a suit against the bank, the nature of which is not disclosed further than that it was likely to alarm depositors. As a result, the policy of purchasing the stock held by those who seemed disposed to give trouble was entered upon by the plaintiff in error and those associated with him in conducting the affairs of the bank. These purchases were made out of cash in the vaults of the bank, and to take the place of the money so improperly used, the notes of some one were taken for the amount thus taken from the funds of the bank, the stock being attached to the notes as security therefor. The plaintiff in error testified it was the understanding with the makers of these notes that the paper in each case was but a memorandum to show that the stock standing in the name -of the maker of the note was in fact the property of the bank. The stock was taken at a discount, in one instance $1200 only being paid for $2000 in stock, and the only purpose of such purchases was to prevent an exposure of the true condition of the bank by dissatisfied stockholders.
Another instance indicated the tottering condition of the Central Trust and Savings Bank and the knowledge thereof entertained by the plaintiff in error. When that bank applied to the Atlas National Bank for the loan of $20,000, before mentioned, the Atlas National Bank contended the Central Trust and Savings Bank was indebted to it in the sum of $30,000 as endorser of a note in that amount. The name of the maker of such note, or other description thereof, is not disclosed by the record. This claim
The treasury of the Central Trust and Savings Bank was further despoiled of its funds by the plaintiff in error, and perhaps others associated with him in the management and conduct of the bank, by the substitution of the stock and bonds of a corporation known as the “Central Bank Vault
The Central Bank Vault Company was also made the instrument to accomplish a further diversion of the assets of the bank to the benefit of the plaintiff in error, and possibly his associates. They, as the managing board of directors of the Central Bank Vault Company, caused bonds of that company to be issued in the aggregate sum of §50,000. Of this issue, bonds in the face value of §40,000 were among the assets of the Central Trust and Savings Bank at the time of the failure of that institution. The evidence does not disclose the details of the transaction, which
We have examined and considered the complaints with relation to the alleged erroneous rulings of the court as to the admissibility of testimony and in giving, refusing and modifying instructions. They relate to matters of minor importance, as, for instance, that the court refused to allow the plaintiff in error to testify as to his belief as to the solvency or insolvency of the bank, and that the court instructed the jury that it was to be presumed that the plaintiff in error, as president of the bank, knew of the condition of the bank at the time of the receipt of the deposit by the prosecuting witness, etc. In the face of the evidence, which left remaining no rational doubt or question that the plaintiff in error had full personal knowledge of the affairs of the bank, it is unnecessary to
The testimony removed every reasonable doubt of the guilt of the plaintiff in error of the offense charged against him, and there is no error in the record of a character to demand that the judgment of conviction should be reversed. It is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.