OPINION
¶ 1 This is an appeal from a jury verdict finding Covenant Transport (Covenant) not negligent after a trial for personal injuries and wrongful death resulting from a motor vehicle accident. We affirm.
BACKGROUND 1
¶2 On July 24, 1999, Dr. Leon Paulos (Paulos) and his wife, Sally, were traveling north along state road sixteen (S.R.16) on Paulos’s motorcycle. They had just passed through Randolph, Utah and were following a dark-colored, unidentified car. Dr. Roy Traywick and Natalie Higginson, Sally’s daughter, followed behind the motorcycle in another car. Some three miles north of the Paulos party, Scott Travis (Travis) drove a Covenant semi-truck in the opposite direction. Cooper Strength and Nicole Strength were passengers in the semi, training to be truck drivers. Cooper was in the passenger side of the semi’s cab and Nicole was in the semi’s sleeper. Traveling behind the semi was a Toyota 4-Runner SUV (the Mucha vehicle), driven by eighteen-year-old Marianne Mucha (Mucha).
¶ 3 S.R. 16 is a rural, two-lane road approximately twenty-six feet wide. Upon reaсhing a flat area of S.R. 16, about one-half mile north of the point of the accident, the Mucha vehicle began to overtake the Covenant semi. Mucha entered the northbound lane of traffic to see if it was clear to pass. She saw a “speck of a car on the horizon” traveling north. Mucha asked the passengers in the car, “do you think we can make it?’.’ and received no response. Mucha then commenced her pass of the Covenant semi. There is conflicting evidence as to how quickly and how far the Mucha vehicle progressed in the pass before the accident occurred. There is also conflicting evidence as to how long the Mucha vehicle remained in the northbound lane, but it did remain there, neither completing the pass nor resuming its position behind the Covenant semi.
¶ 4 In the meantime, the dark-colored, unidentified ear approached in the northbound lane. The unidentified car swerved to the right around the Mucha vehicle. Then, for the first time, Mucha saw the Paulos motorcycle. Mucha attempted to leave the road by moving to her left. Paulos hit the brakes on his motorcycle and veered to his right, but Mucha was blocking that path. Paulos then attempted to go left, but it was too late. The Mucha vehicle struck Paulos and Sally with its right front corner, propelling both of them into the air. A Life Flight helicopter transported them to Salt Lake City where Sally died shortly thereafter and Paulos remained *754 in intensive care for the severe injuries he sustained.
¶ 5 Paulos subsequently filed a complaint against Covenant, Mucha, and the owners of the Mucha vehicle — Richard and Sylvia Mu-cha — for negligence causing his injuries and the death of Sally. One year' later, Paulos entered into a settlement agreement with the Muchas on behalf of Sally’s estate and himself, reserving his right to pursue claims against Covenant.
¶ 6 The case went to trial against Covenant. At the end of trial, the jury answered question one on the special verdict form, finding that Covenant was not negligent. In accordance with instructions, the jury did not reach the other questions on the verdict form relating to proximate cause, comparative negligence, contributory negligence, and damages. Paulos’s motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and new trial were denied by the trial court. Paulos appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which then transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section § 78-2-2(4) (2002).
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶ 7 Paulos claims that the trial court committed reversible error in several ways. Each issuе by itself, Paulos submits, constitutes reversible error; additionally, the multiple errors, taken together, constitute cumulative error requiring reversal.
See Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp.,
¶ 8 First, Paulos asserts that the trial court should have admitted the American Trucking Association’s Safety Guidelines Handbook into evidence as an exhibit and allowed the jury to use it in its deliberations. “ ‘The admissibility of an item of evidence is a legal question.’ ”
Gorostieta v. Parkinson,
¶ 9 Second, Paulos maintains that the trial court erred by allowing Cooper Strength to provide an elapsed time estimate of the accident. “In reviewing questions of admissibility of evidence at trial, deference is given to the trial court’s advantageous position.”
Whitehead,
¶ 10 Next, Paulos contends that the trial court inappropriately instructed the jury. “A trial court’s ruling concerning a jury instruction is reviewed for correctness.”
Butler v. Naylor,
¶ 11 Finally, Paulos reasons that the trial court prejudicially erred by submitting the issue of Paulos’s contributory negligence to the jury because there was no evidence of contributory negligence. “All parties are entitled to have their theories of the case submitted to the jury in the court’s instructions, provided there is competent evidence to support them.”
Newsom,
ANALYSIS
I. The American Trucking Association Handbook
¶ 12 A substantial issue at trial was the standard of care required of Covenant’s *755 driver, Travis. Paulos’s expert testified that Travis should have reduced his speed and moved to the right as far as possible to assist Mucha in completing the pass. In support of that position, Paulos offered a truck driver’s handbook from the American Trucking Association (the ATA handbook). Both sides acknowledged that the ATA handbook set forth an accepted standard of care as to what a semi-truck driver should do when being overtaken. Paulos argued that the ATA handbook was not a learned treatise, but rather was admissible as a safety manual containing the standard of conduct for semi-truck drivers. Covenant objected to its admissibility on the basis of relevancy, and alternatively urged that the ATA handbook should bе treated as a learned treatise pursuant to rule 803(18) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The trial court overruled Covenant’s relevancy objection, but agreed that the information from the handbook was admissible under rule 803(18). Therefore, the court allowed Paulos’s expert to read from the ATA handbook, as well as to display the relevant portions to the jury. Because it was admitted under rule 803(18), the court did not receive the ATA handbook as an exhibit to be used by the jury in its deliberations.
¶ 13 Utah Rule of Evidеnce 803(18) contains the hearsay exception for learned treatises:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule ...:
(18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct examination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judiciаl notice. If admitted, the statements may he read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits.
Utah R. Evid. 803(18) (emphasis added).
¶ 14 As explained by the Utah Supreme Court in
Butler v. Naylor,
¶ 15
Butler
cites rule 803(18), which arguably limits its applicаtion to subjects of “history, medicine, or other science or art.” Utah R. Evid. 803(18). The rule, however, can be interpreted to include .the ATA handbook. Because this rule is identical to the federal rule, federal cases are instructive.
See LeVanger v. Highland Estates Props. Owners Ass’n,
¶ 16 Although no Utah case explicitly extends rule 803(18) to include nongovernmental safety codes or nonscientifíc safety cоdes, the ATA handbook is of the same nature as the other materials explicitly mentioned in the learned treatise exception. We therefore believe that the ATA handbook was properly admitted under the learned treatise exception. Pursuant to the dictates of
Butler,
the trial court properly proscribed its admission as an exhibit and correctly kept it from jury deliberations.
See Butler,
¶ 17 Moreover, any error in admitting the ATA handbook under the learned treatise exception was harmless. Paulos submitted that the ATA handbook was admissible as nonhearsay because it provided a standard of care. “There is no doubt that in some jurisdictions safety codes have been excluded as hearsay.... But in others they have been admitted after proper identification by a qualified witness for the purpose alluded to above, i.e., as some evidence of the proper standard of care but not as absolute evidence of such standard.”
McComish v. DeSoi,
Criticism has been leveled in this case not only against the competency of the codes but against the introduction of the documents as well. This secondary problem is one which must be left largely to the discretion of the trial court. Whether the entire code or just the pertinent portion should go to the jury (removed from the document, or copied or photostated), or whether the pertinent portion should simply be read to the jury, must remain in his hands, and an appellate tribunal will not interfere unless abuse of discretion is manifest.
McComish,
II. Cooper Strength’s Elapsed Time Estimate
¶ 18 Paulos asserts that the trial court erred by allowing Cooper Strength (Strength) to estimate the amount of time thаt elapsed between the time the Mucha vehicle attempted to pass the Covenant semi and the point of the accident. Counsel for Covenant told Strength to visualize the event, raise his hand when the Mucha vehicle began to make its pass, and give another signal at the time when the collision would have occurred. The time that elapsed between Strength’s hand signals was then measured to be approximately five seconds. Paulos characterizes this as a staged demonstration and claims that, as such, Covenant was required to recreate the actual event with substantial similarity. We disagree with Paulos’s characterization that Strength’s elapsed time estimate was a staged demonstration of the actual event.
¶ 19 A staged demonstration is the “deliberate recreation of an event under staged conditions.”
Fusco v. General Motors Corp.,
¶ 20 At trial, Strength gave arguably contradictory responses when asked to recall how much time elapsed between the inception of the Mucha pass and the accident. In his first response, he said, “It was like a flash. It was an instant. I mean, it was quick. It wasn’t a lot of time.” When he gave his second response, he explained that it was “not even a minute. I would say less, 30 seconds, 45 seconds. It wasn’t very long.” These responses warranted clarification of the issue and it was perfectly within the trial court’s discretion to allow Strength to explain, in a way meaningful to the jury, his inconsistent statements.
See Perkins v. Fit-Well Artificial Limb Co.,
¶21 Here, substantial similarity of conditions was not required because Strength’s estimate did not purport to demonstrate the actual occurrence of the event depicted. He was simply asked to visualize the occurrence of the event in his mind and attach an amount of time to that event. “The issue for us is whether the demonstration is sufficiently close in appearance to the original accident to create the risk of misunderstanding by the jury, for it is that risk that gives rise to the special requirement to show similar conditions.”
Fusco,
III. Jury Instructions
¶ 22 Paulos claims the trial court committed reversible error in giving instruction number sixteen, which advised the jury of the settlement that was reached between Paulos and the Muchas, because it was a comment on the evidence as well as an incorrect statement of fact and law. Paulos objects to the following language from instruction sixteеn:
You may, however, consider the settlement agreement when you weigh the believability of the testimony presented. Since the plaintiff and the Muchas have settled, they are no longer adversary parties in this *758 lawsuit. The plaintiff now has a financial interest in showing that Covenant Transport is entirely to blame for the accident. Also, the Muchas now have no reason to dispute the amount of damages the plaintiff claims.
¶23 In
Slusher v. Ospital,
[wjhere the action is tried by a jury, the court shall, upon motion of a party, disclose the existence and basic content of the agreement to the jury unless the court finds that, on facts particular to the case, such disclosure will create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.
Id. Instruction sixteen did precisely what Slusher commands. At trial, Paulos claimed that the instruction was erroneous because it did not advise the jury against considering any aspect of the settlement in arriving at its determination of liability. However, the second paragraph of instruction sixteen, unmentioned by Paulos, gives that very limitation:
By settling with the plaintiff, the Muchas did not admit any fault. You must still determine from the evidence which party or parties were negligent, if any, and the percentage of negligence that еach contributed in causing the accident. In making that determination of fault, you must not consider the settlement agreement as either an admission of fault (or lack of fault) by the Muchas. Nor should you consider the settlement agreement as an indication of the Muchas’ willingness to deal responsibly with the plaintiff.
¶ 24 As for Paulos’s contention that the last paragraph of instruction sixteen was a comment on the evidence,
Slusher
held that “the jury should be informed of the changed financial interest of the parties concerned and the realigned positions of the litigants.”
Id.
Instruction sixteen did that: “Since the plaintiff and the Muchas have settled, they are no longer adversary parties in this lawsuit. The plaintiff now has a financial interest in showing that Covenant Transport is entirely to blame for the accident. Also, the Muchas now have no reason to dispute the amount of damages the plaintiff claims.” Further, footnote nine of
Slusher
cautioned that the instruction needs to “emphasize that the settlement and resulting change in the adversarial alignment of the parties could be considered only in evaluating the credibility of testimony and not on the question of liability.”
Slusher,
¶ 25 Additionally, before a party cаn “assert that the trial court erred in either giving or failing to give an instruction,
a party must first submit comet instructions
and then, should the court fail to give them, timely except.”
Newsom v. Gold Cross Serv., Inc.,
¶ 26 Paulos also takes exception to instruction twenty-two. Instruction twenty-two advised the jury that “[a] violation of a safety law is evidence of negligence.” The instruction then listed three exceptions to that rule:
(1) When obeying the law would hаve created an even greater risk of harm.
(2) When the person who violated the law was faced with an emergency that person did not create, and, by reason of the emergency, that person could not obey the law.
(3) WThen the person who violated the law made a reasonable effort to obey the law, but was unable to do so.
¶ 27 It is important to note that the jury probably did not even reach the exceptions, given the dispute over whether Covenant violated а safety law. However, even if the jury did conclude that Covenant had violated a safety law, there is ample evidence to support submission of the exceptions to the jury.
*759
The extensive evidence left the jury with many ways that it could view how the accident occurred.
See Newsom,
¶ 28 We will not address Paulos’s objection to instructiоn twenty-three because Paulos has not preserved this issue for appeal. In fact, far from preserving his objection to this instruction, Paulos actually requested that this instruction be given to the jury. Paulos also argues that the trial court erred in giving both instructions twenty-three and twenty-six because they were duplicative and unfairly emphasized a standard of conduct Covenant was entitled to expect. Once again, however, Paulos requested that instruction twenty-six, in addition to instruction twenty-three, be givеn to the jury.
IV.Special Verdict Form Caption
¶ 29 As with instructions twenty-three and twenty-six, Paulos did not preserve this issue for appeal. When the court addressed the special verdict form caption with the parties, the court noted that the purpose of the caption was to “capture the heading as set forth in the complaint.” After some dialogue, counsel for Paulos agreed that the complaint was the dispositive document. The complaint, obviously submitted by Pau-los, contains the Muchas in the caption; thus, it was prоper for the verdict to also contain the Muchas.
¶ 30 Paulos admits that he did not preserve his objections to instructions twenty-three, twenty-six, and the verdict form caption; however, he insists that the trial court plainly erred in using the instructions and caption he offered. Where Paulos submitted the instructions and invited the error (if an error does exist), the doctrine of plain error cannot be relied upon.
See State v. Perdue,
V.Evidence of Paulos’s Contributory Negligence
¶ 31 Finally, Paulos contends that the question of Paulos’s contributory negligence should not have been submitted to the jury. This contention is without merit. The question of contributory negligence was properly submitted to the jury, based on the evidence that Paulos followed the vehicle ahead of him too closely. Paulos’s own expert testified that, with more time, Paulos could have аvoided the accident. In any event, given the verdict that Covenant was not negligent, the jury did not even reach the question of Paulos’s fault.
VI.Cumulative Error
¶ 32 “Although [Paulos] asserts that a number of errors were committed at trial, we find none, and therefore there is no cumulative error.”
State v. Medina-Juarez,
CONCLUSION
¶ 33 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the jury’s verdict in favor of Covenant.
¶ 34 WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS and NORMAN H. JACKSON, Judges.
Notes
. " 'On appeal from a jury verdict, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to that verdict.’ ”
Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding,
. In both
Alexander v. Conveyors & Dumpers, Inc.,
. In
Finchum v. Ford Motor Co.,
. Contrary to Paulos's statement that "[t]he Fifth Circuit did not view advisory circulars in
Muncie Aviation [Corp. v. Party Doll Fleet, Inc.,