104 Ga. 24 | Ga. | 1898
The plaintiff in error brought his petition to enjoin criminal proceedings against him and his employees, under the provisions of the charter of Sj^camore, prohibiting and making penal the sale of intoxicating liquors within its incorporate limits, and to enjoin similar proceedings under a municipal ordinance, prohibiting, under penalty of fine or imprisonment, the keeping of such liquors in the city for the purpose of sale or barter. He alleges that the municipal ordinance in question is void and has been repealed; that if the corporate authorities are allowed to institute and carry on the threatened prosecutions, “it will not only harass and jeopardize his personal liberty, without any lawful authority, but it will also in
In Gault v. Wallis, 53 Ga. 675, it was held that “Courts of equity have no jurisdiction to interfere with the administration of the criminal laws of the State by injunction or otherwise.” And in Phillips v. Mayor etc. of Stone Mountain, 61 Ga. 386, it was held: “No injunction, or order in the nature of an injunction, will be granted to restrain proceedings in a criminal matter.” In Garrison v. City of Atlanta, 68 Ga. 64, where these decisions were followed, the principle is reaffirmed in the following language: “ Injunction will not he granted to restrain a criminal proceeding.” These decisions seem to be decisive of the questions raised in the present case; and but for a later decision of this court, which is invoked in behalf of the plaintiff in error, and which we shall presently consider, we should not deem it necessary or profitable, in this opinion, to do more than cite and follow these adjudications. The case in the 61 Ga. 386, is especially in point, owing to its similarity to the case now under consideration. In that case, certain retail liquor-dealers sought to enjoin prosecutions under a municipal ordinance which was passed after they had obtained their licenses to sell, on the ground that the ordinance was void and materially restricted their business. This court, speaking through Bleckley, J., who delivered the opinion, said: “Whatever may be the infirmities of the penal ordinances of Stone Mountain, an injunction in the present case was properly denied. If unlawful convictions take place before a municipal court, reversal can be had in the superior court, as a court of law, by certiorari. This is a plain and adequate remedy, and a court of equity need not and can not interfere. Chancery takes no part in the administration of criminal law. It neither aids the criminal courts in the exercise of jurisdiction nor restrains or obstructs them.” The principle upon which these decisions are founded has long been well settled by a great current of authority, both in this country and in England. In Re Saw
We think, therefore, that the true principle which underlies the case that we have just been discussing, as we gather it from its peculiar facts and the opinion of the court, is, that when the damages would be irreparable if the threatened injury is not prevented, equity, if properly appealed to, will not permit valuable, vested corporate franchises, granted by the State, to be seriously impaired or practically destroyed by prosecutions instituted under color of municipal ordinances, which
A case which is almost the exact counterpart of this one is that of Burnett v. Craig, 30 Ala. 135, in which'there was a bill for injunction which alleged that the town council of Cahaba had passed an ordinance fixing a license for retailing within its incorporate limits; that the complainant had obtained a State license, and, acting upon legal advice that the ordinance was illegal, had opened a store in that town and commenced retailing spirituous liquors; that he was thereupon arrested for violating the ordinance, and fined and imprisoned; that he had instituted a proceeding, which was still pending, to test the ordinance; and that the council still threatened to fine and imprison him as long as he persisted in carrying on his business. The prayer was, that the municipal authorities be enjoined until the validity of the ordinance was determined by the legal proceedings. The bill was dismissed in the court below, for want of equity, and the case was carried to the Supreme Court, where the judgment of the lower court was affirmed, the higher court holding that “ Chancery will not restrain quasi-criminal proceedings by the authorities of a municipal corporation for repeated violations of an alleged invalid ordinance.” This case was subsequently referred to in Port of Mobile v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., supra, as not being at all in conflict with the decision rendered in that case. The case made by the plaintiff in the court below falling within the general and well-established rule applicable to cases in which an injunction is sought to restrain criminal, or quasi-criminal proceedings, the judge committed no error in refusing to grant a temporary injunction.
Judgment affirmed.