Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Schoharie County (Bartlett, III, J.), entered August 20, 2004, which, inter alia, granted petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Ct Act article 6, to modify a prior order of custody and visitation.
Petitioner and respondent Luke Pagnillo (hereinafter respondent) are the parents of a 10-year-old child. Although they separated when he was 18 months old, both parents continued to reside in the Town of Cobleskill, Schoharie County, until the year 2000, when respondent moved to the Town of Fort Montgomery, Orange County, approximately 2x/2 hours away by automobile, to take a seasonal job with the Department of Environmental Conservation. He resided in his mother’s home and exercised visitation on three weekends a month. Thereafter, respondent moved to the Town of Ossining, Westchester County, completed his Master’s degree and is presently a substitute teacher.
By an order entered upon consent on-May 22, 2001, petitioner and respondent continued to share joint custody, with petitioner having primary physical custody and final decision-making authority. Respondent was granted, inter alia, alternating weekend visitation and the majority of the child’s summer vacation.
In April 2004, petitioner commenced this modification proceeding to permit her to relocate with the child to Mississippi, some 1,400 miles away, because her fiancee, now husband, who has a Master’s degree in Zoology, accepted a job in the field of herpetology as a Gopher Tortoise Biologist. Respondent opposed the relocation and filed a cross petition seeking to modify the May 22, 2001 order to provide him with “true joint custody,”
Initially, we note that “[a]s the party seeking relocation, petitioner ha[s] the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the proposed relocation would be in the child’s best interest” (Matter of Grathwol v Grathwol,
Here, petitioner’s main reasons for the move distill to her desire to live with her husband who, she asserts, is unable to find a full-time job in New York or the northeast in his chosen field of herpetology and to achieve a more financially stable life for herself and her children. Notably, petitioner’s husband did not testify at the hearing and petitioner offered only conclusory testimony regarding his job qualifications and prospects. Furthermore, there is no factual basis from which to reasonably conclude that his position in Mississippi is permanent, will have the opportunity for advancement, or that his annual salary, represented to be $32,000, will increase in regular increments. We note also that petitioner has no firm job prospects in Mississippi. In short, however well-intentioned, the degree to which the proposed move will enhance the financial stability of petitioner and the child is speculative at best.
Petitioner also asserts that the move will have no impact on the child’s relationship with respondent. True, respondent’s custodial periods postrelocation would include all of the child’s summer: and school-year vacations as well as four-day weekends, whenever available. Clearly, however, the proposed relocation would, deprive the child of frequent and regular contact with re
While we certainly appreciate petitioner’s motivation to relocate, in our view, she has failed to meet her burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the child’s best interest will be served by the proposed move to Mississippi. On this record, neither petitioner’s perceived economic enhancement, nor the prospect of living together as a new family unit in Mississippi, provide sufficient justification to uproot the child from the stability of the life he has here. Indeed, petitioner recognized the value of that stability when she indicated that she would preserve the status quo by remaining here with the child if relocation were not approved. Viewing the totality of the circumstances, and having concluded that petitioner has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that the proposed move would serve the child’s best interest, we reverse Family Court’s order.
We need not address respondent’s remaining arguments.
Mercure, Crew III, Spain and Carpinello, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law and the facts, without costs, petitioner’s application dismissed and the order entered May 22, 2001 shall remain in full force and effect.
Notes
Inasmuch as respondent has not addressed in his briefs the denial of his application for modification, we deem that matter abandoned (see Rothberg v Reichelt, 5 AD3d 848, 849 n [2004]).