Paul SATTERFIELD, Appellant v. DISTRICT ATTORNEY PHILADELPHIA; Attorney General Pennsylvania; Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
No. 15-2190
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued March 27, 2017
(Opinion Filed: September 26, 2017)
Susan E. Affronti, Esq., Simran Dhillon, Esq. [Argued], Philadelphia County Office of District Attorney, 3 South Penn Square, Philadelphia, PA 19107, Counsel for Appellees District Attorney of Philadelphia, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, and Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
Before: AMBRO, VANASKIE, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges
OPINION OF THE COURT
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.
Society views the conviction of an innocent person as perhaps the most grievous mistake our judicial system can commit. Reflecting the gravity of such an affront to liberty, the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception has evolved to allow habeas corpus petitioners to litigate their constitutional claims despite certain procedural bars if the petitioner can make a credible showing of actual innocence. In 2013, the Supreme Court‘s decision in McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 185 L.Ed.2d 1019 (2013), extended this doctrine to allow petitioners who can make this showing to overcome the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act‘s (“AEDPA“) one-year statute of limitations.1 In doing so, the Supreme Court recognized that an untimely petition should not prevent a petitioner who can adequately demonstrate his actual innocence from pursuing his claims. This view reflects society‘s value judgment that procedure should yield to substance when actual innocence is at stake.
Despite repeatedly asserting his innocence, Appellant Paul Satterfield was convicted of first degree murder in 1985 and sentenced to life in prison. After many years of direct and collateral litigation, he appeared to emerge victorious when the District Court, acting on his habeas petition, found that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim was meritorious. But Satterfield‘s hopes for relief were short-lived, as we reversed the order granting habeas relief after finding that his petition was barred by AEDPA‘s statute of limitations. Satterfield‘s fight was revived several years later when the Supreme Court handed down its decision in McQuiggin. Had this decision been earlier, Satterfield had more solid support to pursue his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in spite of his untimely petition. In McQuiggin‘s wake, Satterfield sought relief from the judgment denying his habeas petition, characterizing McQuiggin‘s change in relevant decisional law as an extraordinary circumstance to justify relief under
The District Court denied Satterfield‘s Rule 60(b)(6) motion after determining that McQuiggin was not an extraordinary circumstance. While we do not opine
Separately, and perhaps more importantly, we explain that the nature of the change in decisional law must be weighed appropriately in the analysis of pertinent equitable factors. McQuiggin implicates the foundational principle of avoiding the conviction of an innocent man and attempts to prevent such a mistake through the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception. If Satterfield can make the required credible showing of actual innocence to avail himself of the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception had McQuiggin been decided when his petition was dismissed, equitable analysis would weigh heavily in favor of deeming McQuiggin‘s change in law, as applied to Satterfield‘s case, an exceptional circumstance justifying Rule 60(b)(6) relief. While Satterfield‘s ability to show actual innocence is not case determinative in that the District Court must weigh all of the equitable factors as guided by precedent, we clarify that the nature of the change in law cannot be divorced from that analysis.
I.
The tortuous path to Satterfield‘s current appeal begins more than three decades ago. In 1983, Satterfield visited the home of Azzizah Abdullah to repair her television set. When Satterfield had finished and the television appeared to be working properly, Abdullah paid Satterfield‘s fee. But the television ceased working only a short while later, prompting Abdullah to summon Satterfield back to her home to complete the task. He made several additional attempts to fix the recalcitrant television, but his efforts were in vain. During Satterfield‘s final service call to Abdullah‘s home, her husband William Bryant became frustrated with Satterfield‘s repeated failures. Conflict erupted. When Bryant demanded Abdullah‘s money back while brandishing a knife and a baseball bat,2 Satterfield returned the money and quickly departed, never reporting the incident to the police.
Approximately one week after the altercation in Abdullah‘s home, Bryant was shot outside his home in the early morning hours. Police interviewed two eyewitnesses—brothers Eric and Grady Freeman—on the morning of Bryant‘s murder. The Freemans had been in their home at the time of the shooting and, upon hearing the gunshots, peered out from their windows at the crime scene. Eric Freeman reportedly saw a man who “looked like he was white,” “had like blond hair,” and was about 5‘9“.3 (J.A. 695-97.) According to Eric, the man briskly walked to a parked car, looked both ways before getting in,
Investigators soon learned of Satterfield‘s recent altercation with Bryant. This information yielded a search warrant for Satterfield‘s home and car. Upon execution, however, the searches produced no evidence implicating Satterfield, and the investigation went dormant for about a year.
The story picks back up in 1984, when Satterfield met Patricia Edwards at a nearby racquet club. Mrs. Edwards suggested that Satterfield play tennis with her husband, Wayne Edwards. After playing together on several occasions, Satterfield and Mr. Edwards met for lunch at the racquet club. The conversation began with benign pleasantries, with the two discussing commonalities in their upbringings, among other things. Mr. Edwards claimed that the conversation eventually culminated with Satterfield admitting to Bryant‘s murder in fairly explicit detail. Mr. Edwards contacted the police through his attorney, and Satterfield was arrested days later.
At Satterfield‘s trial, Mr. Edwards testified to Satterfield‘s confession. The State Respondents characterize Mr. Edwards’ testimony on the stand as both credible and corroborated by the evidence. Mr. Edwards told the jury that Satterfield had not reported his altercation with Bryant to the police because he assumed it would be futile based on a past experience with a customer. Mr. Edwards also explained that Satterfield had admitted to disposing of his .44 caliber gun—the purported murder weapon—shortly after the killing, only to later tell police the firearm had been stolen. According to the State Respondents, Mr. Edwards also testified to details of the crime that nobody beside the killer could have known; for instance, that the killer had fired four shots at the victim and that the victim was running away at the time he was struck.4
Satterfield took the stand in his own defense. He admitted that he had told Mr. Edwards that he was once suspected of murder and recounted to Mr. Edwards the details laid bare in the search warrants he had been served with during the investigation. But Satterfield insisted that Mr. Edwards had fabricated the rest of the confession, possibly prompted by a developing romantic relationship between Satterfield and Mr. Edwards’ wife. Satterfield also testified that he had owned a .44 caliber special gun like the one used in Bryant‘s murder, but reaffirmed that it had been stolen in an unreported burglary years before the killing. He nonetheless admitted that he had purchased .44 special ammunition on the very day that he was assaulted by Bryant.
Satterfield was represented by attorney Lee Mandell at his murder trial. Mandell did not call either of the Freeman brothers as witnesses, nor did Mandell even interview either of the brothers prior to trial.5 Instead, the only mention of either brother‘s eyewitness statement came when Satterfield read Eric Freeman‘s description of
After his conviction, Satterfield filed post-verdict motions alleging that Mandell was ineffective for failing to present the Freemans as defense witnesses at trial. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing during which it heard testimony from Mandell and both Freeman brothers. Eric Freeman repeated his earlier description of the suspect as a white man with blonde hair. (J.A. 642.) Grady Freeman, however, took the opportunity to clarify his initial description of the suspect as having “light skin,” now explaining that the suspect was “Caucasian” and had light blonde hair. (J.A. 620.) He further proclaimed that he was “positive” Satterfield was not the man he had seen at the time of the shooting. (J.A. 620.) Importantly, there was some sparring at the evidentiary hearing over whether Grady‘s initial statement to police that the suspect was light-skinned meant that the suspect had lighter black skin or was white. (J.A. 612.)
Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed Satterfield‘s post-verdict motion and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The Pennsylvania Superior Court then denied his appeal, determining that Mandell had pursued a valid trial strategy in attempting to avoid a rebuttal of Eric‘s favorable description of the suspect with Grady‘s initial statement. (J.A. 675.) But the Superior Court‘s conclusion relied on its observation that Grady Freeman had identified the fleeing man “as a ‘light-skinned’ black male, with cut short hair, in his early thirties,” a description which “closely fit that of Satterfield.” (J.A. 674.) Later, the District Court presiding over Satterfield‘s habeas proceedings would point out that the Superior Court‘s characterization of Grady‘s statement was in error. Grady Freeman had never described the suspect as a “light-skinned black male,” but merely as “light-skinned.” Nonetheless, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocatur.
Satterfield next filed a pro se King‘s Bench petition with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1996. This petition was denied, along with his petition for reconsideration. Satterfield‘s 1997 pro se PCRA petition was also denied, and his appeals were unsuccessful.
In 2002—almost 20 years after Bryant‘s murder—Satterfield filed a federal habeas petition raising nine claims, including actual innocence and ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to present the Freemans as witnesses. A Magistrate Judge initially recommended the petition be dismissed as time-barred. After finding that Satterfield‘s King‘s Bench petition was a “properly filed” application for state post-conviction review, the District Court remanded the petition to the Magistrate Judge for further analysis of the timeliness issue and the merits of Satterfield‘s claims. The Magistrate Judge then issued a supplemental report recommending Satterfield‘s claims be denied on their merits, which the District Court initially adopted. But after Satterfield‘s objections, the District Court granted relief on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. The District Court concluded that the Pennsylvania Superior Court‘s determination that Mandell had a reasonable basis in not putting forth the Freemans’ testimony was based, as mentioned earlier, on a misreading of Grady Freeman‘s statement. Satterfield v. Johnson, 322 F.Supp.2d 613, 620, 623-24 (E.D. Pa. 2004). The District Court, however, adopted the supplemental report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge denying relief on Satterfield‘s other claims. Id. at 624.
In 2014, approximately 30 years after Satterfield‘s arrest in connection with Bryant‘s murder, he filed a motion with the District Court under
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to
III.
Satterfield invokes
Satterfield asserts in his Rule 60(b)(6) motion that a change in relevant decisional law occurring after his petition had been denied is an extraordinary circumstance upon which his Rule 60(b)(6) relief may issue. Satterfield identifies the
The decision in McQuiggin is particularly relevant to Satterfield‘s case because we reversed his successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim after finding that his petition was untimely under AEDPA. Had McQuiggin been in place at the time of Satterfield‘s habeas proceedings, an appropriate showing of actual innocence may have allowed Satterfield to overcome his untimely petition and pursue his ineffective assistance claim. Thus, we must determine whether McQuiggin is a change in decisional law that can serve as an extraordinary circumstance upon which Rule 60(b)(6) relief may issue, either on its own or when paired with the equitable circumstances of the case.
A.
Satterfield properly characterizes McQuiggin as effecting a change in our decisional law. Prior to McQuiggin, we had never affirmatively held that a showing of actual innocence could serve as an equitable exception to AEDPA‘s one-year statute of limitations. In fact, several circuits were split on the issue of whether such an equitable exception or basis for equitable tolling existed at the time McQuiggin was decided. Compare Rivas v. Fischer, 687 F.3d 514, 548 (2d Cir. 2012) (a compelling claim of actual innocence may excuse an otherwise untimely habeas-petition); Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 934 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (same); San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257, 1267-68 (11th Cir. 2011) (same); Lopez v. Trani, 628 F.3d 1228, 1230-31 (10th Cir. 2010) (same); and Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2005) (same), with David v. Hall, 318 F.3d 343, 347 (1st Cir. 2003) (a showing of actual innocence does not excuse an otherwise untimely filing of a habeas petition); Cousin v. Lensing, 310 F.3d 843, 849 (5th Cir. 2002) (same); and Escamilla v. Jungwirth, 426 F.3d 868, 871-72 (7th Cir. 2005) (same).
We had numerous opportunities to confront habeas petitioners’ arguments that their actual innocence should permit an equitable exception to, or equitable tolling of,6 the statute of limitations. In each case, we declined to decide whether a showing of actual innocence could provide a basis for an equitable exception or equitable toll-
B.
We turn next to whether the change in law borne by McQuiggin may properly serve as the basis of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Precedent makes clear that changes in decisional law alone will “rarely” constitute “extraordinary circumstances” for purposes of a Rule 60(b) motion. Cox, 757 F.3d at 121. Satterfield‘s reliance on an intervening change in the law is hardly novel in the habeas context, and petitioners have had little success with such arguments. The Supreme Court‘s decision in Gonzalez v. Crosby is a prime example of the difficulty of pursuing a Rule 60(b)(6) motion premised on a change in law. In Gonzalez, a district court had denied a prisoner‘s habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds. The prisoner later sought Rule 60(b)(6) relief, arguing that the Supreme Court‘s intervening decision in Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000), marked a change in the interpretation of AEDPA‘s statute of limitations.8 Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 536. The Court affirmed the denial of the prisoner‘s Rule 60(b)(6) motion, emphasizing that the district court‘s initial ruling on the timeliness of the petition was consistent with the Eleventh Circuit‘s then-prevailing interpretation of the statute. In that sense, the Court observed, “[i]t is hardly extraordinary that subsequently, after petitioner‘s case was no longer pending, this Court arrived at a different interpretation,” and “[a]lthough [the Court‘s] constructions of federal statutes customarily apply to all cases then pending on direct review, not every interpretation of the federal statutes setting forth the requirements for habeas provides cause for reopening cases long since final.” Id. (citation omitted).
Both the State Respondents and the District Court interpret Gonzalez as foreclosing Rule 60(b)(6) relief in Satterfield‘s case. They conclude that the change in law brought about by McQuiggin or any change in habeas law for that matter—
Our decision in Cox, rendered almost ten years after Gonzalez, further confirms that our Circuit has “not embraced any categorical rule that a change in decisional law is never an adequate basis for Rule 60(b)(6) relief.” Id. at 121-22. Instead, we have consistently taken the position “that intervening changes in the law rarely justify relief from final judgments under 60(b)(6).” Id. (emphasis in original). Rather than impose any per se or bright-line rule that a particular change in law is never an extraordinary circumstance, we adhere to a “case-dependent analysis” rooted in equity. Id. at 124. This analysis manifests as a “flexible, multifactor approach to Rule 60(b)(6) motions . . . that takes into account all the particulars of a movant‘s case,” even where the proffered ground for relief is a post-judgment change in the law.10 Cox, 757 F.3d at 122.
In this context, we opt for more analysis of the equitable circumstances at play in Satterfield‘s case. The District Court concluded that the change of law in McQuiggin was not an extraordinary cir-
We will vacate the order of the District Court as it relates to Satterfield‘s Rule 60(b)(6) motion and remand to it to carry out another analysis. The task of weighing the equitable factors in order to grant or deny a Rule 60(b)(6) motion is “left, in the first instance, to the discretion of a district court.” Cox, 757 F.3d at 124. Should the District Court grant Satterfield‘s motion, he will be permitted to pursue his meritorious ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim once more.
IV.
While the District Court must take the first pass at weighing the equitable factors involved in Satterfield‘s Rule 60(b)(6) motion, we emphasize that the nature of the change in decisional law itself must be a factor in the analysis. The principles underlying the Supreme Court‘s decision in McQuiggin are fundamental to our system of government and are important to the inquiry on remand.
McQuiggin allows a petitioner who makes a credible showing of actual innocence to pursue his or her constitutional claims even in spite of AEDPA‘s statute of limitations by utilizing the fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice exception—an exception “grounded in the ‘equitable discre- tion’ of habeas courts to see that federal constitutional errors do not result in the incarceration of innocent persons.” McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1931. Underlying the fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice exception is a “[s]ensitivity to the injustice of incarcerating an innocent individual,” and the doctrine aims “to balance the societal interests in finality, comity, and conservation of scarce judicial resources with the individual interest in justice that arises in the extraordinary case.” Id. at 1932. For this reason, “‘[i]n appropriate cases,’ the principles of comity and finality that inform the concepts of cause and prejudice ‘must yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration.‘” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982)) (alteration in the original). The Supreme Court has underscored the importance of these principles, explaining that “concern about the injustice that results from the conviction of an innocent person has long been at the core of our criminal justice system. That concern is reflected, for example, in the ‘fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.‘” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 325 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
The values encompassed by the fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice exception and which drive the Supreme Court‘s decision in McQuiggin cannot be divorced from the Rule 60(b)(6) inquiry. Cox requires a weighing of the equitable factors at play in a particular case, and the nature of the change in law itself is highly relevant to that analysis. McQuiggin illustrates that where a petitioner makes an adequate showing of actual innocence, our
Given this observation about the importance of the change in law effected by McQuiggin and the weight it should carry in the equitable analysis, a court should focus its efforts primarily on determining whether Satterfield has made an adequate showing of actual innocence to justify relief. The change in law brought about by McQuiggin will only permit him to overcome his time-barred petition if he can make a credible showing of actual innocence—a burdensome task that requires a petitioner to “persuade[] the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1928, 1935 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329). Thus, the miscarriage-of-justice exception and McQuiggin‘s holding more broadly will not be applicable to Satterfield‘s case if he cannot make a proper showing of actual innocence, and the District Court must determine whether such a showing has been made as a threshold matter. We leave this inquiry entirely to the District Court on remand, and recognize that the issue may require an evidentiary hearing during which other equitable factors may come into play.
Among these additional equitable factors, the District Court may consider Satterfield‘s meritorious ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. The Supreme Court‘s recent decision in Buck v. Davis established that the severity of the underlying constitutional violation is an equitable factor that may support a finding of extraordinary circumstances under Rule 60(b)(6). The appellant in Buck sought to vacate the court‘s judgment so he could present an otherwise defaulted claim of
McQuiggin also makes relevant whether Satterfield raises a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, as the actual innocence exception only provides a gateway for courts to review a petitioner‘s separate claim of constitutional error. See McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1931; see also Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316-17 (noting that petitioners seeking habeas relief carry less of a burden when their convictions are the result of unfair proceedings—and the actual innocence threshold standard applies—than when they have been convicted after a fair trial). Because Satterfield‘s claim of constitutional error—counsel‘s unreasonable failure to investigate and present exculpatory eyewitness testimony—is the reason why the actual innocence exception could apply to his case, the gravity of that error bears on the weight of his McQuiggin claim.
In previously granting Satterfield‘s ineffective-assistance claim, the District Court concluded that Satterfield‘s counsel was ineffective in failing to call the Freeman brothers as witnesses or otherwise to present their testimony, and that counsel‘s error prejudiced Satterfield. Such a finding of constitutionally deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), is rare. Thus, the District Court may consider weighing this factor in favor of finding extraordinary circumstances.
Because the District Court is ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion in the habeas context, it may also account for the “[p]rinciples of finality and comity, as expressed through AEDPA and habeas jurisprudence” by “consider[ing] whether the conviction and initial federal habeas proceeding were only recently completed or ended years ago.” Cox, 757 F.3d at 125. When more time has elapsed since the final conviction, a court will give more weight to the state‘s interest in finality.
The Supreme Court, however, has established that considerations of finality and comity must yield to the fundamental right not to be wrongfully convicted. See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536-37, 126 S.Ct. 2064, 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006); Schlup, 513 U.S. at 320-21 (citing Murray, 477 U.S. at 496); cf. Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 557, 118 S.Ct. 1489, 140 L.Ed.2d 728 (1998) (“In the absence of a strong showing of ‘actual innocence,’ the State‘s interests in actual finality outweigh the prisoner‘s interest in obtaining yet another opportunity for review.” (citation omitted)). Hence the District Court should give less weight to these factors when a petitioner asserts a threshold claim of actual innocence. The fact that Satterfield‘s state proceeding ended a decade ago should not preclude him from obtaining relief under Rule 60(b) if the court concludes that he has raised a colorable claim that he meets this threshold actual-innocence standard and that other equitable factors weigh in his favor.
As we have explained, though, the weighing of the equitable factors in this case belongs to the District Court in the first instance. Though we have pointed out the importance of the change in McQuiggin and its weight in the Rule 60(b)(6) analysis—as well as several other equitable factors for consideration—we express no opinion on the final outcome. The District Court is best positioned to carry out this analysis.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the April 16, 2015 order of the District Court with respect to the denial of Satterfield‘s request for Rule 60(b)(6) relief and remand for reconsideration of the