PAUL E. TAYLOR v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
NO. 2022-CA-1046-MR
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals
AUGUST 18, 2023
RENDERED: AUGUST 18, 2023; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
OPINION AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND JONES, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Paul Everett Taylor appeals from the denial of his
On April 10, 2017, parole officer Courtney Turpin received an anonymous “community complaint phone call” alleging that Taylor had been selling heroin at his residence. The caller specifically alleged that her family member had died after using heroin purchased from Taylor. Officer Turpin and another parole officer, Roger Copher, went to Taylor‘s residence to perform a home visit.
When they arrived, the officers observed two men standing by the mailbox and a woman cleaning a glass window near the front door. Both officers testified that they believed the woman was Taylor‘s wife. As they approached, they heard someone say, “P.O.‘s here.” The officers then heard Taylor‘s voice respond, “Who?” As they neared the front door, the officers observed Taylor go down a hallway and toward the back of the home in a “jogging” manner. After the officers knocked on the front door, an unknown man exited the house, and the woman told the officers that they could enter the home.1
After entering the home, multiple items of suspected contraband were found. A search warrant was eventually secured, and a full search of the home was conducted. Discussion of the details of those searches is unnecessary, as the only issue before us today is whether the parole officers’ entry into the home was lawful. The searches of the home produced multiple bags of heroin, as well as digital scales, an iPhone 6s, over $18,000.00 in currency, and bags of synthetic marijuana.
Taylor filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in the home as fruits of an illegal entry into the home. The trial court held a suppression hearing at which Parole Officers Turpin and Copher, as well as
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The trial court denied the suppression motion without entering any written findings of fact or conclusions of law. The court‘s oral ruling denying the motion was on the basis that the officers received consent to enter the residence. The trial court also found that even if the parole officers had not received valid consent, they had reasonable suspicion to enter and search the residence.2
Taylor v. Commonwealth, No. 2018-SC-000343-MR, 2019 WL 6973775, at *1-2 (Ky. Dec. 19, 2019).
Taylor eventually entered a conditional guilty plea to various drug related charges in which he reserved the right to appeal the motion to suppress issue. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed Taylor‘s conviction and held that the wife‘s consent allowed the officers to enter the home without a search warrant.
The trial court granted the request for an attorney and appointed the Department of Public Advocacy (DPA) to assist Taylor. The DPA reviewed the case, but believed it was not a case that a “reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to bring at his or her own expense,”
The trial court later granted a hearing as to two issues raised in the
Taylor, his wife, and his trial attorney all testified, with the trial judge asking questions of the individuals. Taylor‘s wife testified that she did not give the officers consent to enter the home and was not present in the courtroom on the day of the suppression motion hearing. She also testified that the security camera that caught the arrest on video automatically erases video after ninety days; therefore, there was no video available. Taylor‘s trial counsel testified that the consent issue was not raised by the Commonwealth in any discovery prior to the suppression hearing and he was surprised when the parole officers testified about being given consent to enter. He testified that had he known consent to enter was an issue, he would have had Taylor‘s wife present at the hearing. Counsel also testified that neither Taylor nor his wife mentioned the existence of the security camera video before or after the suppression hearing.
The trial court overruled Taylor‘s
ANALYSIS
The only issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying Taylor counsel once it decided to hold an evidentiary hearing. We believe the trial court did err.
Here, the trial court appointed counsel to Taylor at the outset, but allowed the DPA to withdraw from representation pursuant to
if the department and the court of competent jurisdiction determines that it is not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to bring at his or her own expense, there shall be no further right to be represented by counsel under the provisions of this chapter.
Failing to appoint counsel to assist Taylor with the evidentiary hearing was an error; however, a ”
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or order, or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order unless it appears to the court that the denial of such relief would be inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
We conclude that the failure to appoint counsel to represent Taylor for the evidentiary hearing was harmless error. First, the two issues that were reserved for the hearing, the consent to enter and the security video, were discussed and relevant testimony was presented by Ms. Taylor and Taylor‘s trial counsel. In addition, the consent issue was not the only reason the motion to suppress was denied. The trial court also held that there was reasonable suspicion that criminal
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did err in not appointing counsel to Taylor once an evidentiary hearing was ordered; however, we believe this was harmless error under the circumstances of this case. We affirm.
ACREE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
JONES, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND DOES NOT FILE SEPARATE OPINION.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
Andrea Reed Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Daniel Cameron Attorney General of Kentucky
Jenny L. Sanders Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
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