159 P. 78 | Or. | 1916
delivered the opinion of' the court.
The argument of the petitioner proceeds upon the theory that the legislative act of 1915 is unconstitutional because it requires the payment of a fee, that all persons who followed that statute were unlawful candidates; and that therefore all votes cast for those persons were deposited for unlawful candidates, and should not be counted. The petitioner announced his candidacy in compliance with the provisions of the direct primary nominating elections law, which was adopted by the people in the exercise of the sovereign right of initiative at the general election held on June 6, 1904 (Chapter 1, Laws 1905; Sections 3349-3391, 2 L. O. L., inclusive), but the other five persons filed their declarations of candidacy in the manner prescribed by the legislative act found in Chapter 124, Laws of 1915. The direct primary nominating elec
“Any registered elector may become a candidate for his or her party’s nomination for any office to which he or she is constitutionally eligible * # in addition to the method now provided by law, by filing declaration of his or her candidacy, as herein provided and accompanying said declaration with the required filing fee. ’ ’
The fees are fixed at $150 for United States senator; $100 for offices to be voted for in the state at large, except national committeemen, delegates to national party conventions and presidential electors; $100 for representatives in Congress; $50 for certain district offices; $20 for county offices, except district offices within the county; $10 for senator and representative in the legislature; $15 for national committeemen, delegates to national party conventions and presidential electors; and $5 for district offices within the county. Upon the filing of the declaration and the payment of the required fee, “said candidacy shall be deemed complete,” and the name of such candidate is then “printed upon the official ballot at the ensuing primary election, and no additional signatures or fees shall be required to make said candidacy complete and effective.”
“No act shall ever be revised or amended by mere reference to its title, but the act revised or section amended shall be set forth and published at full length”: Sheridan v. City of Salem, 14 Or. 328, 337 (12 Pac. 925); State v. Rogers, 22 Or. 348, 365 (30 Pac. 74).
Even though an independent act, complete wi,thin itself, works a repeal by implication, the repealing statute is not pregnable on account of a failure to observe Article IV, Section 22: Warren v. Crosby, 24 Or. 558, 563 (34 Pac. 661); Northern Counties Trust v. Sears, 30 Or. 388, 399 (41 Pac. 931, 35 L. R. A. 188). The second statute employs the most positive language in expressing its purpose. The title introduces the act by declaring that it is “an additional method, whereby electors may become candidates for party nominations.” Section 1 provides that an elector may become a candidate for a party nomination “in addition to the method now provided by law * # as herein provided.” The final section directs that:
“In case any candidate for office shall elect to become a candidate under the provisions of Section 3361 of Lord’s Oregon Laws, he shall be required to file the following declaration.”
Section 3361 relates to the form of the petition to be circulated and filed when following the provisions of the statute of 1904. It is true that the title of the initiative act asserts that one of its purposes is to forbid “the nomination of candidates for public office by such political parties in any other manner,” and Section 11, being Section 3359, L. O. L., amended by Chap
“No law shall he passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.”
The successful candidates gained no advantage over Patton when they filed their declarations under the act of 1915, because their names were printed on the same ballot and exactly as they would have appeared if they had filed petitions as the petitioner did. There is nothing on the printed ballot to indicate the method selected by the candidate, but his name is printed on the ballot, which is submitted to the voter, in the same place, manner and form, whether a petition is filed under the 1904 act or a declaration is made pursuant to the statute of 1915. It is argued, however, that the second statute enables a rich person to become a candidate when perhaps the electors might be unwilling to sign a petition; but this argument fails when viewed in the light of local history, for it is common knowledge that no person has failed to secure a sufficient number of signatures on account of any unwillingness of electors to sign his petition. It is true that all voters will not sign all petitions, but it is also true that electors will usually sign a petition, when requested, to enable the petitioner to become a candidate. The act of 1915 does- not, in any way, add to the qualifications of an elector who desires to become a candidate. No person is obliged to pay a fee, for the method requiring a fee is optional. The elector may create the right to become a candidate, either by a mere declaration and the payment of a fee, or by a petition without a fee, and a statute requiring the payment of a reasonable fee places no obstacle or impediment in the way of a person whether he be rich or poor, so long as another method like the one here requiring no fee is open