573 S.W.2d 71 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1978
In a dissolution of marriage action, the Circuit Court of Greene County, Missouri, ordered William to pay Carolyn certain monies for temporary support and medical expenses. William became delinquent. On February 18, 1975, while employed in Wichita, Kansas, William sustained an injury which obligated his employer and its insurer, Home Insurance Company, to pay him benefits under the workmen’s compensation law of Kansas. Carolyn caused the issuance of a writ of garnishment in aid of execution which was served upon Home on June 25, 1975, via the Missouri Director of Insurance. The garnishment on execution seized and attached in Home’s “hands all debts due or to become due by you to William . . or so much thereof as will be sufficient to satisfy the sum of” $1,167.79. Sixteen days after it had been served with summons or on July 11, 1975, Home paid William $2,923.50 pursuant to a settlement agreement regarding the workmen’s compensation claim. Thereafter and subsequent to due proceedings, the circuit court in Missouri rendered judgment for Carolyn against garnishee Home in the sum of $1,167.79, together with 6% interest from June 25, 1975, and costs. Home appealed.
Mislabeled “Points and Authorities” [Rule 84.04(a) and (d)],
Home’s second and last point relied on is that the trial court erred in entering judgment against it because the workmen’s compensation benefits owed to William were exempt from attachment or execution or garnishment under either Missouri or Kansas law. In this respect, we are dealing with two Missouri and one Kansas statutes, to wit:
Missouri — § 287.260: “The [workmen’s] compensation payable under this chapter . shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, and execution, shall not be subject to setoff or counterclaim, or be in any way liable for any debt . . . § 452.140: “No property shall be exempt from attachment or execution in a proceeding instituted by a married woman for maintenance, nor from attachment or execution upon a judgment or order issued to enforce a decree for alimony or for the support and maintenance of children. . . . ”
Kansas — § 44-514: “No claim for [workmen’s] compensation . . . shall be assignable or subject to levy, execution, attachment, garnishment, or any other remedy or procedure for the recovery or collection of a debt . . .2
In construing Missouri § 287.260 and Kansas § 44-514 with Missouri § 452.140, we must ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature from the words used in the statutes and adopt that sense which best harmonizes with the context thereof and promotes in the fullest measure the apparent policy and objects of the legislature. Pugh v. St. Louis Police Relief Ass’n, 237 Mo.App. 922, 935-936, 179 S.W.2d 927, 934—935[11] (1944). A reading of various exemption statutes, including §§ 287.-260 and 452.140, supra, serves to demonstrate a consistent legislative scheme to provide for family needs. By allowing exemptions from executions or attachment, the legislature has repeatedly evidenced a studied undertaking to insure, as far as practicable, against want on the part of the family as a unit and on the part of wives and dependent children when the unit has been broken by death, divorce or separation. The obvious undertaking is to protect the family or dependent members thereof from creditors in general. E. g., § 287.260, supra (workmen’s compensation); § 452.140, supra (married woman’s action for maintenance and child support); §§ 87.090, 87.365 and 87.485 (firemen’s pension funds); §§ 513.-435, 513.440 and 513.450 (head of family exemptions).
Singly reading § 287.260 and Kansas § 44-514 admits a conclusion of their absolute application. However, when these laws are viewed compatibly with the obvious aims and purposes of § 452.140, there remains little or no reason why dependent wives and children should be classified with general creditors and excluded from executing on workmen’s compensation payments which, in part at least, were designed for their benefit. “The legislature was concerned about the care and support of the injured workman and his dependent family; for this reason the workmen’s compensation system was created. This being so, it is illogical to think that the benefits of the Act were intended to be withheld from the dependents of an injured workman who refuses to accept the legal obligation to support them.” Calvin v. Calvin, 6 Or.App. 572, 487 P.2d 1164, 1166[3, 4] (1971). Also: “It would indeed be anomalous to hold that by reason of the exemption from claims of creditors as provided in the foregoing section [§ 287.260], the injured employee could avoid his obligation to support and maintain his wife and children when in fact the exemption was to assure them, as well as the husband, the necessities of life during his disability.” Commons v. Bragg, 183 Okl. 122, 80 P.2d 287, 290[2] (1938). To like effect see: Hughes v. Hughes, 132 N.J.Super. 559, 334 A.2d 379, 381[4] (1975); Steller v. Steller, 97 N.J.Super. 493, 235 A.2d 476, 479[1] (1967); 2 Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 58.40, at p. 10-261; An-not: Exemption — Claim for Alimony, Workmen’s compensation payments, 54 A.L. R.2d 1422, § 6[f], p. 1435.
The judgment is affirmed.
All concur.
. Unspecified references to rules and statutes are to Missouri Supreme Court Rules, V.A. M.R., and Revised Statutes of Missouri, V.A. M.S.
. Neither we nor the parties hereto have been able to find a Kansas statute comparable to § 452.140, supra.