PATTI FORTUNE AND JEREMY DOMIN v. FIRST PROTECTIVE INSURANCE COMPANYPATTI FORTUNE AND JEREMY DOMIN v. FIRST PROTECTIVE INSURANCE COMPANY
John H. Pelzer of Greenspoon Marder LLP, Fort Lauderdale; and Jeremy F. Tyler and Jonathan B. Aversano of Greyer Fuxa Tyler Attorneys at Law, Sunrise, for Appellants.
Jay M. Levy and Ryan L. Marks of Jay M. Levy, P.A., Miami; and Karen D. Fultz and Phillip J. Sheehe of Sheehe & Associates, P.A., Miami, for Appellee.
Patti Fortune and Jeremy Domin (the Homeowners) filed a bad faith action pursuant to
The Homeowners’ property was insured by a policy with the Insurer. After suffering losses from Hurricane Irma on September 10, 2017, they timely filed a claim with the Insurer. The Insurer investigated the loss and determined that after applying the policy‘s deductible and depreciation, the amount of the loss was $3,013.20. The Homeowners presented the Insurer with their public adjustor‘s estimate of what they alleged were the full scope of necessary repairs.
The Insurer then invoked the appraisal process pursuant to the policy on December 27, 2017. Section I of the policy contains a provision that either party may demand a mediation or appraisal of the loss if the parties “fail to agree on the settlement regarding the loss.” The policy also provides that “unless there has been full compliance with all of the terms under Section I of this policy,” the Homeowners cannot bring an action against the Insurer.
On January 8, 2018, the Homeowners filed a CRN alleging violations of
The Insurer generally denied the allegations, claiming that it did not owe any insurance proceeds to the Homeowners under the “insurance policy at this time.” Further, the Insurer stated that it had not committed any acts of bad faith and that it had sought appraisal to resolve the parties’ dispute as to the amount of loss. The Insurer also asserted that it would be unable to cure any alleged violations based on the “vague and general demands” in the CRN. The Insurer did not pay any damages within sixty days of the filing of the CRN.
The Homeowners’ appraiser and the neutral umpire set the amount of the loss, and an appraisal award was entered on June 1, 2018, in the total amount of $121,516.55. On July 17, 2018, the Insurer paid the net amount owed of $110,067.35.
On October 25, 2018, the Homeowners filed their complaint that sought relief for insurer bad faith under
The Insurer filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment, to which the Homeowners filed a response in opposition. The Insurer asserted that it “fully cured the alleged bad faith during the cure period set forth under Florida Statutes by complying with the appraisal process, which resolved the dispute between the parties and was agreed to by [the Homeowners] as demonstrated in the Appraisal Award dated June 1, 2018.”
After a hearing on the Insurer‘s motion, the trial court determined that the Insurer was entitled to summary judgment.3 The court‘s written ruling states “[t]hat, as a matter of law, [the Insurer] cured the Civil Remedy Notice of Insurer‘s Violations by its invocation of the appraisal process, in accordance with the applicable insurance policy, before [the Homeowners‘] filing of the Civil Remedy Notice of Insurer‘s Violation and by [the Insurer‘s] subsequent payment of the appraisal award.” The trial court denied the motion to dismiss as moot.
On appeal, the Homeowners contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the Insurer cured the CRN merely by invoking the appraisal process and then paying the appraisal award outside the sixty-day time limit of
(1) Any person may bring a civil action against an insurer when such person is damaged:
. . .
(b) By the commission of any of the following acts by the insurer:
1. Not attempting in good faith to settle claims when, under all the circumstances, it could and should have done so, had it acted fairly and honestly toward its insured and with due regard for her or his interests[.]
The statute also provides a civil remedy for violations of specific provisions of
The statute gives an insurer a cure period which provides that “[n]o action shall lie if, within 60 days after filing notice, the damages are paid or the circumstances giving rise to the violation are corrected.”
The prerequisites to file a statutory bad faith action are: “(1) determination of the insurer‘s liability for coverage; (2) determination of the extent of the insured‘s damages; and (3) the required notice must be filed under
Section 624.155 does not prevent the insured from sending a CRN prior to a determination of liability or damages. Vest, 753 So. 2d at 1275; Landers, 234 So. 3d at 856. The Florida Supreme Court in Vest further explained:
Nor is the insurer‘s appropriate response to that notice depend[e]nt on such a determination. The insurer‘s appropriate response is based upon the insurer‘s good-faith evaluation of what is owed on the insurance contract. What is owed on the contract is in turn governed by whether all conditions precedent for payment contained within the policy have been met. An insurer, however, must evaluate a claim based upon proof of loss required by the policy and its expertise in advance of a determination by a court or arbitration.
753 So. 2d at 1275-76 (emphasis added). Thus, the Insurer‘s response was not dependent on the determination of damages, in this case by way of appraisal. The Insurer was required to evaluate the claim based upon the policy‘s required proof of loss “and its expertise in advance of a determination” of damages. Id. The statutory claim for bad faith “is founded upon the obligation of the insurer to pay when all conditions under the policy would require an insurer exercising good faith and
In Landers, a bad faith action regarding a sinkhole claim, Landers alleged, among other violations, “claim delay and low-balling.” 234 So. 3d at 858. He “filed his CRN before the appraisal process was complete,” and the insurer failed to cure the alleged violation within the sixty-day period. Id. at 860. The insurer argued that the CRN was invalid because “a condition precedent to payment—determining the amount of loss through appraisal—had not been fulfilled.” Id. at 858. The appellate court disagreed and stated that “[p]reventing an insured from filing a CRN before coverage and liability have been conclusively established would frustrate the purpose of the statute by further delaying the time necessary to assess and pay out claims and discouraging insurers from taking timely, independent action on claims.” Id. at 860. For instance, Landers asserted that if the insurer had “properly investigated his claim, it would have known that the subsurface repair plan was inadequate.” Id. The appellate court reversed the final summary judgment in favor of the insurer and remanded for further proceedings. Id.
Even if a policy requires the mediation or appraisal process to occur prior to suit being filed, an appraisal is not a condition precedent to the insurer fulfilling its obligation to fairly evaluate the claim and to either deny coverage or to offer an appropriate amount based on that fair evaluation. See id. at 859-60. A fair evaluation would be evidence that an insurer did not act in bad faith. But a lowball offer made in bad faith is not cured by an insurer ultimately paying what it is later found to owe via the appraisal process.
The language of
The Insurer asserts that when the CRN does not state the amount necessary to cure the alleged bad faith, the Insurer‘s invocation of the appraisal process constitutes a corrective action within the meaning
The Insurer relies upon 316, Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 625 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (N.D. Fla. 2008), to support its position that because the CRN did not contain a cure amount, the Insurer cured the CRN by invoking the appraisal process under the policy before the cure period expired. This court has addressed 316 and determined that a specific cure amount is not a requirement for the CRN under
In addition, the issue on summary judgment that the trial court determined in 316 was that the insurer had not acted in bad faith as a matter of law. 625 F. Supp. 2d at 1195. Discussing 316, the Middle District has rejected an insurer‘s argument that ”316 stands for the proposition that when the insurer follows the appraisal process as set forth in the policy and promptly pays the agreed upon appraisal amount, the insurer will not be held as having acted in bad faith.” Fox Haven of Foxfire Condo. IV Ass‘n v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 2:13-cv-399-FtM-29CM, 2015 WL 667935, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 17, 2015). The Fox Haven court determined that “the ruling in 316 is not that broad” and that the “court‘s conclusion that the insurer had acted in good faith was based primarily on the fact that the insurer ‘paid almost sixty-percent of the final award in advance of the appraisal process.‘” Id. (quoting 316, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 1193).
Here, the trial court did not resolve on summary judgment whether the Insurer acted in bad faith, which is generally for the finder of fact to determine. See Vest, 753 So. 2d at 1275. Instead, the trial court determined as a matter of law that the Insurer cured the CRN by invocation of the appraisal process and subsequent payment of the appraisal award after the cure period.
The Insurer contends that invoking appraisal met the cure provision which states, “No action shall lie if, within 60 days after filing notice, the damages are paid or the circumstances giving rise to the violation are corrected.”
For instance, the Homeowners also alleged a violation of
In summary, at issue here is the alleged violation of “[n]ot attempting in good faith to settle claims when, under all the circumstances, [the Insurer] could and should have done so, had it acted fairly and honestly towards its Insured, and with due regard for her or his interests.” We conclude that the Insurer‘s invocation of the appraisal process and payment of the appraisal award after the cure period expired did not cure, as a matter of law, an alleged violation for failing to attempt to settle claims in good faith. Therefore, we reverse the final summary judgment entitled “Order Granting Defendant‘s Motion for Summary Judgment” and remand for further proceedings in which the Homeowners can pursue their action for bad faith. We express no opinion on the factual issue of whether the Insured acted in bad faith.
Reversed and remanded.
VILLANTI and LaROSE, JJ., Concur.