A Hоuston County jury found Benjamin Patterson guilty of felony theft by shoplifting, OCGA § 16-8-14 (a), (b) (2). Following the grant of an out-of-time appeal, Patterson appeals, contending the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and raises several claims of error, including ineffective assistance of trial counsel. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Viewed in the light most favorable to support the jury’s verdict, 1 the record reveals the following. On December 27, 1998, three employees of a J. C. Penney in Centerville responded to a “shoplifting-in-progress” announcement and attempted to stop a woman from removing apparel from the men’s department. The employees chased the woman as she ran to a nearby car, a late-model, four-door, off-white Oldsmobile. The womаn ignored the employees’ shouts to stop and entered the car on the passenger side. As soon as the woman got into the car, a man “came flying around” the employees, got in the driver’s seat, and “immediately reversed the car and took off.” One employee wrote down the car’s tag number. Another employee watched the driver as he “slammed” the car into reverse and sped away. The driver backed up so quickly that he forced the employee from behind the car to the driver’s side where she made eye contact with him. This employee positively identified Patterson at trial as the getaway driver.
Using the tag information obtained by the store employee, the police traced the car to its owner, a woman who loaned the car to Patterson on the day of the robbery. The woman testified that Patterson neither returned her car nor explained what happened to it. The police later found the car wrecked in Macon. When the police first tried to locate Patterson, they learned he was in a “treatment center” but they were unable to “make contact with him due to patient confidentiality.” It is unclear from the record whether this was a hospital; nevertheless, the jury might infer that Patterson sought some kind of medical attention immediately after the wreck.
*676 When an investigator later interviewed Patterson in jail, Patterson claimed the car had been stolen from him. He could not describe the thieves, however, and he claimed he chose not to report the theft because he intended to find the car himself. Patterson insisted he had never been to the J. C. Penney in Cеnterville. He added that “if he was being charged with this shoplifting... there would be video cameras in the store to show that it was not him.” Toward the end of the interview, the investigator told Patterson that he might be able to get him a reduced sentence, possibly just time served, if he cooperated. Following a hearing, the trial court suppressed those statements Patterson made after the investigator’s offer.
Although the police were unable to recover the stolen clothes, employee testimony established that Patterson’s accomplice took a bag full of Dockers brand shirts. An investigator testified that 30 shirts 2 were stolen. An employee familiar with the items taken testified they were priced from $48 to $52 each.
1. When a criminal defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his or her conviction, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.)
Jackson v. Virginia,
Based on the evidence adduced, including Patterson’s conduct during and after the theft, the jury was authorized to find Patterson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as a party to the crime of theft by shoplifting. See
Stewart v. State,
2. Patterson contends the trial court should have suppressed all of the statements he made to the investigator during his custodial interview, not just those made after the investigator offered him a hope оf benefit, a reduced sentence. 3 He contends all his statements should be considered tainted because it was impossible to determine at what point during the interview the investigator’s offer was made.
The investigator testified that prior to starting the interview, he read Patterson his Miranda 4 rights, made sure Patterson understood them, and had Patterson initial a waiver of rights form. He also testified that their discussion of a possible lighter sentence occurred well into the 30-minute interview, toward the end. The trial judge questioned the investigator about when the offer was made, determined which statements were made before and after the offer, and then excluded those statements that might have been tainted by any hope of benefit. The trial court accepted the investigator’s chronology of the interview and found that any statemеnts made prior to the offer were voluntary.
“The burden is on the prosecution to show the voluntariness of a custodial statement by a preponderance of the evidence. Factual and credibility determinations of this sort made by a trial judge after a voluntariness hеaring must be accepted by appellate courts unless such determinations are clearly erroneous.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Lopez v. State,
3. Patterson contends the trial court erred in denying his Batson 5 challenge to the State’s use of one of its six peremptory strikes to exclude from his petit jury the only African-American male on the panel of thirty-four potential jurors. The prosecutor explained that he *678 struck this juror not because of race but because the juror’s name was familiar and he had reason to believe the juror failed to report his criminal history, which included an arrest or conviction for theft. When the prosecutor sought to verify that the juror had a criminal history, he received information that the chief assistant district attorney had confirmed that the juror was “the same guy with this history.”
Because the prosecutor offered a race-neutral reason for the peremptory strike and the trial court ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, we need address only the sufficiency of the prosecutor’s explanation for the peremptory strike.
Chunn v. State,
“The trial court’s factual findings must be given great deference and may be disregarded only if clearly erroneous. The factors thаt make up a trial court’s credibility determination under
Batson
will often go beyond the mere words that accompany the record before the appellate courts.” (Citations, punctuation and footnotes omitted.)
Morris v. State,
4. Patterson contends the trial court erred in refusing to give his requested charges on identification. Patterson argues that his charges were “more aсcurately developed or tailored to the specific facts of this case” than those given by the court. Our review of the jury charges given reveals that the trial court’s instructions were substantially the same as those requested. Consequently, we find no error.
Heard v. State,
5. Patterson argues he is entitled to a new trial bеcause he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He contends his attorney failed to interview key witnesses and failed to move for a
*679
directed verdict. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an apрellant must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that but for this deficiency, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.
Strickland v. Washington,
(a) The transcript of the motion for new trial hearing reveals that Patterson’s attorney did contact the Statе’s eyewitnesses through her investigator, but those witnesses were “less than receptive” to being interviewed. She was also aware of the witness Patterson now claims would have exonerated him, but either could not locate him or had determined he lacked helpful informatiоn. At any rate, counsel reviewed the incident statements and was, therefore, aware of what these witnesses reported seeing. Patterson offered no evidence at the motion for new trial hearing establishing how his attorney’s failure to interview these witnesses prejudiced him. And he failed to proffer the testimony of the witness who could allegedly exonerate him. Pretermitting whether counsel’s performance was deficient, there is nothing in the record establishing the requisite prejudice.
Sanders v. State,
(b) Patterson’s attorney did not make a motion for a directed verdict on Patterson’s shoplifting charge because, based on the trial judge’s comments, she expected the motion would be denied. Further, given that the evidence in this case was sufficient to survive a motion for directed verdict, counsel was not deficient for failing to make the motion.
Banks v. State,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Jackson v. Virginia,
Although the court sustained Patterson’s objection to any testimony the investigator might give concerning the
value
of the shirts, there was no objection posed to nor any instruction given by the court to disregard the officer’s testimony concerning the
number
of shirts stolen. We are unable to ascertain from the transcript whether the investigator’s testimony as to the number of shirts stolen was hearsay or otherwise lacked probative value. See
White Missionary Baptist Church v. Trustees of First Baptist Church,
The investigator advised Patterson that “if he would just he truthful and cooperate, we would work with him, that maybe he would just have to do a restitution and time already served.”
Miranda v. Arizona,
Batson v. Kentucky,