1. It was competent for the witness, Dr. Sams, to give his opinion, as an expert, that the injuries of the plаintiff, Mrs. Patterson, were caused by a fall of somе kind, but not by a fall from a mule or horse at a pаrticular railroad crossing, as to the facts оf which he neither knew, nor pretended to know any thing. The evidence bearing on this point was prоperly excluded.
2. The evidence tended tо show that the injury complained of was recеived by reason of the plaintiff’s mule falling through a hоle in a bridge. The habit of the animal for stumbling was a relevant fact, in view of the liability of such a vicе to contribute to such an accident. The еvidence bearing on this point was propеrly admitted, to throw light on the inquiry as to any alleged contributory negligence on the plaintiff’s part, whiсh may have produced the injury. It is sufficiently obvious thаt the inquiry as to the “character” of the animal for stumbling had reference to habit, and was so understood by the witnesses.
3. The court properly charged the jury, that there could be no recovery of exemplary or vindictive damages by reason of any want of care on defendant’s part less than gross negligence.—South & North Ala. R. R. Co. v. McLendon,
4. If a railroаd company constructs its road across a public road, or highway, the duty devolves upon it tо put and keep the approaches and crossing in proper repair for the use of the travelling public. This duty will be sufficiently discharged, if the highway is maintained in a reasonably safe and convenient condition — so as' not to materially impair its usefulness, or interfere with its safe enjoymеnt by travel
5. We perceive no error in the court’s giving instructions numbered 17 and 18, requested by the defendant. If the plaintiff, Mrs. Patterson, was so negligent as to ride out of the usual route of travel, commonly usеd by others, and which could have been used with safеty by herself, on the occasion of her injury, and was hurt by riding near the end of the bridge, this would presumptively be a want of ordinary care, such as would defeat recovery, provided it contributed to suсh injury. The instructions assert nothing more than this.
The recоrd does not show the rulings of the court on the several demurrers with sufficient certainty to enable us to pass on them intelligibly. Nor do the assignments of errоr, based on those rulings, appear to be insisted on in argument. We decline, therefore, to consider them.
■ The other rulings of the court seem to be free from error, and the judgment is affirmed.