Appellants Patterson and Scott were injured on February 2, 1984, when the 50-foot metal scaffolding they were using in connection with the renovation of a building came into contact with a high-voltage electric power line. On January 30, 1986, shortly before the statute of limitation ran on their negligence aсtions, appellants filed their complaints for damages against sevеral parties. Over the next several weeks, they amended their complaints several times, adding other *658 parties involved in either the renovatiоn of the building or in the manufacture of equipment used in the project. One оf the parties named was the engineering firm of Rosser White Hobbs Davidson McClelland Kelly, Inc. (hereinafter “Rosser”) which, appellants contended, was employed as the architect on the project.
Rosser was sеrved on February 13, 1986; it timely filed its answers, denying the allegations of appellants’ complaints, on March 3, 1986. On April 23, 1987 Rosser filed its motions for summary judgment, together with suрporting affidavits, in which it contended that it was not employed as the arсhitect on the project and owed appellants no duty of cаre with regard to the scaffolding. Rosser also averred that Fabrap Arсhitects, Inc. was the architect on the project. The record shоws that in January 1987 Rosser merged with Fabrap Architects, Inc. (hereinafter “Fabrаp”); the firm then became known as Rosser Fabrap International, Inc. (hereinafter “Rosser Fabrap”). On May 31, 1987, appellants filed their dismissals without prеjudice as to defendant Rosser.
On November 16,1987, appellants filed their third аmended complaint naming Rosser Fabrap, as the successor cоrporation to Fabrap, as a party defendant. Rosser Fabrap filed its answer on December 8, 1987, admitting that Fabrap was employed as the architect on the project, but raising the defense that appellants’ claims against Fabrap were barred by the applicable statute of limitation. Rosser Fabrap also filed motions for summary judgment based on this defense, which the trial court granted on June 2, 1988.
Appellants argue that since they were entitled to “renew” their actions against Rosser within six months of the dismissal of their original complaints against it pursuant to OCGA § 9-2-61, that they were then еntitled to file their renewal actions against Rosser Fabrap as the suсcessor corporation, to Rosser (see OCGA § 14-2-216 (b)), and the trial court еrred in concluding that Rosser Fabrap was entitled to summary judgment based on thе expiration of the period of limitation.
“To be a good ‘renewal’ of an original suit, so as to suspend the running of the statute of [limitation] . . . the new рetition must be substantially the same both as .to the cause of action аnd
as to the essential parties.
[Cits.] The rule requiring substantial identity of essential parties has been held not to be violated: where a party in a later case is the successor trustеe, or other representative,
of an original party
who occupied the same рosition as plaintiff or defendant; . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)
Sheldon & Co. v. Emory Univ.,
Judgments affirmed.