Initiаlly, we consider whether the trial court’s order is ap-pealable. G.S. 5A-17 provides, “A person found in criminal contempt may appeal in the manner provided for appeals in criminаl actions, except appeal from a finding of contempt by a judicial official inferior to a superior court judge is by hearing de novo before a superior court judge.” G.S. 5A-24 provides, “A person found in civil contempt may appeal in the manner provided for appeals in civil actions.” Our statutes make no provision for appeal when a person is found not in contempt.
We consider the appealability of such an order in Equipment Co. v. Weant,
At the outset we face the question whether appeal lies to review an оrder dismissing a charge of indirect civil contempt. We hold that it does where, as here, the order affects a substantial right claimed by the appellant. G.S. l-277(a). Had defendants been adjudged guilty of the contempt charged, they would have had the right to appeal expressly granted by statutе, G.S. 5-2 [since repealed]. That statute, however, makes no reference to an apрeal from an order adjudging an alleged contemnor not guilty, and our attention has been direсted to no other statute or case authority of this State which expressly deals with the question. Dеcisions elsewhere are divided. See Annot.24 A.L.R. 3d 650 , “Appealability of Acquittal from or Dismissal of Charge of Contempt of Court.” In the only North Carolina case cited in that Annotation, Murray v. Berry,113 N.C. 46 ,18 S.E. 78 (1893), our Supreme Court declined to review the action of the trial court in refusing to attach respondents for contemрt. In that case, however, the Court found that the rights which plaintiffs sought to enforce by the contempt proceeding could be more properly determined in a pending civil action brought by rеspondents to partition land, title to which was in question. In the case now before us, we are аware of no other proceeding by which plaintiff can enforce its rights under the consent judgment dated 23 June 1975 than by the contempt proceedings which plaintiff now seeks to have us review. Since the order denying plaintiff the relief sought clearly affects a substantial right of the appellant, that is, the right to have the 23 June 1975judgment enforced, we hold that the present appeal lies by virtue of G.S. l-277(a). See § 7 of An-not., 24 A.L.R. 3d 650 , cited supra.
Weant involved a charge of civil contempt. The charges in the present case are in the nature of criminal contempt.
Proceedings for contempt are of two classes, criminal and civil. Criminal proceedings are those brought to preserve the powеr and to vindicate the dignity of the court and to punish for disobedience of its processes or orders. Civil proceedings are those instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of the parties to actions and to compel obedience to orders and decrees mаde for the benefit of the suitors. Criminal proceedings, involving as they do offenses against the courts and organized society, are punitive in their nature, and the government, the courts, and the people are interested in their prosecution. Whereas civil proceedings, having as their underlying purpose the preservation of private rights, are primarily remedial and coеrcive in their nature, and are usually prosecuted at the instance of an aggrieved suitor. 12 Am. Jur., Cоntempt, section 6.
Galyon v. Stutts,
The present case is not like Weant in which the plaintiff was seeking to enforce her rights under a prior judgment or cоurt order. Attorney Palmer did not have custody of the plaintiffs child at the time these proceеdings were instituted, and the plaintiff was not seeking to regain custody or to enforce the child custоdy order by way of these contempt proceedings. Rather, the present proceedings were instituted to vindicate the dignity of the court and to punish attorney Palmer for his alleged interference with the custody order. Although they arise in a civil case, such contempt procеedings are criminal in nature. Blue Jeans Corp. v. Clothing Workers,
Appeal dismissed.