In re DONERAL PATTERSON, a Minor. DONERAL PATTERSON, Appellant, v. THE PEOPLE, Respondent.
Sac. No. 7439
In Bank
Dec. 13, 1962.
Appellant‘s petition for a rehearing was denied January 9, 1963.
58 Cal. 2d 848
In summary of the case, we cannot say the director‘s method of prohibiting adverse selection by the insurers is arbitrary or capricious. As one of insurers’ counsel stated, “[I]t has certainly been true that the private carriers as they dropped from 52 percent of the total business to 29 percent at the end of 1960 skimmed the cream by dropping their worst risks.” The director adopted regulations reasonably designed to prevent the skimming of the cream. We are neither capable of compounding an alternative nor, if we could, are we called upon to substitute our less skilled judgment for that of the director.
Let the peremptory writ of mandate issue as prayed.
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., and White, J.,* concurred.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, Assistant Attorney General, and Raymond M. Momboisse, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
Facts: The minor was charged with entering a residence “with the intent to commit the crime of theft, thereby violating Section 459 of the Penal Code of California.”
He was taken into custody on November 30, 1961. His mother and only available parent, Opal Patterson, was given telephonic notice of the detention hearing before the juvenile court referee, set for December 1, 1961.
Following the detention hearing, the court by order adopted the referee‘s recommendation that the minor be committed to the custody of the county probation officer, to be detained in the Juvenile Hall pending hearing of a petition that he be declared a ward of the court.
Written notice of the hearing on the petition, set for December 18, 1961, was personally served on the minor‘s mother. After the hearing, the juvenile court declared the minor a ward of the court.
These questions are presented for determination:
First. Was insufficient notice of the detention hearing given to the minor‘s mother, resulting in a lack of jurisdiction in the juvenile court?
No.
Second. Were the minor and his parent adequately apprised of the right to counsel?
Yes.
An affidavit of Walter A. Schmidt, the referee of the juvenile court, established that the minor was advised at the detention hearing of the right to counsel. The minor‘s mother did not attend that hearing.
The mother of the minor was personally served with notice of the hearing on the petition, which notice contained the statement required by
Accordingly, the judge is required to ascertain at the beginning of the hearing whether the parent or the minor has been informed of the right to counsel and is then required to advise them of such right only if he has ascertained that they have not previously been informed thereof.
The records before the court at the commencement of the hearing reflected that the minor had been advised at the detention hearing of the right to counsel and that his mother, who was present at the hearing on the petition, had been advised of the right to counsel in the notice of hearing personally served upon her.
Once the judge had ascertained from the records then before him that the minor and his parent had been informed of the right to counsel and that no request had been made for the appointment of counsel, he was justified in proceeding without again advising the minor or his parent of the right to counsel. That duty would have evolved upon him only if it had appeared that they had not previously been advised of such right.
The minor further contends that
This contention overlooks the further requirement in the section that such an appointment is mandatory only if the parent or guardian desires the appointment of counsel. The record is devoid of any evidence which would indicate such a desire on the part of the minor‘s parent. If, as here, the parent has not indicated any desire for counsel, the court has no obligation to appoint counsel, and its failure to do so did not vitiate the judgment entered.
Third. Was the minor‘s admission of the charges against him the equivalent of a plea of guilty and, as such, sufficient to support the judgment?
Yes. The minor argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the judgment and that the probation officer‘s report was improperly admitted and considered by the court, since the report contained conclusions and hearsay. This contention has been held to be without merit. (In re Garcia, 201
In addition to the report that was received in evidence when the minor appeared before the court, the charges were read, and he admitted their truth in open court. The testimony of an accused at his trial not only establishes the corpus delicti of the offense but is sufficient to justify a judgment. (People v. Hill, 2 Cal.App.2d 141, 155 [37 P.2d 849] [hearing denied by the Supreme Court]; People v. Hudson, 139 Cal.App. 543, 544 [2] [34 P.2d 741].)
It is likewise settled that the admission by a minor of the charges against him in open court is the equivalent of a plea of guilty and therefore raises no issue of fact and precludes the necessity for the presentation of evidence in support of the allegations contained in the petition. (In re Dargo, 81 Cal.App.2d 205, 208 [4] et seq. [183 P.2d 282] [hearing denied by the Supreme Court]; cf. People v. Johns, 173 Cal.App.2d 38, 42 [2, 3] [343 P.2d 92].)
Fourth. Did the trial judge properly review the report of the probation officer and the other records before him at the time of the hearing?
Yes. It must be presumed, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, that the statutory requirements were followed by the trial judge. (
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., and White, J.,* concurred.
TRAYNOR, J., Dissenting.—I dissent. In my opinion the decision herein renders superfluous and unenforceable the provisions of
A judge can now “ascertain” whether the minor and his parents have been informed of the minor‘s right to be represented by counsel simply by examining the records to note whether the notices required by sections 6332 and 6593 were given. He need not place anything on record to indicate that he has even made that examination. He need not undertake any investigation to determine that the records before him are correct. He need not determine whether the absence of counsel at the hearing is the result of an intelligent and understanding waiver of the right to counsel.
The California Juvenile Court Law of 1961 was the product of years of extensive study and criticism of juvenile court procedures. The charge that in their informal procedures juvenile courts were sacrificing fundamental procedural rights of the offender was a matter of national concern.5 Extensive studies of the California juvenile courts were undertaken by a special commission appointed by the Governor, and a more limited study of wardship and the right to counsel by the California Law Revision Commission. These studies found that many judges believed that attorneys had no place in juvenile court proceedings6 and that a majority of judges did not inform the minor or his parents of their right to representation by counsel.7 They concluded that legislation was necessary to compel judges to inform the minor and his parents of this important right.8 Many of the provisions enacted by the Legislature, including those before us in this case, were taken verbatim from the recommendations of the Governor‘s Commission.
The Governor‘s Commission, which drafted the exact wording of
In part II of its report (page 14), the Governor‘s Commission quotes with approval from Shioutakon v. District of Columbia (D.C.Cir. 1956) 236 F.2d 666, 670: “[W]here that right [to counsel] exists, the court must be assured that any waiver of it is intelligent and competent.” (Accord, People v. Chesser, 29 Cal.2d 815 [178 P.2d 76, 170 A.L.R. 246].) Obviously the court cannot be assured of that fact simply by noting that the form notice delivered to the parent contains a statement that the juvenile has a right to be represented by counsel. There is no assurance that the notice was read, that the parent was able to read, or if he could read that he understood what representation by counsel meant. Even if the minor was personally informed at the detention hearing of his right to counsel, there is no assurance that any waiver, whether express or inferred, as in this case, from his appearance at the hearing unaccompanied by counsel, was “intelligent and competent.” The Governor‘s Commission noted the irony of regarding minors as incompetent in financial matters and yet assuming their competence to make important legal decisions “which may involve a drastic curtailment of the minor‘s freedom and liberty.” (Part I, p. 27.) Only by carefully questioning the minor could a judge ascertain that the minor‘s waiver of counsel was intelligent and competent. (See Williams v. Huff (D.C.Cir. 1944) 142 F.2d 91.)
“Ascertain” means “to find out with certainty.” (Webster‘s New World Dictionary of the American Language.) What can the judge find out with certainty if he need only examine the recitals in the records before him? Even if the
In my opinion the purpose of the Legislature in enacting
The judge‘s duty to protect the rights and interests of the minor is particularly significant when a right as vitally important as the right to representation by counsel is at stake. That duty is not discharged when the judge does not even mention that right or show enough interest to question the juvenile or his parent or guardian to ascertain whether the right to counsel is understood and has not been waived through ignorance or misunderstanding. The burden such inquiries place on the judge is minimal when compared with the risk of misinformed waiver and the consequent loss to both the minor and the judge of the aid that counsel can give them in the discovery of the truth and if necessary the formulation of plans of rehabilitation.
Peters, J., and Tobriner, J., concurred.
Appellant‘s petition for a rehearing was denied January 9, 1963. White, J.,* participated in place of Peek, J., who deemed himself disqualified. Traynor, J., Peters, J., and Tobriner, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.