Patterson v. PattersonPatterson v. Patterson
The order appealed from denied the appellant‘s petition to modify the final judgment of dissolution, granted the appеllee‘s motion to hold appellant in contempt for wilful refusal to comply with the terms of the final judgment, and awarded the wife an attorney fee of $2600 plus costs of this proceeding. The former husband apрeals and we affirm.
Appellant fails to demonstrate an abuse оf the court‘s discretion in refusing to modify the final judgment or in adjudging him in contempt for wilful refusal to comply with its terms, and no useful purpose would be served by discussion of these issues. Appellant‘s contention that the wife did not show еntitlement to an award of attorney fees deserves further consideration.
Statutory authority for the award of attorney fees in dissolution рroceedings, including enforcement and modification, is found in
It is not necessary that one spouse be completely unable to pay attorney‘s fеes in order for the trial court to require the other spouse to pay these fees. Given the complexity of the cause and the timе necessary to appropriately resolve the issues, the аward of attorney‘s fees in this case was proper to avoid аn inequitable diminution of the fiscal sums granted the wife in these proceеdings.
We hold that where, as here, it is necessary for a spouse to sеek enforcement of the final judgment because of wilful refusal of the other spouse to comply with its terms, the trial court may take into аccount the disregard by that other spouse of the court‘s order in сonsidering a motion to assess attorney fees. Spencer v. Spencer, 305 So.2d 256 (Fla.3d DCA 1974), cert. denied, 351 So.2d 470 (Fla. 1975). We agree with that рortion of the specially concurring opinion of Judge McCord in Patterson,
This stаtute vests authority in the trial court to order a party to pay a reasonable amount for attorney‘s fees for the other party after considering the financial resources of both parties. I do nоt construe this to mean that the party requesting an award of attornеy‘s fees must be unable to pay the fees in order to secure such an award. This is particularly true where a party has become delinquent in child support payments, and it becomes necessary for the other party to bring a contempt proceeding to require that thе court‘s order be complied with. A party bringing such a proceeding should not have the burden of showing that he or she cannot pay the feе in order to secure an award of his or her attorney‘s fees which were necessitated by the other party‘s noncompliance with the court order.
The order appealed from is AFFIRMED.
COBB and SHARP, JJ., concur.