Patterson v. Emerald Mountain Expressway Bridge, L.L.C.Patterson v. Emerald Mountain Expressway Bridge, L.L.C.
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Pittman, Crawley
James N. Walter, Jr., D. Kyle Johnson, M. Courtney Williams, and Richard H. Allen of Capell & Howard, P.C., Montgomery, for appellees Emerald Mountain Expressway Bridge, L.L.C., and Alabama River Parkway, L.L.C.
Thomas T. Gallion III and Constance C. Walker of Haskell, Slaughter, Young & Gallion, L.L.C., Montgomery, for amicus curiae Sarah G. Spear, revenue commissioner for Montgomery County.
Suzanne H. Mills, Tuscaloosa, for amicus curiae Doster L. McMullen, tax assessor for Tuscaloosa County.
PITTMAN, Judge.
Emerald Mountain Expressway Bridge, L.L.C., Alabama River Parkway, L.L.C., and Black Warrior Parkway, L.L.C. (hereinafter referred to collectively as “the taxpayers“) filed a declaratory-judgment action requesting the trial court to interpret
We conclude that the dispositive issue is whether
We review a summary judgment de novo.
The facts in this case are undisputed. The taxpayers operate toll bridges in Elmore, Montgomery, and Tuscaloosa Counties and own real property that they use in connection with the operation of the toll bridges. The taxpayers are licensed to operate the toll bridges pursuant to
This court has stated the law relating to an exemption from ad valorem taxation as follows:
“It is well settled in Alabama law that taxation is the rule and an exemption is the exception. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. State, 512 So.2d 115 (Ala.Civ.App.1987). An exemption from taxation is to be strictly construed against the party claiming the exemption and in favor of the right to tax. Ex parte Fleming Foods of Alabama, Inc., 648 So.2d 577 (Ala.1994). No property is to be exempted unless the legislature‘s intention to exempt that property clearly appears in some statute. Brundidge Milling Co. v. State, 45 Ala.App. 208, 228 So.2d 475 (Ala.Civ.App.1969). The party seeking an exemption from taxation assumes the burden to clearly establish the right, and in all cases of doubt as to legislative intention the presumption is in favor of the taxing power. Chemical Waste Management, 512 So.2d at 119.”
AU Hotel, Ltd. v. Eagerton, 689 So.2d 859, 861 (Ala.Civ.App.1996) (emphasis added).
The taxpayers argue that the Legislature‘s intention to exempt their real property from ad valorem taxation is contained in
“(d) After a license is issued pursuant to subsection ... (c) by ... the State Department of Transportation, no further license of any type from any governmental body or agency, including, but not limited to, a business license, shall be required to construct, own, or operate the toll road or the toll bridge, ferry or causeway and no further license, tax, or fee may be imposed by any governmental body or agency.”
The taxpayers were licensed to operate their toll bridges by the State Department of Transportation pursuant to
The revenue commissioners argue that
First, we agree with the revenue commissioners that
Our conclusion is further buttressed by
The taxpayers are correct that other provisions of Alabama law provide exemptions from ad valorem taxation; however, all those provisions contain an express exemption from ad valorem taxation. See, e.g.,
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred by entering a summary judgment for the taxpayers. The trial court‘s summary judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
YATES, P.J., and MURDOCK, J., concur.
CRAWLEY and THOMPSON, JJ., dissent.
THOMPSON, Judge, dissenting.
Because I conclude that the plain and unambiguous language of
The full text of the applicable statute provides:
“§ 23-1-81. County commissions—Authority to establish, operate, etc., bridges, ferries, causeways, etc.; licensing.
“(a) The county commission of each county is invested with authority to purchase
or establish toll bridges, free bridges, causeways, and ferries or free ferries within their respective jurisdictions as provided in this article and may levy a special tax to purchase or build the bridges and causeways when, in the opinion of the county commission, the public good requires it. “(b) The county commission of each county may also license any individual, group of individuals, partnership, corporation, association, or any other legal entity to establish or to operate toll roads, toll bridges, ferries, or causeways and authorize the licensee to establish and fix the rates of toll. Toll roads and toll bridges that are licensed by a county and which are on or over the line between any two counties shall be licensed by both counties.
“(c) The State Department of Transportation may license any individual, groups of individuals, partnership, corporation, association, or any other legal entity to establish or operate toll roads, toll bridges, ferries, or causeways and authorize the licensee to establish and fix the rates of toll.
“(d) After a license is issued pursuant to subsection (b) or (c) by a county commission or the State Department of Transportation, no further license of any type from any governmental body or agency, including, but not limited to, a business license, shall be required to construct, own, or operate the toll road or the toll bridge, ferry or causeway and no further license, tax, or fee may be imposed by any governmental body or agency.
“(e) No toll bridge shall be established over the same watercourse within two miles of any other toll bridge.
“(f) Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to limit the authority of the Department of Conservation and Natural Resources to grant easements and licenses with respect to the placement of bridges on state land.”
(Emphasis added.)
In construing a statute, the focus of this court is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. State v. Pettaway, 794 So.2d 1153, 1155 (Ala.Civ.App.2001); see also Ex parte Cove Properties, Inc., 796 So.2d 331 (Ala.2000); IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng‘g Assocs. Corp., 602 So.2d 344 (Ala.1992). In determining the Legislature‘s intent, this court must first look to the actual language of the statute as enacted by the Legislature. Young Oil Co. v. Racetrac Petroleum, Inc., 757 So.2d 380, 383-84 (Ala.1999); Ex parte Taylor, 728 So.2d 635, 636 (Ala.1998); Robicheaux v. Robicheaux, 731 So.2d 1222, 1223 (Ala.Civ.App. 1998).
“‘Absent a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, the language of the statute is conclusive. Words must be given their natural, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and where plain language is used, the court is bound to interpret the language to mean exactly what it says.’ ‘If the language of the statute is unambiguous, then there is no room for judicial construction and the clearly expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect.‘”
State v. Pettaway, 794 So.2d 1153, 1155 (Ala.Civ.App.2001) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also Ex parte Cove Properties, Inc., 796 So.2d 331, 333-34 (Ala.2000); Young Oil Co. v. Racetrac Petroleum, Inc., 757 So.2d 380, 383-84 (Ala. 1999); IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng‘g Assocs. Corp., 602 So.2d 344, 346 (Ala.1992). Further, the Supreme Court of Alabama has stated:
“It is true that when looking at a statute we might sometimes think that the ramifications
of the words are inefficient or unusual. However, it is our job to say what the law is, not to say what it should be. Therefore, only if there is no rational way to interpret the words as stated will we look beyond those words to determine legislative intent. To apply a different policy would turn this Court into a legislative body, and doing that, of course, would be utterly inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of powers.”
DeKalb County LP Gas Co. v. Suburban Gas, Inc., 729 So.2d 270, 275-76 (Ala.1998) (emphasis added). When construing the language of a statute, this court must presume “‘“‘that every word, sentence, or provision was intended for some useful purpose, has some force and effect, and that some effect is to be given to each, and also that no superfluous words or provisions were used.“‘“’ Ex parte Uniroyal Tire Co., 779 So.2d 227, 236 (Ala.2000) (quoting Sheffield v. State, 708 So.2d 899, 909 (Ala.Crim.App.1997)).
Although this court will generally not look beyond the words of the statute when there is any rational way to interpret those words, see DeKalb County LP Gas Co. v. Suburban Gas, Inc., supra, I find it instructive that House Bill 352 (hereinafter “H.B. 352“), as it was originally introduced in the House of Representatives, stated
“(d) After a license is issued pursuant to this section by a county commission or the Department of Transportation, no further license of any type from any governmental body or agency, including, but not limited to, a business license, shall be required to construct, own, or operate the toll road or the toll bridge, ferry, or causeway and no further license, tax, or fee may be imposed by any governmental body or agency with respect to the privilege of engaging in the activities licensed.”
Journal of the House of Representatives, State of Alabama, 2000 Regular Session, p.
The majority concludes that the word “tax” as it is used in
“[t]here is a rather obvious fundamental difference in upholding the trial court‘s judgment and reversing it; this Court will not reverse the trial court‘s judgment on a ground raised for the first time on appeal .... This difference is predicated on the ‘long-standing, well-established rule that [in order to secure a reversal] the appellant has an affirmative duty of showing error upon the record.‘”
Smith v. Equifax Servs., Inc., 537 So.2d 463, 465 (Ala.1988) (quoting Tucker v. Nichols, 431 So.2d 1263, 1264 (Ala.1983)); Docena Fire Dist. v. Rucker, 564 So.2d 422 (Ala.1990); McGugin v. McGugin, 357 So.2d 347 (Ala.Civ.App.1978). Because this argument was raised by the revenue commissioners for the first time on appeal, the trial court was never given an opportunity to address this assertion. See Smith v. Equifax Servs., Inc., supra. Thus, this court should not consider that argument, much less use that argument as the sole basis for its reversal of the trial court‘s judgment. See Smith v. Equifax Servs., Inc., supra. Further, the Supreme Court of Alabama has specifically held that unless the word “tax” has been expressly defined, it will be presumed to include levies for both revenue and regulatory purposes. State v. Commercial Loan Co., 251 Ala. 672, 38 So.2d 571 (1948). Nothing in the language of
Most of the arguments raised on appeal by the revenue commissioners center around the Department of Revenue‘s position and the attorney general‘s opinion regarding the proper interpretation of
The Supreme Court of Alabama has held that
“[tax] exemption clauses are not to be so strictly construed as to defeat or destroy the intent and purpose of the statute, and no strained statutory construction is to be given which would have that effect. Our responsibility is to give effect to the legislative intention where it is manifested.”
Flav-O-Rich, Inc. v. City of Birmingham, 476 So.2d 46, 48 (Ala.1985). This court will not “read into [a] statute something which the legislature did not include[,] although it could have easily done so.” Noonan v. East-West Beltline, Inc., 487 So.2d 237, 239 (Ala.1986).
The revenue commissioners assert that the attorney general‘s opinion is a correct interpretation of
“means any new or additional license tax and does not refer to existing taxes such as the state income tax, franchise tax, or ad valorem property tax. The Act does not exempt toll roads, toll bridges, ferries, and causeways from preexisting taxes. The Legislature intended to exempt toll roads, toll bridges, ferries, and causeways from any future additional license taxes imposed, in addition to the existing license taxes.”
Op. Att‘y Gen. No. 2000-020 (October 26, 2000). Such a reading of the statute contravenes the statute‘s plain and unambiguous language. As the trial court stated in its May 16, 2001, order:
“In addition to changing the word ‘further’ into ‘future,’ the [revenue commissioners]’ construction of § 23-1-81(d) would transform the word ‘tax’ into the term ‘license tax.’ If the legislature had intended to limit the exemption in the statute to ‘new or additional license tax[es],’ instead of the general exemption of ‘further tax’ stated in the statute, it easily could have done so.”
This court should not so strain statutory construction to read into
Further
Further, when a statute repeatedly uses a phrase in relation to the same object or subject matter, that phrase
“shall ‘be interpreted to have the same meaning’ throughout.... Moreover, ‘where, in a constitution or statute, a word or phrase is repeated, and in one instance its meaning is definite and clear, and in the other it is susceptible of two meanings, it will be presumed to have been employed in the former sense.‘”
House v. Cullman County, 593 So.2d 69, 72 (Ala.1992) (citations omitted). The word “further” is used as an adjective twice in
I conclude that the plain and unambiguous language of
CRAWLEY, J., concurs.