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Patterson v. Cronin
650 P.2d 531
Colo.
1982
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*1 аlways required compli- We have careful requirements PATTERSON,

ance Crim.P. 11. Stephen Plaintiff-Appellee, guilty plea accepted A cannot be absent a v. affirmatively showing record a factual basis Dan CRONIN by that People as rule. v. See Denver, municipal corporation, Murdock, 187 Colo. (1975); 532 P.2d 43 Defendants-Appellants. Alvarez, People 181 Colo. 508 P.2d No. 80SA80. (1973); People v. Randolph, 175 Colo. P.2d 203 If conviction is Colorado, Court of Supreme guilty on a predicated plea obtained with- En Banc. compliance with Crim.P. 11 the out defend- Aug. 1982. to vacation judg- ant has sentеnce, ment and and withdrawal Rehearing Denied Sept. E.g., People Sandoval,

plea. 188 Colo. 535 P.2d 1120 People v. Ran-

dolph, explanation

No amount of to the defend- the value element

ant of theft felony

charge can serve as a surrogate for estab- a factual

lishment of basis to support that of the charge,

element or for a waiver of a of that basis in

presentation fact. This is

not a case of mere lack of adherence to a See, advisement format. e.g., People

ritual Lambert, 189 Colo. 539 P.2d 1238 found, As the trial court and as the

majority’s own recital of the facts amply

demonstrates, a factual basis for the value presented

element was not form at Furthermore, providency hearing. determined, Appeals

the Court there is support

no foundation record to

conclusion that the defendant waived the of a full

presentation factual basis for

plea. view the my Colorado Court of Ap correctly

peals decided the issues prop reversed the trial

erly court’s denial of the 35(b)

defendant’s Crim.P. motion. People Cushon, 631 P.2d I (Colo.App.

would affirm the decision of that court.

I am authorized say that Justice ‍‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌​​​​‌​‌​‍DU- QUINN and Justice join

BOFSKY me in

this dissent.

533

I. August 17,1977, Prior to Stephen Patter- automobile, son’s Checker New bearing plate BSB065, Mexico license number illegally parked in Denver on seven sepa- *3 instance, rate occasions. In each a sum- complaint mons and was affixed to the windshield of The sum- automobile. mons ordered Patterson to appear before Jr., Frye Sawaya, Frye, John & R. Rich- the Denver Traffic Bureau with- Violations Rose, Denver, ard B. for plaintiff-appellee. in seven to days alleged answer the viola- Zall, Himel- City Atty., Max P. Gerald Municipal tion of the illegal park- Code for Denver, grin, Atty., for defend- City Asst. ing. Additionally, each contained summons ants-appellants. following warning: “IMPORTANT: FAILURE TO RE- ERICKSON, Justice. SPOND WITHIN 30 OF DAYS ISSUE appellant, City County The and of Denver DATE WILL SUBJECT THE VIOLAT- (Denver), appealed has from a decision of OR TO SUCH OTHER PENALTIES AS the Dеnver District Court which held that LAW, BY PRESCRIBED INCLUDING service of a summons for parking a viola- affixing tion a THE summons and IMPOUNDING OF THE VEHICLE complaint to an unattended is invalid. AND INVOLVED THE ISSUANCE OF The district court concluded that the meth- A WARRANT FOR THE ARREST OF process, od of service permitted of by sec- THE VIOLATOR.” tion 505.4 of the Municipal Revised Code of instances, In each of seven Patterson City County and of (Municipal Denver respond. failed to Accordingly, Denver Code),1 was defective because did not Traffic Violations Bureau issued an order comply with the methods of service re- that his automobile be immobilized in ac- 206(f) quired by Rule of the Colorado Mu- provisions cordance with the of section 505.- nicipal Court Rules of (Municipal Procedure 11-1(15) Municipal of the Denver Rules).2 We affirm Code.3 the district court judgment upon but different grounds. order, Pursuant to a was at- “boot” Municipal complaint 1. Section of the Denver 505.4 Code “A or summons summons and is- provides: pursuant to these sued rules shall be served Illegally personally upon copy “Notice of Parked Vehicles. the defendant and a When- any service, given personal motor vehicle ever without driver In lieu to him. of stopped parked or found in violatiоn may copy of the leaving made service be imposed by restrictions this Main Division complaint summons or summons and at the Code, any FIVE of the Revised place defendant’s usual of with abode some police any employee City or officer and person age years eighteen over resid- Denver, County designated the Mana- by mailing copy therein to the de- or Safety ger give and Excise to such notices fendant’s last known address certified duties, part finding as a of his official such mail, receipt requested, not return less than vehicle, registration shall takе its number days prior to five the time the defendant and take other information dis- required appear.” to played may identify on user, conspicuously and shall affix to such 505.11-1(15) pertinent provides 3.Section writing vehicle a notice in on a form autho- part: hereof, rized 505.1 section for the driver driver, owner, person charge “When a respond charge thereof to to and answer the respond of such vehicle has failed to to a against (7) days him within seven notice of and has ... also Traffic Violations Bureau. The officer or em- respond to the notice failed additional sent ployee copy shall send one notice so registered employees to the owner ... copy Chief of issued to the Police and one Denver, City County acting in their the Traffic Violations Bureau.” capacity, official officers Police 206(f) provides: hereby Department may, they 2. C.M.C.R. are autho- 206(f), Patterson was not 17, ments of August C.M.C.R. automobile on to the tached violation Denver Sheriff’s by member addition, im- subsequent Accordingly, an immobiliza- Department.4 charges. the vehicle which to sec- was affixed to of his vehicle tion mobilization part: pertinent 505.11-1(15) taking constituted The of law. without property “RELEASE: that Patterson failed then concluded court obtained at the Clerk’s can be Release damage resulting actual prove court, county Room Office vehicle but that Pat- of his Building, .... Ar- was entitled nominal terson made for the release must be rangements sum of $250. after the installation within 72 hours will removed or the vehicle be this device impounded pursuant from the street II. 505.11-1(15). NO CHECKS to section *4 with the trial Initially, disagree we IN PAYMENT OF FINES.” ACCEPTED of practice that Denver’s conclusion court’s day following was removed the The boоt to the complaint a summons and affixing the traffic appeared Patterson before when of an unattended motor vehicle windshield his accumulated fines and paid and bureau parking of a violation. notice improper fee.5 “boot” a ten dollar in issue Although the method of service Patterson filed August On by sanctioned C.M. specifically is not here action in the Denver District rights

civil 206(f), we hold that it is sufficient for C.R. City’s failure to alleging Court the owner purpose notifying of the limited immobilizing his provide parking vehicle of a unattended motor of an process his to due violated violation.7 by the Fourteenth guaranteed of law and authority promulgate The to the United States Constitu- Amendment Rules is vest Municipal Court interpret II, and Article section 25 of the Colora- VI, to Article in this Court ed sought damages pur- He do Constitution. 2 and 21 of the Constitu sections 1983 and 42 U.S.C. U.S.C. § suant statutory of con Fundamental rules tion. alleged dep- unconstitutional for the § require Municipal Court struction of the use of his automobile.6 In rivation as a liberally construed when read Rules be ruling complaint, on the the trial court did whole, adopt we must a construction and whether not reach issue of purpose with the of the rules. consistent predeprivation hearing before a Farms, Down 195 Colo. v. Watered Rowe be immobilized. In- may vehicle motor Westminster 576 P.2d stead, that because the the court concluded 164 Colo. 435 P.2d Phillips, the individual summons- service of Municipal Rules Court affixing purposes them to Patterson’s automo- The es fair- simplicity procedure, to “secure comply require- did not notice are bile Denver, City County temporarily period Safety and of and rized to and for a of sev- for Lavato, hours, enty-two (72) member of the Denver such vеhicle immobilize Officer vehicle, on, installing attaching Department Patter- who immobilized to such Sheriffs trial, designed to restrict the normal Prior Patterson a device automobile. son’s ” punitive complaint waiving of vehicle.... movement such amended substituting City damage claim and screws, clamps, The boot consists metal 4. place County as a defendant of Denver which, padlocking device when attached Lavato. Officer vehicle, prevents being wheel of a from to the driven. unlawfully parked driver of the 7.Should automobile, City section “boot” fee was raised be found with the 5. fifty person- requires Denver to dollars. Code 505.2-2 206(f). compliance with C.M.C.R. al service sought complaint both actual and Patterson’s Cronin, Manager punitive administration and the on the ground ness in elimination that it is in itself reason- unjustifiable expense and delay.” C.M. ably certain to inform those affected.” 650,000 202. Denver issues over sum- C.R. at year. each To monses at 874. service of require personal each summons MacMillan, MacMillan See also 174 Colo. not be consistent with the purposes would Applying 482 P.2d the Mul- Municipal Court securing Rules in test of service now lane method simplicity procedure or eliminating un- review, practice under we conclude that the expense justifiable delay. The Munici- affixing summonses complaints Rules were pal pro- not intended to illegally parked vehicles which are left vide a basis for serving posses- owner or is a method unattended of service reason- of unlawfully parked sor motor vehicles. A provide certain to ably of the viola- requirement personal service for such Although a summons may tion. so served violations would be impracticable and un- always be recеived due to outside duly burdensome on Denver’s law enforce- forces, does not require that the resources and ment de- unreasonably adopted method of service be absolutely lay charges. the resolution of the Prima certain to notice in every instance. responsibility facie an unlawfully Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and parked motor vehicle be imposed upon Co., supra; see Trust also MacMillan v. registered owner a municipality’s use MacMillan, addition, if no re- police power enactment of to the summons sponse is received traffic ordinances. Columbus v. Traffic Violations Bureau within seven *5 Webster, 327, 170 Ohio St. 164 N.E.2d 734 505.5 of days, section the Denver Municipal (1960). Accord Baker v. of Iowa City, provides that a subsequent Code notice of (Iowa 1977). 260 N.W.2d 427 violation shall be mailed to the violator.8 not We do believe ‍‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌​​​​‌​‌​‍that fundamental We therefore hold that the fundamental

principles process of due require personal process of due principles are satisfied parking service of summonses. In Mullane methods service and the notice of park- Co., v. Hanover Central Bank and Trust 339 ing violations currently рrovided by Denver. 306, 652,94 70 (1950), U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 865 we Accordingly, reverse the decision of the Supreme the United States Court set forth trial court on the issue of service. following test to applied be in determin ing whether the method of service utilized III. provide notice satisfies the requirements process:

of due Patterson claims that the immobili “The means of his vehicle employed zation without notice and the [to notice] must be such as one right desirous of to a actually right violated his to due informing the might guaranteed absentee of law reasonably by the Four adopt accomplish it. Thе Amendment reasonable- teenth to the United States ness and hence the II, constitutional validity and Article section 25 of Constitution chosen method be defended We agree. the Colorado Constitution.9 Mails, 8. Section 505.5 of the Denver Code States the Traffic Violations Bureau provides: shall send another notice mail to the own- original er of the vehicle to which the Comply “Failure to with Notice Attached to affixed, informing him of the violation.” Parked Vehicle. If a violator of the restric- stopping, standing parking tions on or under precluded addressing 9. We arе not this Main Division FIVE of this Revised Munici- that it was not on issue the fact ruled Code, pal does not to a notice affixed parties since this court below action period to such motor vehicle within a pleadings. raised the issue their trial court (7) days, by appearance seven at the Traffic such, properly As it is before us at this time. arranging pay- Violations Bureau and Tri-County Cf. Matthews v. Water Conservan- ment, disposition charge, or other of the or District, Colo., cy (1980); Board 613 P.2d 889 by mailing payment by means of the United 536 535, Burson, 402 Bell v. U.S. when needed. that requires due process

Procеdural 1589, 90 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 539, possessory prop a interest 91 S.Ct. with person Francisco, be an 557 the state must afforded v. (1971); Stypmann seized San erty Nichol, no for a (9th 1977); Graff opportunity 1338 Cir. F.2d Georgia North Finish hearing. tice of While (N.D. 974 Ill. F.Supp. 370 601, Di-Chem, Inc., 95 419 U.S. Inc. v. ing, temporarily may only be interest owner’s 719,42 (1975); Armstrong L.Ed.2d 751 S.Ct. upon the boot is removed restricted 1187, Manzo, 14 85 S.Ct. fines accumulated of the payment Lounge New Safari L.Ed.2d fee, it does diminish a “boot” P.2d Springs, 193 Colo. in vio deprivation has occurred that a fact Supreme As the United States process:10 lation of Shevin, Fuentes v. has stated in bright lines draws no process] “[Due U.S. deрri- day day or 50 three-day, around (1972): tak- Any significant property. vations century the central “For more than within the by the State is property had meaning of Due Process Clause. Al- of the purview rights are to clear: ‘Parties whose been severity dep- length though heard; entitled to be affected are be would be possession of use or rivation right they may enjoy in order determining weigh factor another It equally first be notified.’ they must form of appropriate [is] right that the to notice and fundamental determinative not deemed to be heard ‘must be ” (Citations some sort.’ hearing of and in a meaningful at a time granted Georgia Finishing, ” Inc. omitted.) North (Citations manner.’ omit- meaningful Inc., 606, 95 Di-Chem, at S.Ct. U.S. ted.) at at at 757. 722 L.Ed.2d at 569-70. enforced, property interests de- interest As now individual’s Secondly, the procedure of by the immobilization prived “boot” fee pay used to money 505.11-1(15) of the Denver Munici- section for the removal by Denver collected (1) are twofold: an interest in and pal Code device itself is also constitu *6 vehicle; (2) an the immobilized use of Landrieu, Remm v. tionally protected. See in the “boot” fee collected Den- interest (E.D. 1976). La. also 542 See F.Supp. 418 the removal of the immobilization ver for Beckwith, Pharmacies v. Fabulous Webbs may significant Both interests be device. 446, 155, 66 L.Ed.2d 358 101 S.Ct. 449 U.S. involved. individual the Cook, Woodworking Co. v. Buffelen (1980); In 501, (1981). Wash.App. 625 P.2d 703 28

First, right to the contin an owner’s now under review as the ordinance asmuch uninterrupted use of his possession ued the owner whereby no mechanism provides the protected by is constitutional immo can the the automobile process. A person’s of due abili provisions depri the procedure improper, as living well bilization ‍‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌​​​​‌​‌​‍to make a as access both ty payment results from the аnd amenities of life vation which the necessities final.11 fee must be considered on the of an automobile “boot” depend availability the 1974) (tem- Iwerks, Nichols, (N.D. F.Supp. Adjustment 974 Ill. of Adams 135 370 vehicles). 578, (1957). impoundment porary of abandoned 316 P.2d 573 Colo. instances, following temporary is not altered Denver’s conclusion 11. Our that, deprivation immobilization be a vehicle or interest was should the related contention improper, ready sufficiently significant answer in dam- it “stands deemed to warrant a Burson, subsequent hearing: ages predeprivation error.” A action Bell v. 402 for said 1586, 1589, infirmi- does not cure the due 91 S.Ct. 39 L.Ed.2d U.S. (1971) (temporary suspension ty from the failure to results 90 of a driver’s which Blackwood, compliance requirements license); F.Supp. hearing Tedeschi v. 410 Shevin, 67, (D.C. 1976) (temporary impoundment process. 407 U.S. Fuentes v. 34 Conn. 1983, (1972). vehicles); 82, apparently L.Ed.2d 32 556 abandoned Graff v. 92 S.Ct.

537 Therefore, Co., 600, because constitutionally protect- Mitchell v. W. T. Grant 416 U.S. 94 1895, (1974); interests are 40 private ed involved when an S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 406 New Sa Lounge v. Springs, supra. is immobilized fari sec- The United has 505.11-1(15) Supreme long of the Denver States tion recognized exception general rule Code, we conclude thаt the due process re- deprivation property requires of a quirements hearing no- pre-deprivation hearing extraordinary provided.12 tice of must be where a circumstances valid governmental a property depri Once or liberty justifies is at stake which postpon interest shown, procedur vation fundamental until after the event. Cale process safeguards al due of notice and an Co., ro-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing 416 to be meaningful heard “at a 663, 2080, 94 S.Ct. 40 U.S. L.Ed.2d 452 meaningful and in a time manner” are ab Shevin, (1974); supra; Fuentes Boddie v. However, specific solute. procedures Connecticut, 371, 780, 91 28 S.Ct. will vary depending upon the na cases, L.Ed.2d 113 In such the bal Carson, ture of each Craig case. 449 ancing approach recognizes that the fiscal (M.D. Fla. F.Supp. 385 See Mullane pre-depriva and administrative burden of a Co., Hanover Bank v. Central and Trust hearing may outweigh incremental 306, U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 865 in fairness and accuracy resulting benefits determining procedures what must be from such a especially cases satisfy proc afforded constitutional due large which occur in numbers involve or requirements particular cаse, ess in a relatively little risk of error or temporary Supreme States United Court has formulat deprivations. Eldridge, Mathews v. supra. balancing test weighs ed fol Tribe, supra at 10-14. See § lowing (1) three factors: private the kind of case, magnitude In this stake; (2) at interest risk of an errone private temporary interest stake is the deprivation of that interest ous and the the use of the loss of automobile and value of probable additional or substitute paid funds release of the vehicle. risk; procedures reducing (3) Although clearly these are inter property govеrnmental interest public involved process pro ests sufficient to mandate due the fiscal and administrative burden tection, they are minimal and of limited requirements additional Co., duration. Mitchell v. W. T. Grant See Organization entail. Smith of Foster New supra; Lounge Safari v. Colorado Families, Moreover, the risk erro Springs, (1977); Love, Dixon v. 431 U.S. deprivation neous also minimal here. It (1977); S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 172 simple procedure is a to determine that a Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. violation has occurred. See Sutton Carson, Craig v. *7 Milwaukee, (7th of 672 F.2d 644 Cir. Tribe, L. American See Constitu 1982). system the used in presently Under 10-13, (1978). Law at 540 tional See also § Denvеr, already the violator has had an Lounge v. Springs, New Safari opportunity validity to contest the of each (1977). 193 Colo. P.2d 372 he receives. Those in ticket instances balancing A gener three factors is which some administrative error has oc ally approach the used to determine the satisfactorily curred could be resolved at a timing See, hearing. e.g., hearing. post-immobilization recognizing private expense 12. While interests in- ience and which will result from com- immobilized, process requirements. a vehicle is pliance volved when we are How- with due significant ever, problem expense not unmindful Denver’s interest of additional “while mind, parking regu- kept justify deny- in enforcement of the effective its it does not must be believe, however, hearing meeting ordinary ing not lations. We do that standards process.” Goldberg Kelly, jeopardized by interest is our conclusion in this due only perceive case. The interest which we 25 L.Ed.2d avoiding is be at stake additional inconven- J., (Powell, Di-Chem, Inc., supra concur- contrast, interest governmental In any provision there impor- ring). ordinances is an Nor is enforcing safety public. Den- the loss if the dеtention mitigate one for tant 650,000 v. W. over summons- is Mitchell improper. issue vehicle See ver authorities Co., year. each Because es for T. Grant Moreover, are, nature, movable, the ordi- by their vehicles any subject the violators to the immobi- written and enforced lacks because nance as vehicle procedure history failing whereby have a the owner of the procedure lization summonses, the immobiliza- subsequently “boot” has can Calero-Toiedo v. practical insuring unjustified. method of See proved tion as Co., Leasing supra; au- New presence proper violator’s Yacht Pearson disposition Lounge Springs, supra; and the of overdue v. Colorado thorities Safari (Iowa light of the vast 260 N.W.2d 427 City, number Baker v. Iowa summonses. involved, per- given un- requirement opportunity violations Because no is prior an to contest Denver’s present service and for scheme sonal der the hearing might immobilizing well overwhelm the adminis- a motor vehicle at a action machinery place to deal with traf- we con- prompt post-deprivation trative the contrary, fic violations. On if the vast that the immobilization of Patterson’s clude majority ignore right of violators chose to violated his to due informing possibility them of the law.13 “booted,” just their vehicle would be notices, ignored prior prior all they have IV. requirement would fail to serve the hearing trial, the lower At the conclusion purpose for which it is intended. held that Patterson had failed court conclude that a is We therefore that he had suffered actual dam prove constitutionally prior mandated as a result of his automobile’s immobili age vehicle, of a long motor so Nevertheless, the court awarded zation. is prompt proceeding as a con damages, in nominal Patterson $250 upon available demand after the immobili- cluding: procedures zation has occurred. Under are available in rec- “[N]ominal Denver, currently however, followed in no associated ognition of the intrinsic value hearing is so post-deprivation rights. constitutionally protected with whose vehicles have been immobi- persons proc- assure that order to by the “boot.” As stated in the immo- lized observed, deprivation strictly is ess notice affixed to the immobilized bilization аctionable nominal dam- this vehicle, only release can be obtained after proof injury.” without ages pays owner a “boot” fee and all accu- that nominal dispute Denver does not either registered against fines the vehi- mulated damages are recoverable in a 42 U.S.C. exists in the provision No ordinance cle. obtaining release of action or the amount of the award by post- the vehicle § Rather, argues it is immune deprivation hearing a bond while a itself. Georgia any damage liability North Inc. inasmuch as the pending. Finishing, See constitutionally Althоugh opportu- with must to be heard in accordance Denver Thus, process requirements. nity once an automobile is immo- for a mandated due *8 ordinance, pursuant 505.11-1(15) drafting bilized to section a new should it choose to Code, necessary so, weigh it is not to Denver Denver should the various inter- do by procedure, define what form immobilization affected the enforcement ests view, adopt procedure In our Denver should be left must take. which will afford due flexibility procedures with the to tailor its in of the vehicle. See Math- to the owner legitimate preserve 319, 893, Eldridge, order to law enforce- 47 v. 424 U.S. ews while, time, providing goals at the same ment meaningful opportunity for the vehicle owner which a municipality may escape to immobilize Patterson’s vehicle was liability order the Traffic Violations by issued for unconstitutional conduct by cloaking Bureau Denver Court. The municipali- guise judicial that conduct in the action. maintains that it cannot ty be held liable Inasmuch as no further is made judicial the acts of its damage case, branch. We to the nominal award in this disagree. portion we affirm that judgment. judicial immunity

The doctrine of whiсh Accordingly, expressed for the reasons to invoke in Denver seeks this case as a herein, judgment of the district court is liability judicial shield to extends only affirmed. officers, Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. (1978),

98 S.Ct. 55 L.Ed.2d 331 ROVIRA, J., part concurs in and dissents “intimately those judi associated with the part. phase cial of the criminal process.” Imbler Pachtman, 96 S.Ct. QUINN, JJ., participate. LEE and do not (absolute (1976) immunity prosecutors); Nielson, ROVIRA, Justice, held Spaulding concurring part (5th F.2d 728 1979) dissenting part: Cir. (immunity ap probation officers); plies ‍‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌​​​​‌​‌​‍Slotnick v. Gar with the agree I ex- majority opinion, as finkle, (1st 632 F.2d 1980) (court Cir. II, pressed Section fundamental absolute enjoy clerks immunity). Judicial of due principles process are satisfied however, immunity, does not extend to methods of service and notice of parking those unassociated with judicial process, violations currently Denver.1 I Lucas, (5th 595 F.2d 985 1979) Crowe Cir. agree further with that part of III Section (judicial immunity does not apply city the court’s opinion that holds that a carrying judicial officers out police orders), hearing is not constitutionally mandated nor does it extend to municipalities. Monell prior to the immobilization of a vehicle. Dept. Social Y., Services of of N. respectfully disagree I analysis 56 L.Ed. 611 conclusions of that part III Section (1978); Heimbach v. Village Lyons, which holds that Patterson is entitled to a (2d F.2d 344 Cir. See also Calhoun v. hearing after (booting) Providence, R.I., City of 390 A.2d 350 vehicle and would therefore reverse the Kittitas, Mauro v. County of judgment district court. Wash.App. 613 P.2d Ac cordingly, Denver’s claim that judicial im Stephen Patterson, who was the munity acts to preclude its liability is with owner of automobile bearing New Mexi- merit. out plates, co license received seven summonses complaints illegal parking Furthermore, we do not believe that placed were on the windshield of his car. complained act of in this case represents He admitted that he ignored received and judicial action. While the order to immobi- complaints each these summonses and lize Patterson’s originated appear and did not before the Traffic Viola- court, county it appears to us that this Bureau tions within seven days either simply order was a clerical entry made or contest the pay charges employee an administrative of that court. to section 505.5 of the Denver The record is void of any evidence which Municipal Code. indicate that the court engaged in an independent Patterson, determination as to the propri- having admitted that he re- ety prior of the order to its issuance. We complaints, the summonses and ceived prepared are an avenue also aware that if he did not opinion. 1. Sections 505.4 and 505.5 of the Denver Mu nicipal majority Code. See fn. 1 and 8 of the *9 part company that I It is here subject being to im- vehicle was

charge his my view majority opinion, pounded.2 to chal- opрortunity ample had Patterson that he was denied argument Patterson’s which offense underlying basic lenge whether law rises or falls on process due and failed being car’s booted in his resulted adequate he received was the notice to failure to Patterson’s to do so. to opportunity him an contest were affixed to his car which tickets The sum- illegal parking. charge contesting the fines which his foreclosed recipient advised the complaint mons and his car and obviated against applied were that, protest any charge you wish to you “If allowing him to a bond necessity post a referee between the may appear hearing pending. deprivation while a p.m. a.m. to 12:00 noon or 2 of 8:00 hours short, to a Patterson was not entitled In p.m.” 4:45 standing hearing and lacks post-deprivation failed, seven instanc- in each of Patterson of the ordi- unconstitutionality to raise es, opportunity himself of the to avail because, appear his failure to nance illegal parking charge contest complaints, to the summonses and response acts, act, his or failure to own therefore confеssed his in default and had he was having his jeopardy himself placed offense, illegal park- underlying guilt “booted.” ing. view, the summonses and com- my chal- ample opportunity had Patterson were sufficient notice of he received plaints charge lenge the hearing possible pen- and the right to original booting basis of the was the permit booting. impoundment alty entitled, He is not nor does to do so. failed oppor- notice of and the Having given been require, another hearing meaningful for a at a time tunity unjustified. as booting manner, require- meaningful in a have been ments essence, majority opinion counte- Shevin, Fuentes v. met. See ignoring of a citizen in acts nances the scoff law who habitu- law and rewards ig- parking regulations and ally violates opinion correctly points out The court’s placed on his car. tickets nores prop- with an “interest person that a op- must be afforded an erty to be seized the dis- judgment reverse the I would for a portunity court. trict hearing.” It notes that the owner of has a to the use of his an automobile an interest fee he

property and boot for the removal of the boot. It paid

has that the Denver ordinance is

then concludes provides because it no

unconstitutional whereby the owner of the auto-

mechanism challenge, post-deprivation can

mobile booting procedure improper.

Further, it condemns the ordinance because obtaining exists for release of provision

no by posting depriva- bond while a

a vehicle pending. LAW, following ER BY lan- PENALTIES AS PRESCRIBED summons contained the 2. The guage: OF THE THE IMPOUNDING INCLUDING THE ISSUANCE INVOLVED ‍‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌​​​​‌​‌​‍AND VEHICLE FAILURE “IMPORTANT: TO RESPOND THE ARREST OF FOR A WARRANT OF 30 DAYS OF ISSUE DATE WILL WITHIN VIOLATOR.” THE THE SUBJECT VIOLATOR TO SUCH OTH-

Case Details

Case Name: Patterson v. Cronin
Court Name: Supreme Court of Colorado
Date Published: Aug 23, 1982
Citation: 650 P.2d 531
Docket Number: 80SA80
Court Abbreviation: Colo.
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