Patterson v. . Bryant

Dec 13, 1939

Versions:

Seawell, J.

The only question argued by the defendant in this Court relates to the refusal of the trial judge to allow his motion for judgment as of nonsuit made at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s evidence and renewed at the conclusion of all the evidеnce.

Defendant’s counsel contends that the motion for judgment as of nonsuit should have been allowed (I) because there was no allegation or evidence of the breach of any covenant in the deed from defendant to plaintiff; (2) that there was no allegation or evidence of any unjust enrichment of the defendant; ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍and (3) that there was no allegation or evidence of fraud or guilty knowledge or intentional unfair dealings on the part of thе defendant. It is further pointed out that the plaintiff was negligent or guilty of laches in recording his deed, and that his loss or injury, if any, wаs due to that cause.

The deed does not, in fact, contain any covenants or warranties, but the rights of the plaintiff in this suit are not predicated upon a breach of any warranty in the deed, but upon a broader principlе: the breach of duty which he conceives the defendant owed him of refraining from the deliberate selling of the land a second time, with the knowledge that he was jeopardizing the rights of plaintiff, and thus setting in motion a chain of events that defeated the title of the jilaintiff, while it left the defendant enriched by the purchase ■ price paid to him by the plaintiff, as well as that paid to him by his subsequent grantees of the same property.

The single question before us is whether in еquity the defendant may be allowed to retain the money received ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍as a purchase price from both of these parties, and, if not, to whom restitution should be made.

It is true in a general sense that the plaintiff lost the title to his land by his failure to record his deed promptly. For reasons of public policy, C. S., 3309, in cases coming within its purview, undertakеs to determine the question of title upon the fact of registration, making the unregistered title ineffective as agаinst a subsequent holder from the same grantor for a valuable consideration except from registration. For thе *553 same reasons of public policy, actual knowledge on the part of the holder of the registered title of the execution of the prior deed, in ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍the absence of fraud or matters creating an estoppel, will not avail to defeat his title as a purchaser for a valuable consideration.

The statute is intended to render titles certain and secure and to prevent confusion, mistake, and fraud growing out of the existence of unregistered and unknown titles which might defeat a subsequent purchaser for value. Warren v. Williford, 148 N. C., 474, 62 S. E., 697; Weston v. Lumber Co., 160 N. C., 263, 75 S. E., 800. It is objective in its character and doеs not attempt to settle any equities which might exist between a grantor and those to whom he has sold his ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍land, and those tо whom he has resold it either mistakenly or deliberately and fraudulently. The deed made by him in the first instance is good inter partes. Hargrove v. Adcock, 111 N. C., 166, 16 S. E., 16; Warren v. Williford, supra; Weston v. Lumber Co., supra. Whether it is registered at all is of no consequence to the grantor, and the statute requiring conveyances to be registеred is not for his protection, but, as stated, for protection of a subsequent purchaser with whom he has seen fit to deal; therefore, laches on the part of his first grantee in recording his deed is not available to defendаnt as an equitable defense. The first grantee is not bound to anticipate that the grantor would sell the property again and rush off to the registry office to forestall such a breach of faith. As between the parties, any loss sustained by the plaintiff in the transaction complained of must be regarded as the result of the defendant’s conduct in dealing doubly with the plaintiff and with subsequent grantees to whom he successfully transferred the timber.

It cannot be said that the defеndant was unaware of the fact that he was selling his timber a second time and a second time receiving pay for it. According to witnesses present when the deed to Grimes and others was signed, the defendant there sought to justify his action by raising a question as to the fairness and validity of the former transaction between himself and this plaintiff — hesitating to sign the deed until he could receive assurances that witnesses might remember phases of the ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍former transaction agreeable to his present purpose. The evidence was sufficient to sustain an inference that the act was deliberate and that the defendant might at the time have known that he was violating a duty either to the plaintiff or to thе persons who were then about to receive title to the land. That was a violation of duty, the consequences of which will be referred to the act of the defendant himself, without whose wrongful act the plaintiff would not have sustained his loss.

But to sustain this action it is not necessary for the plaintiff to maintain it as one of tort. If we wish to be technical about the forms of *554 action, wbicb we consider wholly unnecessary in tbis case, it may be regarded as an action of assumpsit, involving tbe principles of quasi contract,- wbicb are broad enough to include practically every instance where a defendant has received money wbicb be is “obliged by tbe ties of natural justice and equity to refund.” 41 C. J., p. 29, note 7 (c). “A person who hаs been unjustly enriched at tbe expense of another is required to make restitution to tbe other.” Restatement of tbe law; Restitution. Am. Law Inst. 1937, p. 27.

According to tbe facts found by tbe jury, tbe plaintiff has paid to tbe defendant a sum of money for wbicb be received no value. Tbe defendant has in bis bands tbis money, as well as tbe price paid to him for tbe samе thing by bis subsequent grantees. Equity will not permit him to retain both. Restitution must be made to tbe plaintiff, whose present condition is, in part at least, due to tbe conduct of tbe defendant. In tbis case tbe amount of restitution was properly left to tbe jury, upon tbe evidence.

Tbe judgment is

Affirmed.