*1 Wе therefore find that Barbara is entitled Sweeney $9,228.51, reject her contention interest allowed on the $9,000 note held by Girard Trust.
The judgment of the court below is vacated and judgment is here entered for appellant in the amount оf $9,288.51.
Mr. Justice Roberts concurs the result. Mr. Justice Cohen took no part in the consideration decision this case. Appellant, Pattani, Insurance
Company. *2 Mus- C. April 1967. Before Argued 20, J., Bell, O’Brien Roberts, and Cohen, manno, Jones, Eagen, JJ.
re 1967. August 14, refused аrgument him Joseph M. Feldman, O. Stephen Feldman, for Feldman, appellant. Feldman appellee. for Kohonos, John S. by
Opinion June 29, 1967: Justice Mr. O’Brien, appellant, injured Pattani, collision, Bruce on between an January auto- whiсh occurred mobile Mmby driven and one driven by Taylor. Reversa Tbe Taylor at tbe time of automobile, tbe insured Wissahiekon by Mutual Casualty Company, and appellant was insured In- by appellee, Company. Appellant’s aр- surance written policy, contained uninsured re- pellee, coverage, Act quired P. L. August 909, §1, 14, 1963, P.S. §2000. provides liability
The statute all automobile policies issued within the are Commonwealth required expressly unless the provide, covеrage for rejected writing, damages caused The operators of motor owners vehicles. pol- not define uninsured statute does motorists. an unin- involved define icy provision does, however, *3 to “an automobile as which there sured automobile as: time applicable . insurance at the policy . . . no . . is respect or to which there the accident ... with of the time of the accident but at the applicable a policy denies thereunder.” the same writing Reversa trespass against suit in filed a Appellant sus personal injuries for damages to recover Taylor, Mutual entered Wissahiekon in the collision. tained represent and Taylor, of Miss on behalf into a defense arbitration hear during compulsory to a up ed her of in Court County the February 21, 1966, on held ing, re hearing arbitration That County. Philadelphia amount of appellant for finding $719. ain sulted insol Mutual, being Wissahiekon On March appellant receivership. Thereupon, into went vent, be sub the matter appellee upon demand made a provisions the in accordance arbitration to mitted his in coverage contained motorist his uninsured of refusеd arbitra Appellee appellee. written policy in the Court an action commenced appellant tion, compel County to Philadelphia of Pleas Common appellant denied, petition arbitrаtion. appealed to the Superior which affirmed Court, judgment of the Court of Common with one Pleas, On Judge appellant’s dissenting. we petition, granted allocatur.1
The issue before this court was well stated majority opinion оf the Superior Court as “whether provision automobile [this] [policy] extend those covered under policy when at the time of the accident person the ac- causing cident was covered insurance by liability which subsе- lapsed because of the car- quently insolvency rier.” The Court Superior majority concluded of the carrier to the accident insolvency did not provision make the uninsured motorist we reach an conclusion. We policy applicable; opposite agree opinion with the statement dissenting that: “When an insurer fails against or to a satisfy judgment defend claim, it 'denies voluntarily involuntarily, whether insured, him in sense of that only meaningful coverage’ term.” of the Court concluded that
The majority
in
automobile was covered
Taylor
inasmuch as
time of the
and there had been
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Taylor
denial of that
express
no
within the
not an uninsured vеhicle
automobile
This
while novel
provision.
case,
policy
of the
meaning
*4
been con
of
has
Pennsylvania,
courts
appellate
in the
The Su
jurisdictions.
in other
decided
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Virginia,
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Farm Mutual Automobile
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State
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337 of the collision. The South Supreme Carolina Court adopted the of Brower language that: “An insurer de- nies coverage its insured when it fails refuses accord him the protection it contracted to give.” in the instant contends
Appellee, that case, South Carolina in dependent decision Gibson is upon 1963 amendment to the South Carolina which statute, amendment defined an uninsured vehicle specifically as one on which there was insurance but the insurance carrier it insol subsequently who wrote declared vent. is not rationale of the South Such, however, pur Carolina decision. It held specifically pose rather and effect of the amendment was clarify, than to afforded the statute coverage broaden, time it and at prior existed to the amendment In that to the case. of the accident rise gave which in the decision it be added should connection, E.D. F. S.C. Supp. Federal Ins. Co. v. Speight, construed the Federal District Court wherein (1963), as the in the same manner the South Carolina statute of no at is policy bar, Superior Court construed pre as that decision inasmuch authoritative value, Court Supreme and the 11 months, ceded Gibson to the contrary. decided Gibson, Carolina, South Katz subject on this recent decision The most Reporter Ins. 53 Cal. Co., Motorist American Appeals California Court of In that case, (1966). similar to those faced by a situation faced and South Carolina. Virginia courts of appellate requiring uninsured motorist the statute too, There, motor vehicle as one, an defined coverage but writ covered alia, inter Once again, thereunder. it denies ing insolvent to the became сarrier tortfeasor’s of California Appeals adopt Court and South Carolina. Virginia reasoning ed “The of the Vir reasoning stated: pertinently ginia con court Brower and is case is sound, *6 spirit sistent with the and letter of California part pat statute. [The California statute] is a of monetary- ‘designed give tern of statutes which are protection changing large tragically ever group persons lawfully using high of who while neg ways grave through injury themselves suffer ligent highwаys by [citing use of those cases] others.’ liberally carry Such statutes be must construed to out objective compensation providing this of those in for jured through [citing no cases].2 fault their own. statutory objective giving by
“The is not attained person injured against Our an insolvent. a claim that an conclusion is insurer who becomes insolvent coverage’ meaning ‘denies California [the within plaintiff . . . and that here is to the statute] entitled protection policy defendant afforded written respect with to uninsured motorists.” way only in bar differs from The which case at Virginia, in and Cali- decided South Carolina those Pennsylvania uninsured the fact that the is in fornia, vehicles, does not define uninsured motorist statute Virginia, California South Carolina and whereas the question policy de- however, in here, The do. statutes exactly in the same almost vehicles uninsured fines of the other whose states, the statutes do fashion agree their We with con- hеrein. cited are decisions opin- dissenting of the conclusion and with clusion, insolvency tort- of the Court that of the ion occurring to the carrier feasor’s inability of that carrier consequent or refusal has pay judgments to whiсh insured to defend within a denial constitutes liable, become pol- provision insured’s 1966) (R.I. Fusco, A. 2d 447 Co. Ins. Allstate also See added). (footnote icy proceed insured entitles the other ac- policy. cordance his own insurance orders Court and of the Philadelphia County of Common Pleas No. are 6 of and the reversed, case is remanded to the Court of Common proceedings for Pleas further consistent here- with. Concurring Opinion by Mr. Justice Robеrts: join
I majority opinion, I but wish to add my the result reached therein mandated is, view, only by not provisions specific the contract of this policy *7 but also Motor Uninsured Vehicles Stat- August Act ute, §2000. P. L. 40 P.S. 14, 1963, An uninsured motorist is one who is without effective inсapable satisfying insurance and is thus imposed liability Legislature. the minimum Clearly Legislature did not intend restrict benefits of the Motor Act to Uninsured Vehicle those eases where the at tortfeasor lacks insurance mo- injury ment of or where insurance carrier denies his recovery, injured by realistically, since one a tort- prior feasor whose carrier is or has become insolvent just unprotected to the satisfaction his claim is as person injured by as is the a tortfeasor has no who all. insurance at to mean when the I read the statute
Thus, company, reason, for whatever defendant’s insurance responsibility contract fails to under the assume existing and the tortfeasоr, between the injured statute and the far both the so tortfeasor, person In an uninsured motorist. concerned, are injured person’s circumstance, either coverage; provide it if were substitute carrier must purpose legislative not would be obvious otherwise the fulfilled. Eagen
Mr. Mr. Justice join Justice Musmanno opinion. this concurring Dissenting Opinion Mr. Justice Jones: I from the expressed majority dissent views opinion on and would affirm the the basis judgment (Levy majority opinion Insurance Ct. Keystone 209 Pa. Company, A. 2d (1966)). joins dissenting
Mr. Chief Bell in this Justice opinion.
Levy, Insurance Appellant, v. Company. *8 C. J., Before 1967. Mus- May 23,
Argued Bell, JJ. Roberts, O’Brien Eagen, Jones, manno, 14, 1967. August refused reargument