Lead Opinion
This is an action by the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc., seeking to enforce an order and judgment requiring the City of New York to pay a 6% salary increase for the 1975-1976 fiscal year. On this appeal the city contends, inter alia, that it is prohibited from paying the increase by the wage freeze legislation adopted by the Legislature in September, 1975.
Having failed to reach accord on the terms of a collective bargaining agreement to cover the two-year period beginning July 1, 1974, the PBA and the city submitted their dispute to an impasse panel pursuant to the provisions of the New York City Collective Bargaining Law (Administrative Code of City of New York, § 1173-1.0 et seq.). The decision and recommendations of the impasse panel, handed down on April 30, 1975, provided that the PBA be granted an 8% salary increase for the first year to be covered by the contract. The salary increase for the second year was set at 6%. The panel’s findings were accepted in writing by both parties and neither sought to appeal the determination to the Board of Collective
Faced with the city’s refusal to execute and perform the agreement, the PBA, by order to show cause, brought on a proceeding under CPLR article 75 to confirm the award of the impasse panel. The city cross-moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the decision of the impasse panel did not constitute an award within the meaning of article 75. The city’s cross motion was denied. The city having subsequently failed to timely serve its answer to the petition, the petition was granted upon default, and the impasse panel’s determination was confirmed by an order and judgment dated and entered on July 1, 1975.
Thereafter the city commenced computing and paying the retroactive salary increase for the 1974-1975 fiscal year and the increase ordered for the 1975-1976 fiscal year, in compliance with the terms of the July 1 order. In September, 1975, however, the Legislature enacted the law freezing the wages of the city’s employees (L 1975, ch 868, § 2, subd 10, as amd by L 1975, ch 870, §11), and the city immediately discontinued paying the 1975-1976 increase.
The PBA then moved to сompel the city to comply with the July 1, 1975 judgment, and the city opposed the motion. The PBA urged that the wage freeze should not be imposed in their case since their salary increase was contained in a judgment of a court and the legislation had no application to wage increases pursuant to judicial judgments. They also mounted a broadside constitutional attack against the statute imposing the wage freeze. The city, on the other hand, asserted that the legislation did apply to the instant set of facts and that the statute suffered no constitutional infirmity.
The lower court held that the wage freeze legislation was not applicable to the instant case involving a salary increase embodied in a judicial judgment. Nevertheless, that court imposed a stay on the enforcement of its judgment until June 30, 1978, declaring that it was doing so "in the interests of justice and equity and in an attempt to further the recovery of the City of New York from its financial plight”. Both parties appealed that court’s determination.
The pertinent provision of the wage freeze legislation provides: "Increases in salary or wages of employees of the city * * * which have taken effect since June thirtieth, nineteen hundred seventy-five or which will take effect after that date pursuant to collective bargaining agreements or other analogous contracts, now in existence or hеreinafter entered into * * * are hereby suspended.” The threshold question now before us, therefore, is whether this statute applies to the present case.
It is fundamental that a court, in interpreting a statute, should attempt to effectuate the intent of the Legislature (Matter of Petterson v Daystrom Corp.,
Had the Legislature intended that the wage freeze also apply to situations involving judicially mandated salary increases, they were free, assuming arguendo constitutional validity, to draft appropriately worded legislation (cf. Bright Homes v Wright,
Nor is our view altered because the July 1 judgment was one confirming the award of the impasse panel. "A judgment entered upon the confirmation of an arbitral award has the same force and effect in all respects as * * * a judgment in an action” (23 Carmody-Wait 2d, NY Prac, § 141:186; see Jacobowitz v Herson,
Finally, we arе in agreement with the Appellate Division in its holding that the lower court was without power to stay the enforcement of its order (see Matter of Young v Gerosa,
We find no merit in any of the other arguments proffered by the city.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed and the certified question answered affirmatively.
Dissenting Opinion
I agree with Judge Cooke that the wage increase awarded to New York City police officers by the impasse panel is encompassed by the terms of the wage freeze legislation. To his discussion, I would add but one observation. It is undisputed that had the city agreed to the wage increasе voluntarily the wage freeze statute would apply. I fail to see how the city’s position is undermined, and the statute rendered inapplicable, because the city exhausted every available procedural and judicial avenue in an effort to resist the payment of a wage increase. The net result of the collective bargaining procedures and the litigation commenced to en
I also agree with Judge Cooke, although on more narrow grounds, that there is no constitutional impediment to the enforcement of wage freeze legislation. To be sure, a collective bargaining agreement is a contract. Although the Federal Constitution prohibits the States from impairing contractual obligations (US Const, art I, § 10), the constitutional prohibition has never been read literally. (See Home Bldg. & Loan Assn, v Blaisdell,
It suffices in this case to state that the impairment clause and the impairment cases never stripped from the States the power to regulate the terms and conditions of work for municipal employees. Whether couched in terms of emergency power or public policy, a State certainly has warrant to adjust the terms of public employment in order to cope with exigent circumstances. The intimate relation between government and its employees permits flexibility of a kind that is absent from agreements between private parties. More dramatically, the same elasticity is missing from the relatiоnship existing between government and its creditors. (Cf. Flushing Nat. Bank v Municipal Assistance Corp. for City of N. Y.,
The City of New York, it is hardly necessary to state, is confronted by a grave financial emergency. Much of the debt with which the city is confronted is constitutional debt—debt which the city must, by Constitution, pay. Obviously, payment requires the city to make budgetary adjustments. Since expenses relating to personnel constitute a significant and quite sizeable budgetary allotment, obviously, too, personnel expenses are candidates for reduction. Here, too, the city is faced with fixed and vested pension payments that are constitutionally unassailable. (NY Const, art V, § 7.) Instead, it is again apparent that future benefit increases are a prime tаrget for the budgetary axe. It is significant, in this connection, that the State has made substantial contributions necessary to sustain governmental operations of the city. It is not unreasonable for the Legislature to demand, as a condition, for State assistance, that the city does not increase its expenses at a time when all State taxpayers are contributing the moneys necessary to avert local fiscal collapse. Although the city cannot deflect responsibility, it is not without significance that the wage freeze has been ordered by the State. It is also not without significance that the сity had been resisting wage increases and, but for the collective bargaining procedures provided by the Legislature, such increases would never have been. Moreover, the increases have not been abrogated but "suspended”. The city’s faith, in this instance, has been good; there is no direct constitutional provision prohibiting wage freezes nor can such prohibition be drawn by reasonable implication. The measures taken by the State have been appropriate to the circumstances. Hence, I conclude that the wage freeze statute is constitutional.
For these rеasons, I would reverse the order of the Appellate Division.
Dissenting Opinion
I dissent and vote to reverse.
The majority’s construction of the terms of the Financial Emergency Act (L 1975, ch 868, § 2, subd 10, as amd by L 1975, ch 870, § 11) elevates form over substance. The act suspends wage increases "pursuant to collective bargaining agreements or other analogous contracts.” The judgment of Special Term confirming the impasse panel’s award did not create the police officers’ right to the wage increases. The
The majority asserts that since the statute describes "particular situations” to which it applies, "an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted or excluded” (quoting from McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes, § 240).
First of all, the statute speaks to "Increases in salary or wages * * * pursuant to collective bargaining agreements or other anаlogous contracts.” The judgment obtained was not separate and apart from the collective bargaining agreement on which it was based. A judgment does not create new rights but defines and determines what rights already exist. That the terms "agreements or other analogous contracts” embrace judgments obtained for the enforcement thereof has been determined previously and effectively by this very court in Jacobs v Newman (
A review of these other principles manifests the technical nature of the majority’s analysis. In construing a statute, the " 'intent of the Legislature in enacting legislation is the primary object to be found’ ” and " '[wjhenever such intention is apparent it must be followed in construing the statute’ ” (Matter of Astman v Kelly,
The fact that othеr portions of the act refer specifically to judgments (Local Finance Law, §§ 85.10, 85.30; L 1975, ch 868, § 19, as repealed and superseded by L 1975, ch 870, §§ 24, 26, respectively), casts little light on the intention of the Legislature with respect to the wage freeze, since those provisions of the act were designed specifically to deal with "claims” against the municipality.
The majority further notes that since "the statute in question was adopted some two months after the July 1 judgment requiring that the city pay the salary increase * * * we must assume the Legislature was well aware of this fact when the stаtute was passed” (p 209). This does not mean that the Legislature intended to omit judgments from the act. One may just as easily assume not only, as the majority implies, that the Legislature was aware of the judgment, but also that it was rendered on July 1, and, therefore, that the act was made applicable to wage increases "which have taken effect since June thirtieth” specifically to cover this wage increase.
It is a recognized principle that "statutes promoting the public good are liberally construed” (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes, § 341; see Englishbe v Helmuth,
There is no question but that the act applies to judgments arising out of the negotiating contracts and, therefore, we should reach the PBA’s contentions as to the act’s validity.
It is asserted that the judgment obtained at Special Term may not be impaired by the subsequent passage of the act suspending wage increases. In this respect, it is sufficient to note that where a statute "is enacted after judgment and pеnding appeal, the appellate court may dispose of the case in accordance with the law as changed by the statute” (Robinson v Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co.,
The next and principal contention of the PBA is that the act contravenes the Federal contract clause (US Const, art I, § 10). In this respect, the case of Flushing Nat. Bank v Municipal Assistance Corp. for City of N. Y. (
Turning then to the question of whether the Federal contract clause prohibits the wage freeze, the principles are well established. As one noted authority has stated: "When a state permits within its jurisdiction certain contracts, or enters into contracts itself with private parties, it always reserves the right as a sovereign to make whatever changes are necessary to protect the public health, safety, morality or general welfare.” (1 Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, § 3:30, p 250.)
This principle was derived from the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Home Bldg. & Loan Assn, v Blaisdell (
Despite the broad language of the court in Blaisdell, it is argued that the exercise of the police power is limited to a temporary impairment and that, thus, depending on the degree of impairment, in some instances the State may not exercise the police power to provide essential services. This same argument was raised in Blaisdell and there the court
The PBA argues, howеver, that the legislative measures here taken are not reasonable and appropriate. This argument is totally without merit. It is indeed reasonable and appropriate to freeze wages and to take various other measures to reduce expenditures in order to provide funds for essential services—such as hospitals, schools, fire protection, sanitation and indeed, even a continuation of police protection itself. The need for the State to act for the general welfare of its people was definitively expressed in East N. Y. Bank v Hahn (
"The Blaisdell case and decisions rendered since (e.g., Honeyman v. Jacobs,
The cases of Worthen Co. v Thomas (
The narrow ground upon which Judge Jasen resolves the constitutional issue is not in line with prevailing cases as they have developed. The key to this case is the relationship between the State and all its people and not the relationship between the State and public employees. Under Blaisdell, if the legislation is reasonable and appropriate, it is permissible even if it interferes with the rights of private partiеs, as well as public employees.
As stated in Blaisdell (290 US, pp 447-448), whether the legislation is wise or unwise as a matter of policy is a question
Without question, the cases are legion, the principles well established, and the wage freeze provision of the act should be declared constitutional.
Accordingly, there should be a reversal.
Chief Judge Breitel and Judges Gabrielli and Jones concur with Judge Wachtler; Judges Jasen and Cooke dissent and vote to reverse in separate dissenting opinions; Judge Fuchsberg taking no part.
Order affirmed, with costs. Question certified answered in the affirmative.
Notes
This section citеd by the majority, at page 414, itself states: "The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not, however, an ironbound rule of law excluding in all cases from the operation of a statute those things which are not enumerated therein. It is merely an aid to be utilized in ascertaining the meaning of a statute when its language is ambiguous, and should be applied to accomplish the legislative intention, not to defeat it. If the language of a statute indicates that other things than those mentioned are intended to be included within its operation, the maxim will not necessarily require their exclusion, but in such case the intention to the contrary must be discernable from the context of the act itself.” (Emphasis added.)