Cupo v. United StatesCupo v. United States
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Edgerton, Danaher, Wright
EDGERTON, Senior Circuit Judge:
The six appellants were jointly indicted for conspiracy to violate the false pretenses statute of the District of Columbia and five were also charged individually with substantive violations of that statute.
The essence of the alleged conspiracy was that certain appellants would get merchandise on credit from certain stores by false statements about their employment and would return much of the merchandise for cash. In separate false pretense counts, Cupo and Decker were charged with getting merchandise from Bruce Hunt, Inc., by such statements, which were also charged as overt acts in the conspiracy. They were convicted of false pretenses and sentenced concurrently with sentences for conspiracy. Appellants Carbonaro, Palmer and Pelletreau were charged, convicted and sentenced in separate counts for getting automobiles by false statements regarding their employment. Pelletreau‘s sentence was concurrent with his sentence for conspiracy.
I. Joinder of Carbonaro.
Joinder of all the appellants in one indictment appears to have been authorized by Rule 8(b), because all were charged with the same conspiracy. Joinder of the separate charges against Cupo and Decker that they got merchandise by false pretenses was also authorized by 8(b), because these offenses were alleged to be parts of the same conspiracy. But joinder of the separate charges against Carbonaro, Palmer and Pelletreau, that they got automobiles by false pretenses, was not authorized unless these offenses also were in effect alleged to be parts of “the same act or transaction or
The offenses of getting automobiles by false pretenses were not charged in the indictment as overt acts in the conspiracy and were not introduced in evidence as parts of the conspiracy. Although the conspirators planned that merchandise obtained from stores would not be paid for and much of it would be returned for cash, there is no evidence of an intent not to pay for the automobiles. Moreover, the automobile frauds charged against Carbonaro and Pelletreau seem to have occurred before the conspiracy was formed. Pelletreau applied for credit to finance his automobile purchase on July 16, 1962, and Carbonaro on August 8, 1962. Though the indictment charged that the conspiracy began “on or about” July 1962, there is no evidence that it began before October, when Carbonaro was alleged to have got merchandise from S. Kann Sons Company by forging Cupo‘s name. This was the earliest act alleged to be a part of the conspiracy. All other acts alleged to be parts of the conspiracy and all discussions indicating the existence of a conspiracy occurred later. There does not appear to be any theory on which it can be said that Carbonaro‘s getting an automobile by false pretenses was in effect alleged to be part of “the same act or transaction or * * * the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses” as the conspiracy. It follows that
II. Joinder of appellants other than Carbonaro. The remaining appellants, except Sullivan, did not ask for severance and so waived any rights under Rule 8.
III. Sullivan‘s police fingerprint card. Appellant Sullivan says the admission of this card in evidence was equivalent to admitting evidence of previous arrests or convictions. See Leigh v. United States, 113 U.S.App.D.C. 390, 308 F.2d 345 (1962). But in stating his objection counsel did not make clear that it was based on this theory, or ask that the jury be told that the fingerprint card related to Sullivan‘s arrest in the case they were trying. Moreover it is unlikely that the card conveyed a different impression to the jury. The transactions involved in this case occurred late in 1962 and early in 1963. The jury was told that the card was dated April 25, 1963.
IV. The charge to the jury. Both the false pretenses statute,
We find no such error in the charge that “proof beyond a reasonable doubt is such proof as will result in an abiding conviction of the defendant‘s guilt on your part, such a conviction as you would be willing to act upon in the more weighty and important matters relating to your own affairs.” Counsel did not object and it is most unlikely that prejudice resulted. McGill v. United States, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 179, 348 F.2d 791 (1965); Scurry v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 374, 347 F.2d 468 (1965).
We do not reach Pelletreau‘s contentions regarding his conviction of false pretenses since we find no error affecting his conviction on the conspiracy count, for which he received a concurrent sentence. In our opinion the other questions raised by the appellants do not require discussion.
Nos. 19140, 19142, 19143, 19144 and 19145 affirmed;
No. 19141 reversed and remanded for a new trial.