History
  • No items yet
midpage
Patricio Hernandez-Cordero and Maria Guadalupe Ortega De Hernandez v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Service
819 F.2d 558
5th Cir.
1987
Check Treatment

*1 court wearing its Erie coiffure appropriate-

ly may fill gap law, in a in state but may it

neither disregard nor specific overrule

holdings by the highest state’s court in

interpreting the state’s substantive law.

(cid:127) AFFIRMED.

Patricio HERNANDEZ-CORDERO and Guadalupe Ortega

Maria de

Hernandez, Petitioners,

UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION & SERVICE,

NATURALIZATION

Respondent.

No. 85-4587.

United States Appeals, Court of

Fifth Circuit.

June

The Hernandezes have four children: Victor, Jr., age 11, Lisa, age Patricio Veronica, age age 9 and 8. Victor is a citizen; youngest Mexican the three chil- dren are American citizens. subject deportation Hernandez is

Mr. he has never because obtained a visa. 8 Hines, Austin, Tex., petition- for Barbara 1251(a)(1). Although U.S.C. Mrs. Her- ers. permit upon nandez obtained a visitor’s her States, entry to the United she is also sub- Pa., Rudnick, Philadelphia, Lawrence H. ject deportation because she did not de- Immigration. curiae AM for amicus 1251(a)(2). part expired. when it 8 U.S.C. Meese, III, Spears, M. Edwin James applied Mr. and Mrs. Hernandez for a Justice, Gen., Dept, Robert L. Atty. of suspension deportation and contended Director, Bombaugh, Office they eligible discretionary for that were Hausman, Div., Litigation, Allen W. Civ. deportation relief would cause because Johnson, Director, Eloise Madelyn Asst. E. hardship.” them “extreme See 8 U.S.C. Rosas, Evans, Lauri Steven Richard M. 1254(a)(1). argued The Hernandezes Golding, Attys., Filppu, Marshall Tamor deportation would cause economic D.C., Washington, for I.N.S. hardship they because would be forced to Casillas, Director, M. Dist. San Richard newly-bought sell their home at a loss and Lambert, Antonio, Tex., H. Dist. Di- David difficulty finding work in Mexi- would La., rector, I.N.S., Orleans, for other New hardship co. The evidence of economic was parties. interested supported an affidavit from an econo- specializes in Latin America. The mist who argued Hernandezes also psychological cause emotional and would they uprooted hardship because would be GEE, CLARK, Judge, Before Chief community from the to which had REAVLEY, POLITZ, RUBIN, grown An was accustomed. affidavit sub- WILLIAMS, RANDALL, JOHNSON, psychologist from a licensed detail- mitted HIGGINBOTHAM, GARWOOD, JOLLY, ing the emotional difficulties Hernan- JONES, DAVIS, HILL and Circuit likely deported. if family dez would suffer Judges. also affidavits re- Six teachers submitted oppor- garding the diminished educational DAVIS, Judge: Circuit W. EUGENE tunity in Mexico and the adverse available wife, and his Patricio Hernandez-Cordero Her- likely have on the impact this would Hernandez, Ortega ap- de Guadalupe Maria nandez children. application for a peal of their the denial evidence, evaluating all of the After suspension deportation. 8 U.S.C. immigration judge denied the 1254(a)(1). We affirm. suspension deportation. for a deporta- immigration judge found that I. hardship for Mr. and Mrs. tion would cause children, he found Hernandez and their are citizens of Mr. and Mrs. Hernandez hardship not “extreme.” that the was Republic They Mexico. have resided recognized the economic continuously immigration judge since in the United States at hardship selling newly-bought home a in 1975. Mr. Hernandez they were married loss, a “self- concluded that this was trim-carpenter contrac- a but self-employed is a $12,000 the house was per inflicted wound” because approximately tor and earns deportation pro- after several months year. is a housewife. built Mrs. Hernandez immigration ceedings ap- commenced. assets are valued at The Hernandezes’ employment recognized that the judge also $70,000. proximately opportunities in Mexico are not as favor physically present in the United States for able as those in States, the United but a period continuous of at years least seven noted that it is well-established that immediately preceding eco application; (2) nomic alone person cannot is good constitute “ex character; moral See, hardship.” treme person is e.g., deportation would, Zamora-Gar whose “in cia v. F.2d (5th of the Attorney General,” Cir.1984). re Even considering sult “extreme to the combined alien or effect of *3 spouse, economic to his parent, child, or who is potential other a hardship factors, citizen of the United or immigration States an alien judge lawfully permanent found that the admitted for hardship was not residence. “extreme.” 1254(a)(1). 8 U.S.C. Hernandezes are burden is on young, healthy and alien to significant establish eligibility his family for a sus ties in Mexicowhere pension parents of deportation. their and most of Gomez-Martinez their brothers and INS, v. (5th Cir.), sisters 593 F.2d reside. 10 denied, The immigration cert. judge spe 941, cifically 444 295, U.S. 100 found S.Ct. 62 deportation L.Ed.2d 307 not would (1979). cause “extreme hardship” to any of the three American citizen who, children nota Second, even if these eligibility require bly, bilingual. are satisfied, ments are the Attorney General retains the suspend, discretion to or refuse The Board Immigration Appeals (BIA) to suspend, deportation. INS v. Rios-Pine upheld the denial of the application for a da, 444, 446, 105 2098, 2100, 85 471 U.S. S.Ct. suspension deportation. The BIA evalu- L.Ed.2d (1985). 452 As corollary to this all ated of the alleged hardships that depor- ultimate to deny discretion relief to an oth tation would cause for the Hernandez fami- eligible alien, erwise Supreme Court ly, including the financial hardship, the dif- explained has that “if the Attorney General ficulties of adjusting to Mexico, life in and decides that relief should be denied as a the educational burden on the children. In discretion, matter of he need not consider affirming immigration judge’s determi- whether the threshold statutory eligibility nation that deportation would not cause requirements are met.” at Id. “extreme hardship,” the BIA expressly stated that it had The standard of review “considered all varies depending of the presented, factors on aspect both which of the individually statutory and cu- scheme is mulatively.” at tier, issue. Under the first we review the BIA’s findings of continuous residency Mr. and Mrs. Hernandez brought the in good moral character under the “sub- appeal, stant arguing that the BIA abused stantial evidence” Zamora-Garcia, test. its discretion in denying for 737 F.2d at 490. A finding BIA regarding suspension deportation. panel A the “extreme hardship” requirement is re- this agreed court BIA, reversed the under viewed more limited “abuse of finding that “the mere recitation that all discretion” standard. the factors were considered cumulatively is not sufficient.” standard is exceedingly review Hernandez-Cordero v. 1266, 783 F.2d (5th narrow for 1269 Cir.1986). General’s ultimate For the reasons follow, decision under the second tier we of the affirm the stat- ute. determination Bell, See BIA. v. 787, Fiallo 792, 430 U.S. 1473, 1477,

97 S.Ct. 52 L.Ed.2d (1977); 50 Diaz, 67, Mathews v. 81-82, 426 U.S. 96 II. 1883, 1892, S.Ct. 48 (1976). L.Ed.2d 478 244(a)(1) Section and The Attorney enjoys General “unfettered” Nationality Act creates a two-tiered statu- discretion to decide suspend whether to tory suspension framework for deporta- deportation of Jay an alien. Boyd, v. 1254(a)(1). First, tion. 8 U.S.C. 345, eligibili- 354, U.S. 924, 919, 76 S.Ct. 100 L.Ed. ty suspension for a of deportation (1956). is It has been said that available to an alien who: has been ultimate whether suspend decision de- (1981). grace,” family alleged similar to In a Korean portation Wang, “is a matter of pardon. States ex that would result in “extreme a Presidential United 180 F.2d Shaughnessy, v. to their two American born chil rel. Kaloudis Cir.1950)(L. Hand). also, 489, (2d spoke See dren because neither child Korean. Hintopoulos 142, States ex rel. at United S.Ct. at 72, 77, 77 Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. S.Ct. family BIA that the had failed to found (1957). 621, 1 Judicial review L.Ed.2d prima demonstrate a facie case of “ex discretionary decision is highly of such a hardship,” treme the Ninth Circuit disa subject strictly limited because the is greed, reasoning that the statute should be uniquely competence power within 143, 101 liberally construed. Id. at S.Ct. at political branches. See Fiallo v. Supreme 1030. The Court reversed and 1477; Bell, 430 U.S. at 97 S.Ct. at “improvi held that the Ninth had Circuit 81-82, Diaz, 426 U.S. at Mathews v. dently authority encroached on the which S.Ct. at 1892. the Act confers on the General *4 144, 101 delegates.” and his Id. at at S.Ct. Attorney power under the The General’s explained 1031. The Court that “the Act delegated to Commission- Act has been commits definition extreme hard [the] [of er of and Naturalization who ship] Attorney in first to instance authority redelegated in to turn has delegates, General and his and their con personnel. 8 C.F.R. 2.1. specified INS § struction and of this standard applications specific power The to rule on by reviewing should not be overturned deportation has suspensions for been may prefer simply court because it another delegated immigration judges,1 to 8 C.F.R. 144, interpretation of the at statute.” 242.8, subject decisions are to re- whose emphasized 101 S.Ct. at 1031. The Court 242.21. The view the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § that: similarly from the authority BIA’s derives 3.0,

Attorney General. 8 C.F.R. 3.1. delegates §§ and his General authority have the to construe “extreme case, Mrs. Hernan- In the instant Mr. and hardship” narrowly they should deem it challenge the BIA’s determination un- dez interpreta- wise to do so. Such a narrow that, “in der the first tier of the statute is consistent with the “extreme hard- tion General,” deporta- language, indicates the ship” which itself hardship.” tion not cause “extreme would exceptional suspension nature stipulated The INS has that Mr. and Mrs. remedy. good Hernandez have moral character and satisfy year residency require- the seven 145, at 101 S.Ct. at ment. decisions, post-Wang In we a series argument appeal is The Hernandezes’ on consistently limited stan adhered to a First, re- they twofold. seek substantive authority to the BIA’s dard review over of “ex- of the BIA’s narrow definition view eligi hardship” deny define “extreme Second, hardship.” proce- seek treme See, e.g., bility suspension for a of relief. alleged dural of the BIA’s failure to review 832, (5th INS, F.2d 839 Ganjour v. 796 analyze the relevant factors both Zamora-Garcia, 490; Cir.1986); F.2d at 737 cumulatively. reject individually and We (5th INS, 181, 185 Cir. Ramos v. 695 F.2d arguments in of these turn. both 1983). Although state the stan we often by the of this determination dard review III. standard, BIA an “abuse of discretion” as 490, Zamora-Garcia, 737 F.2d at those Supreme recognized has Court fully convey extent to narrowly terms do not discretion of the BIA to broad reviewing in which deference is due hardship.” Wang, define “extreme INS v. 139, 101 1027, of the BIA’s determination 67 L.Ed.2d 123 substance 450 U.S. S.Ct. "immigration judge.” ably 8 regulations power title with the state that officers,” delegated "special inquiry 8 is to C.F.R. 1.1. 242.8, interchange- C.F.R. that term is used the hardship is not “extreme.” Our lati- The nature of the two-tiered statutory tude to review BIA’s determination of scheme designed by Congress bolsters our hardship” “extreme by the “abuse view that of dis- substantive review a no “ex- cretion” depends hardship” standard treme scope on determination is strictly the BIA’s discretion in limited. We read the Attorney first instance. General’s express Congressional Osuchukwu 1136, authority v. 744 F.2d to use his (5th “opinion” Cir.1984). to In define “extreme evaluating hardship,” the extent of 1254(a)(1), U.S.C. as discretionary BIA’s similar to the authority, Attor- we have ney General’s express Congressional previously stated au- that: thority to use his “discretion” to determine In Wang’s view of language concern- whether ultimately to suspend deportation. ing authority of the Attorney Gener- 1254(a). U.S.C. Supreme Court al to define “extreme hardship” and has defined the latter as “unfettered” dis- construe narrowly, it we doubt that there cretion, Jay Boyd, 354, 351 U.S. at much, remains any, if scope judicial' for S.Ct. at and we see no reason why the review, substantive even under an Attorney General’s discretion determine “abuse of standard, discretion” of no extreme hardship should not be equally hardship” “extreme determinations. By creating unfettered. sys- two-tiered Ramos, 695 F.2d at 185 (emphasis origi- discretion, tem of Congress intended the nal). threshold criteria to opportuni- “restrict the ty for discretionary” relief, expand Substantive not review of a no it. “ex INS v. Phinpathya, treme U.S. determination is S.Ct. strictly *5 584, 592, 78 L.Ed.2d 401. Congression- limited for First, two interrelated reasons. al intent was to limit the number of the expressly statute aliens qualifies the defini eligible relief; for discretionary it tion was of not being “extreme as “in the meant to increase the eligible number of opinion of the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. only aliens to Attorney have the General 1254(a)(1). BIA, as the Attorney use his “unfettered” discretion to ultimate- General’s delegate, is empowered therefore ly deny all, relief.3 After the Attorney to decide what constitutes “extreme hard- may General freely pretermit the eligibility ship” and apply to that standard to each factors deny suspension a deporta- of individual case. 1103; 8 U.S.C. 8 C.F.R. tion, subject virtually to no substantive re- 2.1. See Wang, also atU.S. view. Rios-Pineda, INS v. 105 S.Ct. at Second, S.Ct. at 1029. the statute declares that the hardship “extreme,” must be highly subjective difficult, standard that is sum, In language statute, if impossible, not to review. The BIA is the historical nature of the remedy of sus therefore doubly-insulated from substan- pension deportation holdings and the tive review finding of a of no “extreme Supreme Court, our court and other hardship”: it is only empowered not to circuit leads courts us to conclude that a formulate opinion its own of what is “ex- court has an exceedingly narrow substan

treme,” but to utilize opinion to define tive review of the BIA’s determination of highly subjective term.2 no “extreme hardship.”4 We per- are 2.The dissent analysis asserts that our conflicts Congress 3. The fact that has reserved for itself previous interpretations right phrase grant relief, discretionary "in veto a denial, opinion but gress which not a rigorous utilized is further a more evidence that Con- availability meant to standard of narrow the review than we use here. But in relief, case, expand 1254(c). not it. See 8 U.S.C. dissent, this by unlike the cases cited Attorney authority doubly-insu- General’s is support argument authorities do not judicial lated from review: he is directed to that less opinion is deference due the General’s opinion formulate his as to what constitutes by if the is reached the Attor- hardship. "extreme” None of by cases cited ney delegate General’s rather than the the dissent statutes involves that authorize the personally. General formulation of an about definition 24, 25, Bagamasbad, In INS v. U.S. highly subjective of such a term. 200, 201, (1976), S.Ct. 50 L.Ed.2d 190 the Su- duty exegesis every suaded that in the substantive review of a to write an on conten- required merely hardship" determination, tion. What is is that it no "extreme are entitled to find that the BIA abused its we raised, consider the issues and announce its hardship decision in terms sufficient to enable a discretion in a case where the uniquely extreme, closely approach- reviewing perceive is ing at or court it has thought merely the outer limits of the most severe heard and and not re- hardship INS, the alien could suffer and so se- acted." Osuchukwu v. 744 F.2d at any person 1142-43. vere that essarily reasonable would nec- hardship conclude that the is ex- immigration judge Both the and the against standard, treme. Measured this hardship BIA considered all of the relevant finding DIA did not abuse its discretion in case, they factors in this both conclud hardship facing that the the Hernandezes in ed that were not "extreme." The BIA Mexicowas not "extreme." specifically stated that it "considered all of Iv. presented, individually the factors both cumulatively." Although panel opinion virtually a court has no sub- analysis was critical of the BIA's lack of the cumulative effect of the Hernandezes' on stantive review of the BIA's "extreme hardship" finding, may we still scrutinize hardship, procedural regulari- individual claims of we see little the BIA's decision for ty. else on this record the BIA could have said recently proce- We clarified that this subject. points ascertaining on the Petitioner to no dural review "is limited to independent by synergis any given" factor created whether consideration has been hardship establishing tic effect of the combination of the BIA to the factors "ex- requires separate hardship." claims that and discussion. The BIA therefore did not consideration treme Sanchez v. (5th Cir.1985) (emphasis F.2d original). "utterly fail" to consider the relevant hard In Sanchez we affirmed the de- ship Sanchez, suspension factors. 755 F.2d at 1160. nial of a because contrary, analyzed "utterly give On the the BIA each the BIA did not fail" to con- factor and then concluded that even when pertinent sideration to the factors to a de- analyzed cumulatively, hardship." was termination of "extreme *6 not "extreme." procedural We reasoned that a review that V. petitioner's focuses on whether the claims adequately have been con- question in this case is not strictly sidered should be limited because honest, whether the Hernandezes are de authority "we .. lack the to determine the pendable, hardworking society. members of weight, any, if to be afforded each factor." They clearly Any are. of us would be Id. at 1160. happy gain citizenship. to see them But ordinarily satisfy Congress The BIA will its in its wisdom has determined enough deportation procedural responsibilities by that this is not to avoid demonstrat 1254(a)(1). eligible ing under 8 U.S.C. To be that it has considered all the relevant hardship" discretionary relief, factors of an "extreme nation, determi for this aliens with the individually collectively. highest both character and strictest work ethic INS, 706, they Luciano-Vincente v. 786 F.2d must also establish that will "in the (5th Cir.1986); Ganjour Attorney 708-09 v. General" suffer (5th Cir.1986). hardship" deported. F.2d "It has no "extreme if Thus the himself, preme upheld Attorney the Courtdid not alterthe rule that the Court General'sulti- authority deny suspension deporta- deny suspension depor- mate tion. The clearthat the initialdiscretionto sion of grationjudge to a ultimatedecisionto tationis to be accorded"unfettereddiscretion." a opinion Bagamasbad in makes it deny suspen- Jay Boyd, a See Similarly 351U.S.at 76S.Ct.at 925. case, by in the instant we see no reason was exercised an immi- why ship" and that this determinationwas the determinationof no "extremehard- merely by though shouldbe accordedlessdeference affirmed decisionto the BIA. Even the initial by deny suspension deportation becausethe initial decisionwas made the the a in delegates, by

Bagamasbad by Attorney General's and not was made Gener- delegates, by Attorney al's and not General Generalhimself. only in issue this case is whether the record the majority deem sufficiently severe to be BIA, demonstrates that the as the Attor- “extreme” must be “uniquely extreme, at ney delegate, General’s abused its discre- or closely approaching the outer limits of in finding tion that the Hernandezes will the most severe hardship an alien could not suffer “extreme deported if suffer AND so severe that ANY reason- to Mexico. The record in simply this case person able would NECESSARILY con- does not reveal such an abuse of discretion. clude that the hardship is extreme.” Indeed, we expect would any hardworking (Emphasis added.) This interpretation aliens deported are who to an economically strips phrase “extreme hardship” of deprived country after enjoying high a virtually all content and abdicates our re- of living standard in this country for seven sponsibility under the Administrative Pro- years to suffer hardship similar to that cedure Act to against assure arbitrary and by demonstrated the Hernandezes. In capricious administrative action. I there- short, we see unique no hardship or un- fore respectfully dissent. usually severe hardship that the Hernan- dezes suffer will if deported are I. approaches Mexico that of hard- level ship required compel finding of “ex- As Supreme held Court in Bowen v. treme hardship” by the BIA. Michigan Academy Family Physi- cians,1 Accordingly, the begin order of deny- the BIA with the strong pre- “[w]e ing sumption suspension for a Congress that of de- judicial intends re- portation is view of administrative action.”2 Bowen reminds that us it has been policy

AFFIRMED. Congress to avoid “blank checks drawn to the credit of some RUBIN, ALVIN B. administrative officer or Judge, Circuit board.”3 Justice POLITZ, whom Potter Stewart JOHNSON, observed JERRE S. for the Court WILLIAMS Rusk v. Cort4 JONES, EDITH H. Circuit upon showing Judges join, “clear dissenting: and convincing Congress evidence that so intended” should The majority opinion professes to adhere the courts restrict judicial access to review. to the statutory mandate that federal And, as the Court Bowen, concluded in courts review decisions made subor- ordinarily presume “[w]e that Congress in- dinate government officials, but in fact the tends the obey executive to statutory its opinion adopts a standard of review that and, commands accordingly, it expects renders administrative decisionmaking un- grant the courts to relief when an execu- reviewable. The court thus abandons agency tive violates such a command.”5 “honest, these dependable, hardworking members of society” to the indifference of Even discretionary actions are reviewa- the bureaucracy. *7 Congress While has or- ble for abuse of the discretion imparted, dered relief for aliens deportation whose for discretion is to soundly be exercised would subject or them their children to and is not a license for fiat.6 In the words hardship, extreme only hardship Madison, of James “You must first enable — U.S.-, 2133, 1. 106 at-, S.Ct. 90 L.Ed.2d 623 5. Id. 106 S.Ct. at 2141. (1986). INS, 217, 6. See Foti v. 228-29, 375 U.S. 84 S.Ct. at-, Ludd, 106 S.Ct. at 2135. also See 306, 313-14, (1963); 11 L.Ed.2d 281 United Administrative Discretion and the States Hintopoulos ex rel. Shaughnessy, v. 353 and Naturalization Service: To Review or Not to 72, 77, 618, 621, U.S. 77 S.Ct. Review?, 1 L.Ed.2d 652 Thurgood 65, 8 Marshall L.Rev. 65 (1957); Wong Wing (1983). Hang v. 360 F.2d (2d Cir.1966). 718 Jay But Boyd, see 351 U.S. at-, (quoting S.Rep. S.Ct. at 2136 345, 354-55, 919, 924-25, 76 S.Ct. L.Ed. No. Cong., (1945)). 79th 1st Sess. 26 (1956). 367, 379-80, 787, 794,

4. 369 U.S. 82 S.Ct. (1962). L.Ed.2d 809 Congress governed; language did not this government to control the vest Attorney General or his subordinates place oblige it to control in the next and with “ad hoc discretion” to be exercised at Congress reposed in the circuit has itself.” Congress the whim decisionmaker. obliging responsibility for ad- courts the undoubtedly delegated to the At- discretion agencies to control themselves ministrative torney General to determine in the first congressional to their man- and to adhere hardship.11 instance what is extreme The Administrative Procedure Act date. The agree majority ultimately that this discre- reviewing court shall instructs us: “[T]he tion is not absolute and that the administra- decide, law, questions of inter- all relevant tive decision is not unreviewable. The ma- provi- statutory and pret constitutional however, opinion, jority refers to the stan- sions, meaning appli- or and determine “strictly dard of review not as limited” agency terms of an action. cability narrow,” “exceedingly per- and but also as reviewing court ... hold The shall— mitting “virtually no substantive review” action, agency find- unlawful and set aside of General’s “unfettered dis- (A) ings, found to arbi- and conclusions be— citing single precedent cretion.” Without a discretion, or capricious, an trary, abuse any authority, or other then not in accordance with law.”7 otherwise practical applica- states a formula that in equated this Supreme Court has in every tion must result the affirmance of whether responsibility to determine our majority administrative decision. The of- judg- error of “there has been a clear hardship no illustration of kind fers meaningless if it is ment.”8 Review is extremity, meet its definition of that would that assures by a standard circumscribed hardly imagine anything one can but but hardship any one as a so dire that rea- but result. death person necessarily sonable would consider Im- of section provisions it extreme. migration Nationality Act9 are de- plain meaning This is not the plight of aliens signed to ameliorate the hardship” “Extreme words of the statute. deporta- subject be who would otherwise simply “hardship not is restricted [that] (a) provides: section tion. Part of this extreme, closely approach- uniquely is at or may, in his discre- Attorney General “[T]he ing limits of the most severe the outer tion, deportation” adjust an suspend and so se- hardship the alien could suffer “lawfully ad- status to that of one alien’s any person reasonable would nec- vere that mitted,” if the alien hardship is ex- essarily conclude that the present in the United physically has been Congress intended to restrict treme.” Had period of not less States for continuous narrowly, easily it could have sub- relief so immediately preceding years than seven in next like those used stituted words suspen- for the date of [his 244(a), where relief for cer- part of section sion], proves during all of such groups such as convicted tain of aliens person good period he was and is a is limited to cases criminals and anarchists character; person whose moral and is extremely “exceptional and unusual would, in the hardship.” majority’s definition General, result in extreme as as is at least severe “extreme spouse, words; to his meaning yet by to the alien or plain of these child, distinguishing language used these parent, or who is a citizen of subsections, Congress made clear its *8 two .10 United States... 10. 8 7. 5 U.S.C. 1254(a)(1) (1982) added). (emphasis add- U.S.C. (emphasis § 706 ed). 8. Volpe, 401 Overton v. to Preserve Park Citizens 416, 814, 824, 402, L.Ed.2d 136 S.Ct. 28 U.S. 91 11. INS v. 139, 144, Wang, 101 S.Ct. 450 U.S. Davis, (1971); Law K. Administrative see also 5 1031, (1981). 1027, 123 67 L.Ed.2d 29:7, 1984). (2d at 359 ed. Treatise 12. 8 U.S.C. (1982). 9. 1254(a)(2) (1982). 8 U.S.C. 1254 566 intent to create in i.e., the first subsection a showing “a [they that arbitrary are] compassionate

more standard in than and without reasonable foundation.”17 In second. Woodard, and Inc. v. United Loftin States18 we an followed Fifth earlier Cir Supreme interpreted Court has cuit agreed case19 and with seven other extreme-hardship requirement only in INS holding circuits20 in that determinations Wang.13 v. majority rely on opinion made “in the of” the Commissioner decision, Wang involved a motion to of Internal pursuant Revenue to 26 U.S.C. reopen order on the basis of 446(b) are reviewable for an “abuse of hardship, extreme not an initial extreme- discretion” which “proved must be by a Supreme determination. The clear showing.”21 Interpreting another In Court did not specifically address the stan- statute,22 ternal Revenue the Second Cir dard of evidence, review—substantial cuit in Caldwell v. discretion, Commissioner23 abuse held or a determination of that the standard of review for a caprice^ arbitrariness or determi applied be —to nation made “in opinion of” the initial Board Com determinations of no extreme missioner of hardship. Internal It Revenue was concluded that the “abuse Board of discretion.”24 had not authority” its in find- “exceedfed] ing prima showing facie of extreme then, Until today, judicial interpretation hardship insufficient to reopening, warrant phrase opinion “in the of” has uni- that, therefore, reopening of depor- formly allowed a standard of at review hearings tation required.14 was not least as broad as “clear abuse of discre- tion.” A majority’s multitude statutes contain assertion the words sim- ilar opinion of,” “in the articulations. More used in than 150 of as section these 244(a)(1), are listed in strictly the appendix. limit In attempt review of “no an ex treme reconcile their previous determinations with to a stan de- dard even cisions ordinary interpreting narrower than the words “in “abuse the opin- of,” of discretion” conflicts ion majority argue the consistent that section reading circuits, 244(a)(1) that several including contains a this “double insulation” ren- one, given dering to these words when it more used deferential to the executive in other example, statutes. For branch Ahrens than other statutes that use this Rojas,15 v. which phrase. another Congress, however, involved section surely did not Nationality Act,16 intend the mere use of the word “ex- we held that determinations made “in depart treme” to general from the review of” the General are re standards of the Administrative Procedure simple viewable for “abuse discretion”— Act applied as in all of these instances. 13. 450 U.S. 139, 1027, 101 (1st Cir.1970); S.Ct. 67 L.Ed.2d 123 n. 3 Paving Standard Co. v. Com (1981). missioner, 330, (10th Cir.), F.2d 190 332 cert. denied, 860, 87, 342 U.S. 72 S.Ct. 96 L.Ed. 647 14. Id. at 146, 101 S.Ct. at 1032. (1951); States, 541, Schram v. United 118 F.2d (6th Cir.), denied, 695, 543-44 cert. 314 U.S. 62 15. 292 F.2d 406 (5th Cir.1961). 412, (1941); Bros., S.Ct. Hempt 86 L.Ed. 555 Inc. 16. States, 1172, v. United F.Supp. (M.D. 1182(d)(5)(A) 354 (1982). 1181 8 U.S.C. § Pa.1973), aff'd, (3d Cir.), 490 F.2d 1172 cert. 17. Id. at 411. denied, 826, 44, 419 U.S. 95 S.Ct. 42 50 L.Ed.2d (1974); States, Peterson Produce Co. v. United 18. 577 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir.1978). 229, F.Supp. (W.D.Ark.1962), 205 aff’d, 241 313 (8th Cir.1963). F.2d 609 19. See Wood v. Commissioner, 888, 245 F.2d 892 (5th 1957). Cir. 21. Woodard, States, Inc. v. United Loftin States, Corp. 881, 20. See RCA v. F.2d at 1229. United 664 F.2d 886, 888, (2d denied, Cir.1981), cert. 457 U.S. 1133, 2958, (1982); (1987). 102 S.Ct. 73 L.Ed.2d 26 U.S.C. § Commissioner, 874, (9th v. Sandor F.2d Cir.1976); Marine, Stephens (2d 1953). Inc. v. Commission 202 F.2d 112 Cir. Wilkinson-Beane, er, (9th Cir.1970); 430 F.2d 353 24. Id. at Commissioner, c. 420 F.2d In 114-15.

5^7 wrote, Judge Friendly Wong The late in Immigration Board of Appeals able, are INS,25 Wing Hang v. that exercise of the through exposure their range to a wide “subject cases, General’s discretion to is develop comparisons ap- between obligation the restraint of the of reasoned plicants, their determination of what consti- decision and hence of reasoned elaboration hardship requires tutes knowledge of hu- governing of a fabric of doctrine successive affairs, man judgment, empathy qual- — decisions.” Discretion must be exercised ities that judges federal should have in at reason, caprice. else it is but The least as much measure as administrative power essence of the rational exercise of is officers. explanation of its use. Neither the The majority opinion is, leitmotiv of the hearing Immigra officer nor the Board of bureaucracy “Let the do as it will.” The however, Appeals, provided tion has us Act, however, Procedure Administrative explanation. with such an commands us to review the decisions of determining In Congress what intended such administrative officers to determine to be the breadth of administrative discre- whether have made a clear error of scope judicial tion and review over judgment. they have, If the decision is an exercise, its we should also consider abuse of discretion. rank of the official whose decision is re- Congress may rightly viewed.26 decide II. that cabinet officers deserve more latitude Patricio Hernandez-Cordero is now in making decisions is than accorded lower- years age. wife, Maria, His They is 37. ranking making civil in servants routine in lived the United States for twelve pronouncements. majority opinion As the years, Patricio since he was 22 and Maria however, recognizes, it was not the Attor- since she children, was 25. Three of their ney General who made or reviewed this Patricio, Jr., 11, Lisa, 9, Veronica, now administrative delegated decision. He has 8, are United States citizens who have nev- authority special officers, his inquiry er in another country. lived Mrs. Hernan- them, as the statute labels who have child, Victor, dez has a fourth who is now regulation in judges. been elevated title to Mexico, 14. Born in he lived there with his Their subject decisions are in turn to re- family brought mother’s until he was to the only by group, view an internal the Board years ago United States six to become a Immigration Appeals. Neither the At- family. member the Hernandez General, torney Deputy Attorney his Gen- eral, any nor Attorneys his Assistant The and Naturalization Ser- General has ever considered stipulated whether de- vice has that the Hernandezes portation family of the Hernandez good hearing would are of moral character. hardship. occasion them extreme couple This de- officer found that the Hernandez is “industrious, cision was in depths law-abiding, made type bu- and the reaucracy. anyone neigh- would desire as a next-door are, They majority opinion bor.” as the defining scope Another factor in states, family “[a]ny of us would be unique expertise discretion is the happy gain citizenship.” to see ... agency subject question.27 on the in Texas, determination of what constitutes family Georgetown, extreme lives person family for a or a is not an where Hernandez a home on built a lot Hernandez, question requiring specialized esoteric purchased in 1983. who is self- training familiarity $12,- or employed carpenter, with technical mate- trim as a earns hearing has, rials. year, through officer and the 000 a hard work Davis, (2d Cir.1966). 25. 360 F.2d 27. See K. Administrative Law Treatise 29.00-3, (Supp.1982) (analyzing at 543-44 Na Martin, Immigration 26. See T. Aleinikoff & D. SEC, tional Resources Council v. Defense Davis, (1985); Policy Process and 528-30 K. cf. (D.C.Cir.1979). F.2d 1031 29.00-3, Administrative Law Treatise at 543- (Supp.1982). *10 thrift, Mexico; (2) having and accumulated assets a forced to return to an econo- $70,000. mist, detailing in- value of These assets the severe economic hard- total home; vehicle; encounter; ship family their his clude a motor that would and tools; (un- (3) teachers, piece describing and another of real estate six the serious edu- they fully improved), paid. difficulty for which have cational and emotional that the school-age Hernandez children suf- would found, hearing major- officer and the parents deported they if fer their were concede, ity deportation that would cause perforce accompanied family. Hardened, however, family hardship. fact,” seeing many deported, hearing after others he eval- “The mere officer wrote, hardship uated as less than extreme the “that Mexico is in the midst of an being completely uprooted im- crisis would economic does not mean that there pose family. employment opportunities on the are no there.” mention, however, He does not the evi- appraisal The administrative of the suf- techniques dence that construction are so fering by family that would be endured this different in Mexico that Hernandez would piecemeal, compassion, was devoid of likely employment find no for his Ameri- wrong. hearing Tick tick the officer carpenter. can-learned skill as a trim Mrs. separately evaluated each individual hard- “relatively healthy,” Hernandez is the ad- ship: Selling a home at a loss is an econom- recites, appraisal though ministrative even Besides, hardship, ic but not extreme. requires she suffers from asthma and wound is “self-inflicted” because the house probably treatment and medication that she was built several months after could not afford to continue in Mexico. begun. proceedings family were For a give up creditors, sufficiency Testimony employers, its hard-won economic from hardship, is a it but is well established that and teachers confirms that the Hernan- economic exemplary family alone cannot constitute dezes are an who have majority opin- “extreme long worked and hard to establish a life for —as repeats, citing ion even one of our decisions themselves in the United States who isolated, undisputed, for that devastating consequences but observa- would suffer if displaced family tion. The deported will leave be- to Mexico. a recitation relatives, many hind friends and and this of evidence from the record is sometimes redundant, hardship; yet, according too is a in only to the this instance it is the finding, way adequately portray family. administrative it also is not ex- treme. Johnson, Dan Vice President of Ameri- speak Rock, Spanish,

While the four children can Bank Round which financed the schools, home, says: all of them have entered American Hernandezes’ has “[Patricio] Spanish. and none reads or writes several loans here and obtained has han- hearing may very satisfactory officer found that it be diffi- dled them in a man- Mexico, adjust cult living for them to to life in ner. ... makes his as a trim [He] country carpenter; great three of them have never and he takes a deal of known, work, they pride only but that can do so in in many without not his but all, hardship: acquired years.... “extreme” After as the he has tools over the Immigration Appeals my opinion Board of indifferent- It is that Patricio Hernandez noted, ly respect family their in any circumstances this and his would be an asset to “significantly country not different” are from those which chose to live. He work; pride of other native-born American children re- takes in his and his word is his turning parents’ to their homeland. bond.” hearing Byram, owner, officer considered all fami- John D. a ranch states and, therefore, Hernandez, fungible apparent-

lies to be that Maria who has received ly weight grade attached no to affidavits from: a second education and first teens, concluding psychologist, that the Her- came to the United States in her family nandez would suffer severe emo- him on his worked for ranch from 1972 psychological consequences tional and if until 1977. Her husband worked for him _ from 1975 to 1977. “Since that time I gual classes is a well-adjusted [H]e had continued contact with the Hernandez young man many friends. Under family. I consider them outstanding *11 to be circumstances, these it is likely that he people great who would be a asset to would have academic and social difficulties society. American They working, are hard if he were forced to move back to Mexico persons and highest moral caliber. They have assimilated themselves well into Even if each of the factors listed our society.” hearing officer, considered singly, did not Levens, Sue who holds a degree master’s amount to extreme hardship for Her- and bilingual teaches program of the parents nandez any or of their three citizen Georgetown Independent District, School children, the that, decision together, taken Cynthia and Balfour, kindergarten teach- they not, ignores do the evidence so com- er, only attest not to the conscientiousness pletely as to be arbitrary and capricious. of the school, Hernandez children in but Determining when the cumulative effect of praise also the cooperation partic- and hardship, like the cumulative pain, effect of ipation of parents the Hernandez in school becomes “extreme” obviously calls for projects, parent conferences, and other judgment. There is no When, barometer. school functions. however, many so hardships are to be im- Wheeler, Laura an elementary school posed, the decision impact that their will teacher in the Round Independent Rock not be extreme should not rest merely on District, School writes of and Lisa Patricio: the ritualistic incantation formula, of the “They very are highly motivated children. “having considered all of the factors They well-adjusted are have and made presented, both individually and cumula- many friends here .... I believe it would tively.” The majority are content both to extremely be difficult for and Lisa Patricio approve conjuration this and repeat to it to leave familiar surroundings and enter an because there is “little else ... the BIA environment that they totally would be could have said on subject,”28 and be- teacher, unaccostumed to.” Another [sic] they cause find no hardship “extreme” un- Wittenberg, Shari writes of Patricio: “He less “uniquely it is extreme.” many friends, has made not in his Thus, special inquiry officer and the class, but with other on our students cam- Board of Appeals pus. The children enjoy other —subor- compa- his government dinate their officers—washed ny. Patricio ais hard worker and does his hands of the family Hernandez their very best.... I would hate to think of a duty implement Congress’ humanitarian child like being pulled Patricio from our policy. Congress could, course, system school placed in an unfamiliar illegal ordered all aliens deported. It setting. He potential has so much that I chose, reasons, for benevolent not to exer- feel could if put be lost he into an was power cise this doing when so would occa- atmosphere that would learning distract his sion “extreme hardship.” Although it re- Turner, abilities.” Wendy one Patricio’s power served the to overturn decisions that teachers, writes: always “He was smiling clement, are too it obviously intended mer- and had a positive I sincerely outlook. cy else it permitted would have no relief. believe that change drastic being as such statutory measure of is to mercy avoid sent to Mexico would have a very negative hardship infliction of that is “extreme.” effect on Patricio.” inflicted on family this defies Smith, Erlene Guidance Counselor for any reasonable term Northside Middle School in Georgetown, requires our intervention. Texas, says of Victor Hernandez: “His grades for 83/84 possible school year were all It is that this family may ulti- A’s and B’s speaks English .... mately by invoking be saved compas- [He] fluently and from released bilin- sionate provisions amnesty Immigra- [has been] (5th Cir.1985). 755 F.2d Sanchez Cf. 112b(a) (1982) (“in opin- tion Reform Act of and Control 1986.29 1. U.S.C. that, majority agree do not as we have President”). ion of the suggestion done in other at the cases (1982) (“in 2. 2 U.S.C. government,30 stay our we should decision President”). give apply the Hernandezes a chance to 8123(b) (1982) (“in opin- 3. 5 U.S.C. change newly for a of status under that Secretary Labor]”). ion of the [of They may enacted statute. indeed be able but, requirements, they 150dd(d) (1982) (“in to meet its until opin- 4. 7 U.S.C. so, can do the case show is not Agriculture]”). Secretary ion of the [of technically if moot. Even the Hernandezes (1982) (“in Id. *12 by Congressional are rescued this act of Secretary Agriculture”). of however,

grace, majority the decision will (1982) (“in Id. opinion 6. 389a the of the § abandon other families in like circumstanc- Agriculture”). Secretary of equally unfeeling es to unfettered and judgments by bureaucracy. 499f(a) (1982) (“in the Id. opinion 7. the of § Secretary Agriculture]”). the [of III. 499f(c) (“in Id. (1982) opinion 8. the of § conclude, majority “a court has vir- Secretary Agriculture]”). the [of tually no substantive review of the BIA’s 936a(c) (1982) (“in Id. opinion 9. the of § hardship’ finding.” ‘extreme This limits Secretary Treasury”). the of the judicial narrowly the role far more than 10. Id. 1964(d) 1985) (“in (Supp. Ill the § Congress any intended. The of opinion Secretary Agricul- of the [of of discretion” reasonable “abuse standard requires family. ture]”). relief for this unusual De- portation will inflict on each of its mem- 2805(c) (1982) (“in Id. opinion 11. of the § bers, family collectively, and on the the Secretary Agriculture]”). the [of economic, social, personal, most severe and 1182(a)(15) (1982) (“in 12. 8 U.S.C. the § psychological hardship. inju- That kind of General”). opinion Attorney of the ry is extreme. However much latitude is 1182(d)(5)(A) (“in 13. Id. (1982) opin- the § given immigration the the stat- officials General”). ute, Attorney their ion of the decision that the Hernandez fami- ly hardship will not suffer in the extreme 1251(a)(8) (1982) (“in 14. Id. opinion the § totality as a result of of the circumstances General”). Attorney of the is callous and unmindful of the will of 1251(c) (1982) (“in 15. Id. opinion the of § Congress. suffering It observes without General”). Attorney the compassion, insensitively dismisses the 1253(c) (1982) (“in 16. Id. opinion the of § agony pain of others as it is not an General”). Attorney the for those others to bear. extreme arbitrary capricious, It is therefore 1253(f) (1982) (“in 17. Id. opinion the of § complete abuse of discretion. It is our General”). Attorney the duty adopt proper standard of review 1445(a) (1982) (“in Id. § opinion 18. the of and reverse it. General”). the reasons, respectfully I For these DIS- 804(c) (1982) (“in opin- 19. 10 U.S.C. the § SENT. President”). ion of the 875(c) (1982) (“in Id. opinion 20. the of § APPENDIX President”). the opinion placing Statutes discretion the 4354(b) (1982) (“in Id. opinion 21. the of President, General, of the the or § Secretary Secretary Army]”). a Cabinet the the [of 99-603, 201, 3359, 5, 1987); INS, (5th 29. Pub.L. No. 100 Stat. Jan. Galvan v. No. 86-4365 § (to 1255A). 29, 1986); INS, be codified at 8 U.S.C. Hidalgo-Zelaya § Cir. Dec. v. No. (5th 23, 1986); 86-4411 Cir. Dec. Pouralborz stays, examples granting 30. For of orders see INS, (5th 1986). No. 86-4391 Cir. Dec. INS, (5th Lopez-Rayas v. No. Cir. 85-4732 Feb. 1987); (5th Cir. De Silva v. No. 85-4496 Id. 666g (1982) (“in

45. opinion the of § Secretary the Army”). of the (1982) Id. 4501(c) (“in opinion 22. the of § (1982) (“in Id. 46. opinion the of Secretary Army”). § the of the the President”). (1982) (“in Id. opinion 23. the of § Id. Secretary the Navy”). (1982) (“in of the 47. opinion 691c the § of Secretary Interior”). the of (1982) (“in the Id. 24. opinion the § Secretary Force]”). the Air (1982) (“in Id. [of 48. 695a opinion § 25. Id. 9501(c) (1982) (“in opinion Secretary Interior”). of the § Secretary Force”). of the Air Id. (1982) (“in 49. 696a opinion § 9779(b) (1982) (“in Id. opinion 26. Secretary Interior”). § of the Secretary Force]”). the Air [of Id. (“in 50. (1982) 715e opinion § (d)(3) (1982) (“in 27. 12 U.S.C. 1715Í Interior”). the Secretary of the opinion Secretary of the Housing [of Id. 773i(f)(2) (1982) (“in 51. opinion Development]”). and Urban Secretary Commerce]”). [of Id. 1715v(c)(3)(1982) (“in opinion 28. (1982) (“in Secretary Housing and Ur- [of President”). ban Development]”). (“in 825s *13 21(b) 1985) (“in (Supp. 15 U.S.C. Ill § Secretary the Army”). of the opinion the of Secretary the ... [of 831d(i) (1982) (“in Id. 54. Presi- § [the Transportation]”). opinion”). dent’s] Id. 144(b)(1) (1982) (“in opinion the § Id. 835c(b) (1982) (“in 55. opinion the of § Secretary Commerce]”). of the [of the Secretary Interior]”). the [of 640(b) (1982) (“in Id. opinion the of § Id. 1244(d)(3) 1985) (“in 56. (Supp. Ill § President”). the opinion the of Secretary the the [of (1982) (“in opinion 16 U.S.C. 40b the § Commerce]”). Interior or of Interior”). Secretary of the of the 1533(b)(8)(1982) (“in Id. 57. opinion the § Id. (1982) (“in opinion 242 the of the § Secretary of the Interior]”). the [of Secretary Interior”). of the 1643(b) (1982) (“in Id. 58. opinion the of § Id. (“in (1982) 407m opinion the of § Secretary the Agriculture]”). [of Secretary Interior]”). the the [of 843(d) (1982) (“in 59. 18 U.S.C. opin- the § Id. (“in (1982) 430k opinion the of § Secretary ion of the the Trea- [of Interior”). the Secretary of the sury]”). Id. (1982) (“in opinion 458a the of § Id. 2101(d) (1982) (“in opinion 60. the of § Secretary Interior]”). the the [of General”). Attorney the Id. 459b-2(a) (1982) (“in opinion the § 2386(A)(5)(1982) (“in Id. 61. opinion the § Secretary of the Interior]”). the [of General”). of the 459c-4(a) (1982) (“in Id. opinion the § (“in Id. (1982) 62. 4003 opinion the of § Secretary Interior]”). of the the [of General”). the (1982) Id. 459d-2(a) (“in opinion the § 81c(a) 1985) (“in 63. (Supp. 19 U.S.C. Ill § Secretary Interior]”). of the the [of opinion Secretary the of the of the 459f-ll(b) Id. (1982) (“in opinion the § Treasury”). Secretary of the Interior]”). the [of 1491(b)(1) (1982) (“in Id. 64. opinion the § Id. 460o-2(a) (1982) (“in opinion the § Secretary of the Treasury]”). the [of Secretary Interior”). of the of the 1498(a)(ll) (1982) (“in Id. 65. opinion the § Id. 460kk(n)(4)(B) (1982) (“in the § of Secretary Treasury”). the of the

opinion Secretary of the the Interi- [of or]”). Id. 1526(e)(2) (1982) (“in opinion 66. the § (1982) (“in Secretary Treasury]”). of the Id. the Secretary 485 of [of § [the Agriculture’s] opinion”). (1982) (“in 67. 2(j) 20 U.S.C. the § 1087— Id. (1982) (“in opinion opinion 518 the Secretary of the of the Edu- § [of Secretary Agriculture”). cation]”). of 572 (“in (1982) Id. opinion

92. 753 the of the § Interior]”). Secretary the [of (1982) (“in opinion 101 68. U.S.C. the § (1982) (“in Id. opinion 93. the of § President”). of the Secretary Interior]”). the the [of (1982) (“in Id. § opinion 69. 113a the of 1522(b) (1982) (“in Id. opinion 94. the of § Secretary Agriculture]”). the [of Secretary Interior]”). the the [of Id. (1982) (“in opinion 70. 114a the of § 4.46(b)(1982) (“in opin- 95. 26 U.S.C. the § Secretary Agriculture]”).. the [of Secretary ion of the the Trea- [of (1982) (“in Id. opinion 71. 114c the of § sury]”). Secretary Agriculture]”). the [of (1982) (“in Id. opinion 96. the of the § 375(b) (1982) (“in Id. opinion 72. the of § Secretary Treasury]”). the [of Secretary the Health and Human [of 7324(2) (“in Id. opinion 97. the Services]”). § Secretary Treasury]”). the the [of (1982) (“in Id. § opinion 73. the of the (1982) (“in Id. opinion 98. the Secretary Treasury”). § Secretary Treasury]”). the the [of (“in opinion 74. 22 U.S.C. 277f the § 7513(b) (1982) (“in Id. opinion 99. Secretary State”). § Secretary Treasury]”). [of 1978(a)(3)(B)(1982) (“in Id. opin- 75. § (1982) (“in opin- 100. 29 U.S.C. Secretary ion of the or Commerce § [of President”). Interior]”). ion of the 502(a) (1982) (“in 101. Id. 2304(c)(1)(C)(1982) (“in Id. opin- 76. § Secretary State”). Treasury]”). Secretary ion of the [of 1112(e) (1982) (“in Id. (1982) (“in 102. 2314(g)(4)(A)(iii) President”). Secretary Labor]”). opinion of the [of (1982) (“in 2755(d)(1)(C) 103. 30 (1982) (“in U.S.C. Sec- opin- [the President”). retary opinion”). ion of Interior’s] *14 (1982) (“in 104. Id. 211(c) (1982) (“in opinion the of Id. 3311(a) opinion 79. the of § § Secretary Interior]”). President”). the the the [of 642(c) (1982) (“in Id. (1982) (“in opinion 105. the of Id. opinion 80. 3618 the of § § President”). Secretary Interior]”). the the the [of 865(a) (1982) (“in 106. Id. 4084(c) (1982) (“in opinion the of Id. opinion 81. the of § § Secretary Interior]”). State”). the the Secretary the of [of 923(c) (1982) (“in Id. (1982) (“in opinion 107. the of opinion 82. 25 48 U.S.C. the § § Secretary Interior]”). Interior”). the the Secretary of the of the [of (1982) (“in 108. Id. 1001 Id. (1982) (“in opinion the of opinion 83. 229 the of the § § President”). Secretary Interior]”). the the [of (1982) (“in (1982) (“in opin- 109. 33 U.S.C. 410 the Id. 84. 263 § § [the President’s] Secretary Army”). ion of the of the opinion”). (1982) (“in 110. Id. (1982) (“in opinion 415 the of Id. Secretary 85. 312 of § § [the Secretary Army”). of the the opinion”). the Interior’s] (1982) (“in Id. opinion 111. 494 Id. (1982) (“in the of opinion 86. 348 the of the § § President”). Secretary Transportation”). the of 499(a) (1982) (“in Id. opinion 112. (1982) (“in the of Id. opinion 87. 564n the of § § Secretary Transportation”). the of Secretary Interior]”). the the [of (1982) (“in 113. Id. opinion (1982) (“in 513 the of Id. opinion 636 the of the 88. § § Interior”). Secretary Transportation]”). the Secretary of the [of (1982) (“in 114. Id. (1982) (“in opinion 583 the of Id. opinion 89. 677k the of § § Secretary Army”). the of Interior]”). the Secretary the the [of (1982) (“in Id. (1982) (“in opinion 115. 591 the Id. opinion 90. 677u the of of § § Interior]”). Secretary Secretary Army”). the the the of the [of (1982) (“in Id. 116. Id. (1982) (“in opinion opinion 91. 700 the of the 629 the of § § Secretary Interior]”). Army”). Secretary the the of the [of

573 137. Id. (1982) (“in 145 opinion § the of the Secretary of Interior”). the 117. Id. (1982) (“in 702d opinion § the of Id. 138. (1982) (“in 154 the Secretary § Secretary of the Army”). [the of the opinion”). Interior’s] Id. 118. 1985) (“in 855 (Supp. Ill § the Id. 139. (1982) opinion 315j (“in § of the the President”). opinion of the Secretary of Interior”). the 119. Id. 944(e) 1985) (“in (Supp. Ill § the Id. 140. (1982) (“in opinion 374 opinion § of the the Secretary Labor]”). of [of the Secretary of Interior”). the 120. Id. 1124(d) (1982) (“in opinion § the Id. 141. (1982) (“in of the 375 Secretary opinion § the Commerce]”). of [of the Secretary Interior”). of the Id. 1904(e) 121. (1982) (“in opinion § the Id. 142. (1982) (“in of 375b the Secretary opinion § the the relevant of [of de- the Secretary partment]”). Interior]”). the [of Id. 143. (1982) (“in 417 122. 36 opinion § U.S.C. the (Supp. 1985) (“in 3204 § Ill of the Secretary opinion the Interior]”). the of Secretary [of the of the Navy, the Id. 144. Secretary (1982) (“in of Force, Air 419 the opinion § the of or the Secretary of the Army”). Secretary Interior]”). the [of 123. 38 Id. 5014(b) (1982) 145. (“in (1982) (“in U.S.C. 434 § the opinion § the of opinion President”). the Secretary Interior”). 124. 40 Id. (1982) (“in U.S.C. 146. (1982) (“in 258e opin- the 466 § opinion § the of ion of the Attorney General”). the Secretary Interior]”). the [of 125. Id. 874(e)(2) Id. 147. (Supp. 1985) (“in (1982) (“in Ill § 470 opinion § the of opinion the of the Secretary Secretary the Interior”). of of the Interior”). Id. 148. (1982) (“in 561 opinion § 126. (1982) (“in U.S.C. the Secretary 11a opin- Interior”). § ion of the Secretary of Army”). Id. 149. (1982) (“in opinion § 127. 42 300s-4(b)(2) (1982) (“in Secretary U.S.C. Interior”). § opinion of the Secretary Health Id. 150. (1982) (“in [of opinion § Services]”). Human the Secretary of Interior”). Id. 128. (1982) (“in opinion 151. 44 (1982) (“in U.S.C. opin- the Secretary Health [of and Human ion of the Secretary Agriculture]”). [of Services]”). (“in U.S.C. 3141(a)(2) (1982) (“in President”). of the Secretary Health and [of Human 153. 722(b) (1982) (“in the opinion *15 Services]”). Secretary the Transporta- ... [of Id. 3142(b)(4) 130. (1982) (“in opin- § the tion]”).

ion of the Secretary Health and [of 154. U.S.C.App. (Supp. Ill 1985) § Services]”). Human (“in the opinion of the Secretary [of Id. 3161(b) 131. (1982) (“in opinion § the Commerce]”). of the Secretary Health and [of Human 155. Id. (Supp. (“in 1985) Ill § the Services]”). opinion President”). of the Id. 3214(e) 132. (1982) (“in opinion the § Id. 1111(f) 156. (Supp. 1985) (“in Ill § the of the Secretary Health and Human [of opinion of ... the Secretary of Trans- Services]”). portation”). Id. 4654(c) 133. (1982) (“in opinion the § 157. Id. 1124(a) (Supp. 1985) (“in Ill § the of the Attorney General”). ... opinion of Secretary Transporta- Id. 8402(e)(2)(1982) 134. (“in opinion tion”). § Secretary Health and [of Human 1152(b) Id. 158. (Supp. 1985) (“in Ill § Services]”). opinion of the Secretary Transpor- [of 10508(b) 135. (Supp. 1985) (“in Ill § tation]”). opinion of the Attorney General”). 159. 1211 (Supp. 1985) (“in Ill § (1982) 136. 43 (“in U.S.C. opinion § Presi- of the Secretary [the Transporta- opinion”). tion”). dent’s] 1247(b) 1985)(“in (Supp. 160. Id. Ill § Secretary

opinion Transpor- of the [of

tation]”). 1985) (“in (Supp. Ill

161. Id. § opinion Secretary Transpor- of the [of

tation]”). (1982) (“in U.S.C.App. 1604(j)(4) § Secretary Transportation’s]

[the

opinion”). 1653(i)(3)(1982)(“in opinion

163. Id. § Secretary Transportation]”). [of 1654(m)(2)(1982) (“in opin- Id. § Secretary Transporta- ion of the [of

tion]”). 167c(b) (1982) (“in

165. 50 U.S.C.

opinion Secretary the Interi- [of or]”). 453(a)(6) (“in (1982)

166. Id. Secretary Defense]”). [of 4(b) (1982) (“in U.S.C.App.

167. 50 President”).

opinion of the 10(i) (1982) (“in

168. Id. President”). 1741(d) (“in

169. Id. Secre- [the

tary Transportation’s] opinion”). BOGGS,

In the Matter of BOBBY

INC., Debtor. BANK,

TRINITY NATIONAL

Plaintiff-Appellant, BOGGS, INC., Defendant,

BOBBY Receivership of Judicial

Office Insurance Texas,

for the as State Receiver for *16 Indemnity Company Mary-

Eastern

land, Appellee.

No. 87-1013

Summary Calendar. Appeals,

United States Court of

Fifth Circuit.

June

Case Details

Case Name: Patricio Hernandez-Cordero and Maria Guadalupe Ortega De Hernandez v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Service
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date Published: Jun 19, 1987
Citation: 819 F.2d 558
Docket Number: 85-4587
Court Abbreviation: 5th Cir.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.