Patricia Scott v. Clay County, Tennessee Chinn Anderson Billy Pierce Michael Thompson

article, this the solidary obligor der who SCOTT, Patricia Plaintiff-Appellee, agreement

has not reached a compromise entitled to is have his reduced to the debt payment.10 Accordingly, by extent of the COUNTY, TENNESSEE; CLAY Chinn express settlement, terms of the Anderson; Billy Pierce; Michael is entitled to portion

estate its of the Thompson, Defendants-Appellants. reduced principal debt the amount of No. 98-6157. Further, towards Louis’ claim. paid inas- United Appeals, States Court of agreement much as the did specify not Sixth Circuit. payment only was to be made to the Argued: Aug. “outside bankruptcy,” debt the estate Decided and Filed: March is entitled to have principal payments indebtedness, credited towards its thereby Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied extinguishing liability.11 its April Inherent 2000.* negotiations settlement parties’ is the

linquishment of some of their agreement.

order reach mutual case, gave up portion this Louis total amount he was entitled to collect Hugues

from in order to guaranteed payment definite at a certain By time. attempting to payments recover further estate, from the Louis seeking recoup from the estate that gave up which he negotiations the settlement with Hugues. he is permitted This to do. appealed decision is AFFIRMED. obligee obligor, mise between the and one and intent parties to a written solidary obligors benefits the other instrument, in the including compromise, is ordi portion amount of obligor. of that narily determined from the instrument’s four Id. corners, and extrinsic evidence is inadmissi explain ble either to Osborne, or to contradict the 1256; in 10. 691 So.2d at Mott v. Bris (citations Karts, terms.”) omitted). Inc., strument’s ter’s Thunder (La. 663 So.2d 1995). App. Ct. * Judge Clay grant rehearing would for the rea- Dev., Ortego Dep't sons Transp. State stated in his dissent. (La. 1997) (“The 689 So.2d mean briefed), and (argued M. Brooks

Richard Tennessee, Appellee. for Carthage, briefed), and (argued E. Evans Michael Reese, Evans, Floyd, Todd & T. John Tennessee, Nashville, Appellants. BOGGS, KRUPANSKY, and Before: CLAY, Judges. Circuit KRUPANSKY, J., opinion delivered J., BOGGS, court, joined. in which CLAY, 880-81), delivered a (pp. J. opinion. dissenting separate

OPINION

KRUPANSKY, Judge. Circuit Clay defendants-appellants (“the County”), Sheriff County, Tennessee (“Anderson”), “Chinn” Anderson Cecil (“Pierce”), Deputy and Billy Pierce Deputy Thompson (“Thompson”) Michael of their the district court’s denial contested motion, immunity, for anchored in adjudication of summary Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 plain rights civil claims of the federal (“Patricia” or Patricia Scott tiff-appellee plaintiff alleged plaintiff’). The “the Clay complaint Coun single-count her Anderson, officers Department ty Sheriffs Pierce, Thompson excessive and used force arrest, in violation of her to effect 1988,1 which caused §§ 1983 and U.S.C. further bodily injury. She her serious subjected, any citizen of United seg- provides, pertinent 1. Section 1983 jurisdic- person within or other States ment: any rights, deprivation of to the who, thereof any tion stat- Every person under color of by the custom, secured privileges, or ute, ordinance, immunities regulation, or us- laws, liable to the shall be and subjects, Constitution age, ... or causes State I County, my that the and Anderson maddest ever was in life.” contended More Sheriff, over, County properly proxi failed to train Patricia knew that Robert had mately supervise deputies, ingested significant the defendant volume of and/or coupled alcohol with develop implement ap- psychoac failed to additional substances;4 possessed tive propriate departmental policy official no valid motor operator’s permit vehicle unjustifiable because his li straints exertion force, judicially pursuant cense had been revoked potentially violating lethal thus to his conviction for driving while intoxi by § redressible cated; had, in past, recklessly fled pendent Patricia also asserted state law from law enforcement high authorities at claims. Forthwith, speeds. the emotionally agitat Although unanimity witness is absent ed, chemically impaired, couple en details, regarding various factual the es- gaged passionate argument inside the sential material controlling facts of this moving vehicle. dispute.2 case are not in Dur- substantial Flouting a traffic sign, Robert failed April evening early' the late 28 and stop at the Neely’s intersection of Creek morning April Patricia Scott Road and Highway 53. Deputy Sheriffs willing passenger had been a in her own Thompson, Michael highway pa- routine automobile, a four-door 1978 Chevrolet Ca- trol, observed the Scott vehicle race errati- price, traveling country on the dark road- cally through that intersection with its ways County. of Clay permitted She had tires squealing, momentarily then weave ex-husband, (“Robert”), her Robert Scott pavement turned, off recklessly the as it at earlier, to drive the vehicle. Moments her velocity, hazardous onto Ridge Walker spouse former had retrieved her from a Thompson, Road. concerned nearby locally narcotics den known safety, tailing commenced that motorcar. “Chet’s.”3 Patricia knew that her activi- at the drug ties house had infuriated Rob- speed of the Scott automobile dan- ert; he testified that he probably gerously “was the rose Ridge while Walker law, party injured justifiable in an action at suit in and all inferences are to be drawn equity, proper proceeding Liberty other for re- Lobby, in his favor.” Anderson v. 242, 255, dress!.] U.S. (1986) (citation omitted). 106 S.Ct. 91 L.Ed.2d 202 any plain In action under section the See also Eastman (1) prove tiff must he or she has been Services, Image Kodak v. Technical deprived by of a secured United the 119 L.Ed.2d 265 laws, (2) States constitution or the defendants Metiva, Adams v. 31 F.3d allegedly deprivation who caused that acted 1994). purposes Cir. appeal, For of this law, under color depriva of state and the defendants-appellants either have relied process tion due occurred without of law. upon by plain facts which were conceded City Rapids, O'Brien v. Grand tiff-appellee proved beyond dispute; or were 1994). adopted plaintiff's or have version of con alia, Section inter authorizes the facts, material as articulated via her tested court, discretion, attorney in its to award fees response written to the defendants' Statement prevailing parties

to certain in section 1983 Dispute sup Fact Not in filed Material in cases. port summary judgment of their motion. long standing summary 2. In accordance with 3. Both Scotts had a abuse, history of cocaine norms, judgment reviewing this court has although Robert that he asserted had been favorably construed the record evidence most attempting depen- to overcome his cocaine litigant for the Patricia Scott as the dency. opposing summary judgment. E.g., Matsushi Corp., ta Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 574, 587-88, recently 4. Robert testified he con- 89 L.Ed.2d beers, determinations, sumed between five and seven in "Credibility evidence, prescription pharmaceuticals weighing tandem with drawing and the including legitimate "nerve medicine” jury inferences from facts and "muscle functions, laxants,” produced drug-in- judge.... not those of a The evi which had believed, dence of be the non-movant is to duced mood alteration. hide; that Pierce’s car Robert asserted narrowly miss- Road, rocketing past, from stationary Caprice struck unmarked Anderson’s Chinn ing, Sheriff that Robert rear, posited whereas Pierce parked near he had cruiser service squad into his cruiser himself, Caprice backed the roadside, as the sheriff as well (Pierce) it. In had exited after he response, nearby. sitting had been who event, Deputy Pierce dispute no exists sound- vehicle’s siren with his Thompson, car, produced patrol his parked and exited flashing, pursued lights ing and blue sixteen-round, Ruger nine-millimeter lacked his Because he high speed.5 at Caprice arm, cautiously moved toward license, intended to service Robert a valid driver’s Suddenly, now-stationary to his moth- by fleeing Chevrolet. apprehension evade forward, accelerated rapidly “road run- experienced An the Chevrolet er’s residence. path its leap out of successfully eluded the Pierce ner,” compelling Robert Then, bid apparent Robert in an chases. past high-speed self-defense. police flight, he that, ensuing highway, to the during his driver to return conceded its directly Depu- motorist off towards proceeded one fellow Caprice forced at least have been Rob- “might he vehicle. roadway, Thompson’s approaching and that ty that, have been or could he had observed yellow although across the line ert recalled line,” which yellow ap- con- firearm-toting deputy across the sliding one least safety physical ad- patently duct risked and knew that proaching Caprice, pedestrians, pursu- civilian motorists and officers armed enforcement ditional passenger, patrolmen, Robert’s intend- approaching, he nevertheless were himself. by driving the direction escape ed units would supporting which the from Anderson Patrol cruisers driven arriving. momentarily Pierce Billy Deputy Sheriff Thompson’s pursuit joined Deputy that the Chevrolet was At the moment After the three sher- speeding Chevrolet. the motor- racing again once onto the Scott car chased iffs office units had oper- that its way, Deputy Pierce believed minutes, speeds ranging at twenty for over run down Sheriff tried to ator had earlier hour, Robert per between 85 to miles Anderson,6 attempted had to drive over attempting vehicle while lost control of his (Pierce) only previously, moments and him per to 80 miles hour. sharp a turn at 75 menace posed grave immediate hundred for several Caprice The skidded approaching limbs of his col- lives and feet, thoroughfare, and off the glided highway innocent travel- leagues as well as rail, guard which into a crashed roadside plaintiff has not The .contested ers. abrupt vehicle to an brought fugitive not know that avowal he did Pierce’s halt. inside the vehicle. passenger was also momentous, split-sec- Pierce, with a patrol vehicle had Confronted Deputy whose decision, ond, defendant chase, initially life-or-death reached led erstwhile five initially by firing reacted bul- point, Pierce At some the immobilized motorcar. driver;7 he lets towards the Chevrolet’s the Scott transpired a collision between additional four rounds discharged departmental then an automobile and Pierce’s ve- not intend to kill testified that he did Thompson not recall 7.Pierce deposition, 5. At could driver; rather, simply "intended to he his unit's siren and whether he activated neutralize situation.” after, before, momentarily lights shortly contradiction, pattern of Beyond Robert’s sped perilously close to the Scott vehicle and posed misdeeds serious immi- wanton sheriff and his vehicle. irreparable or other dire nent threat death an consequences, necessitated immedi- which had of Robert’s near colli- 6. Pierce learned and decisive addition ate counteraction. via radio transmissions sion with Anderson above, evolved the record to the evidence Thompson. The three from Anderson and 4, 1996, that, November reflected radio contact defendants maintained Tennessee, Clay County, Court Criminal throughout the chase. Robert, guilty pleas, following his convicted tires, causing Constitution,8 at that vehicle’s it to skid to United States as enforced second, final, (see stop §§ for the time. by U.S.C. 1983 and 1988 note above), injure Pierce’s hail of bullets had failed to Pierce, alleging that Thompson, driver, Unfortunately, Robert Anderson, Scott. personal their as well as however, two of his shots had inadvertent- capacities, committed, official partici- Scott, ly struck Patricia in, whose pated failed prevent, the un- and/or presence as a passenger was unknown to constitutional use of force excessive Pierce. her; seize and that Sheriff Anderson and the County properly had failed to train Immediately following the Chevrolet’s supervise in, deputies defendant and/or officers, incapacitation, including additional implement devise and appropriate and/or Thompson, Anderson arrived policies defining, the lawful application of scene. Robert and Patricia were then re- force to effect an arrest. Additionally, the from the moved vehicle and manacled. plaintiff joined pendent Tennessee consti- However, instantly upon perceiving tutional and tort law claims. Patricia has wounded, they Patricia had been radioed sought in compensatory million $10 dam- for a helicopter. medical evacuation ages, an punitive additional million in $5 rescue aircraft rushed Patricia to Vander- damages, attorney fees and other litigation University Hospital, bilt where doctors dis- expenses, injunction an restricting the de- lodged covered one bullet her inside skull practices, fendants’ forcible arrest and oth- and a gunshot second imbedded within her appropriate er relief. alleged shoulder. Patricia has significant physical she has suffered dam- Following discovery, on June age, lifelong including adverse health con- 1998, the four jointly peti defendants sequences, injuries caused her tioned the district court for a summary permanent presence the bullet judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 dismiss her skull. Patricia states that Scott ing plaintiffs federal civil rights surgically bullet cannot be removed. claims, dismissal, as well as the for want jurisdiction, On November Patricia in federal matter complaint, pendent her her stigated instant Tennessee law claims. Bas Fourth, she advanced claims under the their motion on the quali doctrine of Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to immunity,9 argued fied the defendants Const, felony on endanger- process two counts of reckless without due of U.S. law[.]” ment, assault, felony aggravated XIV, one count of § amend. 1. and one count of misdemeanor evasion of The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process arrest, stemming from his actions on Clause restricts of the activities the states and 29, Furthermore, morning April of 1995. instrumentalities; their whereas the Fifth 18, 1997, deposition February on con- Robert Amendment’s Due Process Clause circum impli- firmed his unstable mental state on the only govern scribes the actions of the federal if, morning; queried during cated when generally Sturgell Creasy, ment. See v. 640 chase, high speed he had considered that if he 843, 1981); (6th F.2d 850 Cir. Walker v. pursuing might continued to flee that a shoot, officer 1247, (6th Cir.1977). Hughes, 558 F.2d 1257 time, replied, Robert "At the I didn't Ergo, complainant's the instant citation to the care if I lived or died.” Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause was a nullity, and redundant of her invocation of the posits, 8. The Fourth Amendment relevant Fourteenth Due part, right people Amendment Process Clause. that "The to be se- persons cure in their ... unreason- "Qualified seizures, 'good immunity or faith' is ... an able shall not be violated[.]" Const, govern U.S. affirmative defense that is available to amend. IV. performing discretionary ment officials func states, The Fifth Amendment in material Hts., City Mayfield tions.” v. Rich 955 part, person deprived that "No shall ... be of 1092, (6th Cir.1992). life, F.2d 1094 "The ulti liberty, property, process or without due Const, proof mate burden of is on the to U.S. oflaw[.]" amend. V. to stipulates, show that defendants are not entitled The Fourteenth Amendment pertinent qualified immunity.” (emphases segment, Id. at 1095 that "No state shall ... life, Circuit, banc, added). deprive any person liberty, property, or The Sixth en has re- 874 ultimately that motion facts, con when whether even evinced How question. claimant, legal or factual posed favorably for the most strued a civil dismissal of ever, court’s a district law, not, support a matter could ap summary disposition rights defendant’s violated any defendant conclusion immunity qualified plication anchored constitutionally-protected any federal predi if appealable no immediately will be arguen- or, alternatively, assuming right; fact material of an finding cate essential the mov- adverse to the evidence do that determination, thus jury for remains sufficient sustain legally was ants Beh purely legal. issue is lynchpin of a jury’s finding rational hypothetical 299, 313, 116 Pelletier, U.S. rens v. 516 infraction, law the defendant (1996); 834, John L.Ed.2d 773 133 S.Ct. be shielded nevertheless enforcers should 309-12, 304, Jones, 115 v. son offend liability because the personal from 2151, That 132 S.Ct. on “clearly established” was not ed norm exception governing to the judicial See, v. Rob e.g., Painter 29, 1995. April because, if a defendant prevails 557, Cir. ertson, 566-67 immunized from personally servant 1999). law, he liability as a matter monetary 1998, 28, the trial court denied July On immunity suit “an entitled to she is from motion, material ruling that subject to [ultimate] a mere defense than rather remained, juror for resolu- fact issues Forsyth, U.S. liability.” Mitchell v. tion, the Fourth Amendment regarding 2806, L.Ed.2d plaintiffs seizure “reasonableness” added). (1985) (italics brackets in original; and, (evolved below); was if the seizure judice, although In the cause sub unreasonable, precise contrib- whether multiple is- disputed factual adversaries of each individual defendant actions uting court, dis- none of those in the trial sues objectively unreasonable under were qualified to the facts were essential puted clearly estab- was dictates of 56(c) immunity See Fed.R.Civ.P. defense. August the incident date. On on lished summary judgment “shall (directing that timely ap- noticed a the defendants de- pleadings, if the forthwith be rendered reviewing bench. to this peal interrogatories, positions, answers file, rejec the affi- together a trial with

Ordinarily, forum’s admissions davits, genu- there is no any, if show that summary judgment motion is of a tion fact and ine issue as to material scrutiny, irrespective appellate Mehra, F.3d cenlly components Williams defined the omitted; 1999) (en banc) (quotations immunity defense: added) (citing Fitzgerald, Harlow v. brackets performing discre- officials Government tionary generally are shielded functions McClellan, Dickerson damages liability insofar as civil from (6th Cir.1996)). clearly estab- not violate their conduct does rights civil liti insulation from federal statutory or constitutional [federal] lished governmental per gation upon state bestowed person would a reasonable of which broadly, immunity sweeps by qualified sonnel " evaluating procedure for have known. The affording 'ample room for mistaken them immunity tripartite: qualified is claims plainly by protecting ‘all but the judgments' First, we determine whether a constitution- knowingly violate incompetent or those who ” occurred; second, Pleasant, we deter- al violation has City 142 v. Mt. the law.’ Sova right 898, (6th Cir.1998) that was violated mine whether (quoting Hunter 902 534, 224, 229, a clearly was a established of known; S.Ct. Bryant, 112 v. 502 U.S. (1991)). fi- person Megenity would have v. reasonable See also 589 L.Ed.2d 116 1120, (6th Cir.1994) plaintiff nally, we whether the Stenger, determine 27 F.3d facts, ("If supported a reasonable alleged we conclude that has sufficient evidence, he been aware allegations by to in- would not that sufficient official rights] committing allegedly did civil viola [federal the official was dicate what (brackets tion, immunity.”) light of the we then afford objectively unreasonable in was added). rights. clearly established moving party judgment is entitled to a terial fact had to initially by resolved law”) added). (emphases matter of as a trier of fact to qualified assess the terms, very provides “By immunity its this standard defense. See Williams v. Meh (6th ra, 685, Cir.1999) (en alleged the mere existence some 186 F.3d banc) dispute parties will (“regardless factual between the the district court’s properly supported defeat an otherwise reasons denying qualified immunity, summary judgment; motion for may jurisdiction the re we exercise ap over the quirement genuine there peal be no to the extent it raises questions of (italics law.”) omitted) issue of material fact.”10 Anderson v. Lib in original; ellipse 242, 247-48, erty Lobby, 477 (quoting McClellan, U.S. Dickerson v. 101 F.3d (6th Cir.1996)). 1151, 1157 (emphases 91 L.Ed.2d 202 in original). Constitutional tort claims

Accordingly, a lower court’s de undergirded by state actors allega termination that employ defendant state tions of excessive force exerted to consum by qualified person’s ees were not shielded immuni amate seizure properly as ty, undisputed with to a reference set of sessed Fourteenth Amendment due facts, operative “final process is a decision” of if guarantees plaintiff law,11 immediately and thus is appealable non-targeted been a innocent third party Mitchell, § under 28 1291.12 collaterally injured U.S.C. by an assertion of offi 580, 105 force; principle instances, S.Ct. 2806. That in cial such the defendant if judge controls even the trial will only errone be liable if he or she had acted ously genuine concluded that issues ma- manner which “shocks the conscience.”13 explained: undisputed 10.The Anderson Court facts or the evidence viewed in light plaintiff most favorable to the fail materiality, As to the substantive law will prima establish a violation of clear identify Only which facts are material. dis- facie may constitutional law we decide that the putes might over facts that affect the out- qualified immunity defendant is entitled to governing come of the suit under the interlocutory appeal. on an properly preclude entry will of sum- Berryman Rieger, v. 150 F.3d mary judgment. disputes Factual that are Cir.1998) (citations omitted). unnecessary irrelevant or will not be count- ed. governs 13.This rule because Fourth Amend- 242, 248, Liberty Lobby, v. Anderson 477 U.S. prohibitions against ment "unreasonable sei- (1986) (cita- 106 S.Ct. 91 L.Ed.2d 202 zures,’’ below, developed apply cannot when omitted). tion purposefully had not been Claybrook "seized" state lawmen. courts, legal 11. All conclusions lower in Birchwell, (6th Cir.2000) 199 F.3d cluding posited resolving summary those ("the Fourth Amendment reasonableness’ judgment qualified motion anchored in im apply standard does not to section 1983 munity, E.g., are scrutinized de novo. Grider physical claims which seek remuneration for Abramson, (6th Cir.), 180 F.3d 746 n. 7 injuries inadvertently upon an inno- denied, - U.S. -, inflicted cert. party by police cent third officers’ use of force Township Brennan v. attempting perpetrator, while to seize be- Northville, 1152, 1154, cause the could authorities not ‘seize’ 1996). person other than one who was a deliberate force.”) recently object 12. The Sixth Circuit has (emphasis clarified the of their exertion of . appellate jur- original) (citing County Inyo, factors which inform an court’s Brower v. isdiction to review a district court’s denial of (1989)). summary judg- immunization on ment: Similarly, pro- Fourteenth Amendment due bounds, dispute If the defendant not does the facts cess rather than Fourth Amendment alleged by plaintiff purposes imperatives, the for of the “reasonableness” confine exer- If, appeal, jurisdiction power accidentally our is clear. in- tions of state which im- stead, disputes plaintiff's pact the defendant the even the intended an official of seizure, story, version of the the defendant must such as where an inadvertent colli- willing police injures nonetheless be to concede the most sion with a vehicle an arrest plaintiff target, agents favorable view the of facts to the because the state had not voli- purposes appeal. Only tionally for if the crafted the violence to facilitate an 876 exacting “shocks Lewis, more posed against the v. 523 U.S. Sacramento

County of of evidentiary requisites 1714-21, conscience” 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d the 833, 118 S.Ct. Birchwell, appeal, Amendment. On 199 Fourteenth (1998); v. the Claybrook 1043 Cir.2000). contrast, defendants-appellants conceded By the 350, 359 motion summary judgment that their asserted force claim an excessive the Fourth under target of should be assessed by premeditated a public servants Amendment, Fourteenth than the to consum rather designed compulsion official Fourth analyzed under Amendment.15 a seizure mate strictures; “reasonableness” Amendment the has defined Supreme Court only that the fault prove need plaintiff the “reason- Fourth Amendment boundaries of was, implicated under the action official ed objective “bal- by adoption of an ableness” circumstances, objectively “unreasonable.” ancing” query: 394-97, Connor, 386, U.S. v. 490 Graham used whether the force Determining (1989); 1865, 443 104 L.Ed.2d. “reason- particular seizure is to effect 7-9, Garner, 1, 105 471 v. U.S. Tennessee Fourth Amendment under the able” Clay 1 L.Ed.2d 85 S.Ct. of the nature balancing a careful quires brook, F.3d at 359. 199 intrusion on indi- quality the Amendment interests vidual’s Fourth judice, In the cause sub dis countervailing governmental against the summary judg presumed, trict court Because the test interests stake.... Patricia, as a volun that purposes, ment the Fourth reasonableness of whom, following tary cohort of Robert’s precise of capable is not Amendment officers forci shooting, the defendant application, mechanical definition or inoperative from the Chevro removed bly however, application requires its proper handcuffed, let, was an immediately intended times laxed Fourth pertinent,14 thereby triggering “objective Amendment’s target of an official unreasonableness” comparatively re seizure at all stan ^[2] stances of each careful attention to whether ^[1] severity suspect particular of the crime at facts poses an imme- case, and circum- includ- issue, most dard favorable to the proof (and hence plaintiff), paradigm juxta- diate threat to others, ^[3] whether safety he is actively officers object of a County had been Sacramento nonetheless seizure. See v. official 1715-16, detention). Lewis, S.Ct. 523 U.S. willful official L.Ed.2d 1043 Accordingly, this review need resolve 15. Garner, 1, 7, 105 See Tennessee exist issue would otherwise whether factual (1985) (“Whenever S.Ct. whether, that regarding at the for trial time person the freedom of a an officer restrains moving discharged weapon into the Pierce his (em person.”) away, has that walk he seized passenger compartment, the de- Chevrolet's added; omitted); Smith v. Fre phasis citation any passenger in fendants to seize intended land, (6th Cir.1992) (resolving F.2d 343 driver, than the that vehicle other an was "seized” that intended arrestee turn would determine which constitutional bullet); police see also of a fatal Brow means plaintiff's charges. proviso would control County Inyo, er v. Birchwell, Claybrook F.3d 350 (1989) (ruling Cir.2000) (explaining the constitutional that target of an arrest who had that an intended had been inadver- action of a citizen who tort police by crashing killed into road been parked tently inside a auto- while wounded "seized,"and commenting had been block during an police shoot-out with mobile "[vjiolation Fourth Amendment that felony suspect parking must in the lot armed acquisition physical requires an intentional Fourteenth Amendment be scrutinized under control.”); California, 401 U.S. Hitt v. proof the record was un- 802-05, standards because 28 L.Ed.2d peace constables contested that the defendant (resolving plaintiff, an arrestee who anyone in- had had been unaware been identity, been the victim mistaken had did not intend to seize side that vehicle though police "seized” even been car). man, anyone might who be inside to confine because the another intended resisting attempting arrest or to evade Although the Fourth Amend ment inquiry “reasonableness” is flight.... largely arrest fact-driven, summary judgment for defen particular The “reasonableness” of a dant servants founded in judged use of force must be from the immunity is appropriate nonetheless when of a perspective reasonable officer on undisputed facts, material plain or the scene, rather than with the 20/20 facts, tiffs version of disputed material hindsight.... vision of The calculus of hypothetical demonstrate that a reason embody reasonableness must allowance officer would able have not known that his for the fact police officers are often actions, circumstances, under the were ob split-second to make judgments— jectively forced unreasonable. See v. City Sova Pleasant, (6th Mt. tense, in circumstances that are uncer- Cir.1998). The testimonial tain, record before rapidly evolving —about review, the instant even when construed amount of force that is necessary in a favorably most plaintiff, for the over particular situation. whelmingly manifested that each of the inAs other Fourth Amendment con- considerations, three Graham highlighted texts, however, the in- “reasonableness” above, militated in support of the incontro in an quiry excessive force case is an vertible conclusion that the defendants’ ac objective one: the question is whether First, tions were objectively reasonable. are “objectively officers’ actions un- serious, Robert had committed life-threat ening reasonable” in crimes in light presence of the facts and of the defen Second, dant officers. them, proof record confronting circumstances without demonstrated that fleeing motorist’s regard to their underlying intent or mo- ongoing felonious posed misconduct an im tivation. mediate threat to safety of officers as Connor, 386, 396-97, Graham v. Third, well as innocent civilians.16 the ve 109 S.Ct. perpetrator hicular actively resisting was (italics added; and brackets citations and by eluding representatives arrest omitted). quotations justice system.17 criminal "[wjhere general Mehra, proposition, 16. As a the offi Williams v. 186 F.3d probable 1999) (en cer banc). has cause to believe that the Cir. Consequently, when the suspect poses physical facts, a threat of serious undisputed plaintiff's material or the harm, others, either to the facts, officer or to it is disputed version of material manifest constitutionally prevent unreasonable that a reasonable officer in the defendant's Garner, escape by using deadly force." posture objectively would have believed that U.S. at ‘"Probable existed, 1694. probable cause the existence of that cause' denotes facts and circumstances within may factor be determined as a matter of law knowledge officer's that are sufficient to Painter, summary judgment. on 185 F.3d prudent person, warrant or one of reason at 571-72. caution, believing, able in the circum controversy, In the case in the testimonial shown, that the suspect stances has commit herein, proof, encapsulated would warrant ted, committing, is or is about to commit an reasonable officer in Pierce's circumstances circumstances, If the objec offense. viewed culprit posed to conclude that the a serious cause, tively, support finding probable others, which, alone, injury standing risk of arresting officer’s actual motives are irrel reconciled his use of force with Fourth Robertson, Painter v. evant.” Amendment strictures. 1999) (quotations and citations omitted). Additionally, target’s persistent high- implicated "Whereas attempts circumstances capture risk to évade created an issues, comprise factual probable objectively the ultimate suspicion may reasonable that he cause determination perpetrated issue of mixed unknown additional serious (citation omitted). offenses, fact." Id. thereby reinforcing weight fact, questions of law and Mixed supporting ultimate first "reasonableness" factor as Wardlow, upon appli- factual determinations based Pierce’s actions. See Illinois v. facts, - U.S. -, subsidiary 675-77, of law to cation 145 L.Ed.2d plenary appeal. ascertainment 8 available, justifi-

Moreover, namely gunfire.19 mandate Pierce by an antecedent ably fleeing fired at the vehicle in order directly instructed that a has this circuit occupant(s); its therefore seize his actions passenger into the who fired constable could violate the Fourth Amendment not vehicle, moving under compartment of a may passenger unknown who remarkably similar to those circumstances Thus, injured by have his actions. been review, did not violate the presently on immunity qualified Pierce entitled to Freland, In Fourth Amendment. Smith v. plaintiffs not impinge because he did (6th Cir.1992), an automobile 954 F.2d 343 rights. violated sped parking of a lot and a out patrol A cruiser fol- posted stop sign. turn, remaining indi two vehicle, in which culminated a lowed that defendants, Thomp vidual Anderson and per hour speeds reaching 90 miles chase at son, im qualified are likewise shielded After the violator districts. residential munity, alleged complicity because their attempted to collide with the twice deadly pat Pierce’s use of coercion lawful vehicle, occupied car cor- police squad ently plaintiffs not could offend However, fugitive nered the motorist. protections. Fourth Amendment Tur culprit automobile into the accelerated his Scott, ner v. cruiser, then lawman’s drove towards 1997) can, (explaining that an officer under a street. The officer fired fatal circumstances, person certain deemed Id. at round at the mobile offender. 344. ally responsible for com unconstitutional summary judg- The Sixth Circuit affirmed pulsion applied by agent a fellow if that shooter, ruling ment that his ac- officer, “(1) for the minimum, actively at either constitutionally force, as tions reasonable a participated were in the use of excessive (2) supervised matter law.18 at 346-48. the officer who exces Id. used (3) force, duty sive the victim owed law, Accordingly, as a matter defen- protection against the use of excessive objec- dant actions Pierce’s faulted were force.”) omitted). (citations reasonable, tively and thus did not violate permissi- Pierce Fourth Amendment. Hence, Pierce, defendants bly discharged duty to professional Anderson, his Thompson, as a matter of through law, store and lawful order maintain have committed no Fourth Amend Scott,20 instrumentality readily against ment infraction most effective Patricia panel duty 18. The Freland commented: each other. Their is to restore order, Connor, maintain lawful while not exac- supra], Graham we [U]nder [v. erbating necessary disorder more than substituting personal must our avoid no- jobs. supposed They do their to act procedure proper police for tions of decisively and to show restraint at the same instantaneous of the officer at the decision moment, and decisions to be their have scene. We cal, must never allow theoreti- haste, pressure, made in and fre- imagination sanitized world of our luxury quently without of a second replace dangerous complex world chance. policemen every day. What con- face Lewis, County Sacramento v. may quite stitutes "reasonable” action seem facing possible different to someone as- omitted). (quotations and citations ques- analyzing sailant than to someone tion leisure. plaintiff's 20. alternate contention that the Freland, Smith v. defendant officers somehow her con- offended Cir.1992) (brackets added). allegedly privileges by initiating the stitutional timely Despite the instant defendants' invo- misconceived, high speed facially chase is be- Freland, patent significance cation and the injured cause she had been in an automo- action, precedent of that to the calamity tive or other dur- collision fortuitous inexplicably trial court failed it to address County the chase. Sacramento Cf. judgment its denying immunity their Lewis, motion. (1998) (concerning the constitu- aptly 19. As observed the Lewis Court: motorcycle tional of the estate of a claim [Tjhe police mishap calling passenger expired an occasion fast who in vehicular Rather, chase). during obligations high speed police tug action tend to Anderson, Pierce, against person and therefore are insulated Thompson in their exposure litigation al to further 42 personal capacities, a procedurally proper §§ 1983 and 1988. U.S.C. case has against been stated defendant Tennessee, Clay County, by virtue of the indicated, previously As plaintiffs specification, complaint, in her qualified immunity of safeguards doctrine Clay that County, as well as the three only person natural certain defendants defendant county agents in their official Painter, capacities. E.g. their individual capacities, infringed her constitutional contrast, By 185 F.3d 566 n. 12. if the rights. legal requirements municipal county of or satisfied,21 liability civil rights Nevertheless, our conclusion that immunity automatically will not excuse a no officer-defendant deprived had municipality county or from constitutional of any constitutional right a fortio even liability, municipal where the or coun ri defeats the claim against the County as ty actors were personally by absolved well. City Heller, See Los Angeles v. of qualified immunity, agents 799, those 796, 475 1571, U.S. 106 S.Ct. 89 if fact (1986) plaintiffs curiam) (“If invaded the (per constitutional 806 rights. Leatherman v. County person Tarrant has suffered inju no constitutional Unit, 163, 166-67, 507 ry Narcotics U.S. 113 at the hands of police the individual 1160, (1993); 122 officer, S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 517 Gar departmental the fact that the reg 358, ner v. Memphis Dept., Police 8 F.3d ulations might have authorized the use of (6th Cir.1993). 365 “An capacity official unconstitutionally excessive force is quite against claim filed employee is point.”) (emphasis Court’s); beside the equivalent Oullette, to a lawsuit 1099, directed against Monday v. 118 F.3d 1105 (6th public entity Cir.1997). agent which that represents.” court, Ergo, this in its Claybrook, (citing 199 F.3d at 355 n. 4 discretionary pendent party exercise of ap Graham, Kentucky v. pellate jurisdiction 473 U.S. appellant Clay over the 3099, (1985)). County, L.Ed.2d 114 plaintiffs directs that further Accordingly, despite the dismissal of against federal claims it shall be dis- herein, Drinski, 1143, (7th illustrated the salient issue wheth- was Plakas v. 19 F.3d Cir.1994). authorized, Birchwell, constitutionally Claybrook er was Pierce un- See also v. 350, (6th Cir.2000). circumstances, 199 F.3d 360 n. 13 der the to at the shoot errant attempt in an endanger- Chevrolet to end its Municipalities “persons” and counties are peace ment of officers and civilians. Whether exposed litigation to under sections 1983 and Robert would have driven the less Chevrolet 1988, legal requisites if the are fulfilled. hazardously pur- if the defendants had not Basinski, v. 105 F.3d Munford it, may mitigated sued which in turn or Cir.1997). See, e.g., Enterprises Haverstick firepower eliminated the ultimate need for to Credit, Financial Federal 32 F.3d 996 n. vehicle, irrelevant, entirely disable that be- (6th Cir.1994) ("section 1983 actions possessed any legal cause Robert in no event against municipalities carry [or counties] cer

justification elements, (1) or excuse for his special including proof felonious life- tain threatening operation City county] pursued [or an official Chevrolet. As cus train, policy failing adequately tom or Circuit to Seventh has commented: supervise, discipline partic or its officers in a attacks, than Other random all such cases matter, policy ular such official [involving jus- use of force criminal adopted by or custom the official was makers personnel] begin tice with the decision of a policy with ‘deliberate indifference' to police something, help, officer to do to to persons wards the af arrest, inquire. If the officer decid- custom.”) (brackets policy fected nothing, ed to do then no force would have added) Harris, (citing City Canton v. sense, police used. been In this officer 378, 387-88, always causes the trouble. But is trouble it (1989)). City L.Ed.2d 412 See also Collins v. cause, police which officer is sworn 115, 120-24, Heights, Harker 503 U.S. of S.Ct. which, society pays him to cause and 117 L.Ed.2d 261 Monell v. limits, kept society Services, if within constitutional Department Social 690-95, praises causing. the officer for summary judgment, abound. Township granting Brennan missed.22 contrary majority, my opinion, the Northville, govern- of law dictates 1996). well-established summary judgment, granting of ing the remand, the district following Finally, there at its only arrive conclusion can determine, in its sound initially court shall all of by deciding disputes are no factual plain discretion, to dismiss whether Plain- fact issues of the contested claims without remaining state tiffs majority opinion the only does tiff. Not fed supplemental or to exercise prejudice, undis- facts to constitute disputed assert 28 U.S.C. over them. jurisdiction eral facts, deny in but its anxiousness puted 1367(a) (c)(3); Uni Carnegie-Mellon § & court, majority the day in Plaintiff her 348-50, 343, Cohill, U.S. 108 484 versity v. by of its factual some conclusions reaches (1988); Rosado 614, 720 98 S.Ct. facts, stating, objectively as established 397, 403-05, 90 S.Ct. U.S. Wyman, 397 v. was in the majority supposes the what (1970); The 1207, 442 Musson 25 L.Ed.2d the time of deputies at the minds of the Corp., 89 atrical, Express v. Federal Inc. The Cir.1996). shooting. (6th surrounding the events 1244, 1254-55 F.3d conduct, for deputies’ explanation their carefully con- reviewing court has This in the much of which could viewed by submitted the argument sidered each to con- the factual circumstances context of persuasive, either none but finds plaintiff, the speculation about after the fact stitute Accordingly, individually collectively. or officers, is asserted of the motivation 28, July of 1998 court’s order the district majority. by the uncontrovertibly true immunity to defendants denying qualified be left to would best Such determinations Pierce, RE- Anderson, Thompson and is time of trial. fact at the the finder of all defen- against All claims VERSED. §§ 1983 and in 42 U.S.C. dants anchored described Plaintiff the officers have and PREJU- DISMISSED WITH 1988 are occurred versions of what vastly conflicting is REMANDED the case DICE. This 28, is April 1995. What evening on the necessary further for such district court of the one-sided missing from the account proceedings as consistent orders and majority opinion by described events disposition of opinion, including this with allegations of Plaintiffs any consideration claims. pendent plaintiffs state pres- This case the events. or version of act- deputies whether questions ents CLAY, dissenting. Judge, Circuit pursuing an individual reasonably in ed for the reasons set respectfully I dissent initially committed allegedly who had court’s well-reasoned out in district violation; depu- whether minor traffic opinion denying Defen- persuasive and their ver- exaggerated or ties embellished summary judgment. I dants’ for motion oc- subsequently which sion of the events in court was correct believe the district shooting; during the chase and curred finding that Defendants are immune Plaintiff deputies whether observed from suit. and in the vehicle riding passenger as a matter, her, whether fired at or for representations Contrary to driver and observed both the the officers in which majority opinion, this is case in and fired at both of them passenger preclude disputes, factual should 2106; § Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend to exer- U.S.C. review declined Even this if 427-28, 702, 425, 54 Corp., S.Ct. discretionary pendent party jurisdic- U.S. cise its Moored, v. County, ruling United States its that none of tion over the Cir.1994); 1419, (6th In re 38 F.3d the three individual defendants violated n. 2 Corp., 3 General F.3d Motors would 1993); which, Guidry Metal Wkrs. v. Sheet the law of the constitute case Ass’n, (10th Cir. rule, 705-06 compel the Intern. would district the mandate 1993); Bailey, court, remand, v. Piamhino following to dismiss the also Cir.1985). against County. See 28 federal claims apply. and disregard safety granting for the ableness” should Plaintiff; whether excessive force was summary judgment under the circum by shooting Plaintiff at her used improper regardless stances this case is effectuating person a “seizure” of her of whether the standard that should be purposes Fourth Amendment. applied in evaluating the officers’ conduct Garner, See Tennessee v. 16- is the “conscience shocking” standard of 85 L.Ed.2d Amendment, the Fourteenth see County of Lewis, opin- As indicated the district court’s Sacramento matter, ion this the officers were (1998), 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 through- touch with one another radio “objective lesser standard of unrea shooting. out the chase Rather sonableness” of the Fourth Amendment. than resolve all the inferences could Garner, 16-17, 471 U.S. at be drawn from the contested facts 1694; Birchwell, Claybrook see also Plaintiff, circumstances favor of as the (6th Cir.2000). Regardless required Court is to do on a motion for standard, appropriate Defendants summary majority im- judgment, has do not dispute, as made clear the dis properly opinion undertaken in its to opinion, trict court’s right that Plaintiffs against solve Plaintiff all the issues free from excessive force under the whether Defendants acted with excessive Fourth Amendment was a clearly estab clearly force and violated Plaintiffs estab- lished the time of the incident in rights. majority lished doing, so question. question The that should have has also resolved Plaintiff the is- been left for trial was whether excessive sues of whether Defendants observed or actually employed against force was Plain had reason to know that excessive force tiff. would be or employed, was about to be opportunity whether Defendants had the This practice Circuit’s unfortunate of ar- prevent and means to the harm to Plain- rogating resolving unto itself the role of Again, tiff. those issues should have been appeal disputes presented by the factual left for resolution at trial. qualified immunity § in a defense Plaintiff, grievous This who action, suffered represented by majority personal injury and harm in the incident herein, opinion troubling continues the subject litigation, which is the of this trend followed this the im- Court permitted should have been properly Claybrook decided case of testimony seeking officers’ to the truth (affirm- Birchwell. See 199 F.3d at 358-61 trial, device of cross-examination at granting court’s district order sum- opportunity should been afforded the mary judgment to the defendants on present direct and evi- circumstantial plaintiffs’ Counts III and IV of the com- argue dence from which Plaintiff could to plaint). I therefore dissent. jury clearly the court and that her estab- rights lished constitutional were violated constituted,

by what the circum- stances, the officers’ excessive use of force for which one or more of Defendants were entitled

not to the benefits of immunity. majority asserts because Plain-

tiff argued has violations of her under the Fourth Amendment and process

violation of her substantive due Amendment, rights under the Fourteenth “objective the lesser standard of unreason-

Case Details

Case Name: Patricia Scott v. Clay County, Tennessee Chinn Anderson Billy Pierce Michael Thompson

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Date Published: Mar 1, 2000

Citation: 205 F.3d 867

Docket Number: 98-6157

Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.