141 Minn. 430 | Minn. | 1919
Plaintiff recovered a verdict against defendant for transmitting and delivering a libelous telegram to plaintiff’s husband. Defendant appealed from an order denying its alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.
The material facts are not in dispute. At the time the libelous telegram was sent, plaintiff, a married woman, was postmistress at the village of Graeeton in the county of Beltrami, and her husband, W. J. Patón, was on a visit to his brother, Robert Patón, at Mirror in the province of Alberta, Canada. Defendant had a telegraph line which
“W. J. Paton, Mirror, Alberta.
“Wife caught in adultery with Cox. Come at once. Answer.
“C. Wilson.”
The operator at Baudette transmitted the message to the operator at Edmonton who transcribed it and delivered it to the operator of the Grand Trunk Pacific Company at that place. This operator transmitted it to the operator at Mirror who transcribed it upon the usual receiving blank and delivered it to Robert Paton, in whose care it was sent, and who happened to be in the office at the time it was received. Robert Paton delivered it to his brother, W. J. Paton. Whether the message was handed to Robert Paton to read or was delivered to him in a sealed envelope addressed to W. J. Paton, is in dispute and the evidence would sustain a finding either way.
The law is settled in this state that a telegraph company may be required to respond in damages for transmitting and delivering a message libelous on its face, unless the message be privileged or the charge be justified. Peterson v. Western Union Tel. Co. 65 Minn. 18, 67 N. W. 646, 33 L.R.A. 302; S. C. 72 Minn. 41, 74 N. W. 1022, and 75 Minn. 368, 77 N. W. 985, 43 L.R.A. 581, 74 Am. St. 502.
That the charge made in this message was false is conceded, and no attempt was made to justify it.
Defendant received this message from an utter stranger. It was glarngly defamatory on its face. Defendant transmitted it without any mowledge as to its truth or falsity, without any knowledge as to whether he person who presented it was or was not a person who was entitled o send it as a privileged communication, and without making any inuiry of any kind. The court submitted the question as to whether the ommunication was privileged to the jury, and instructed them to the ffeet that it was privileged if the operator acted carefully and in good aith, but was not privileged if he was negligent or wanting in good
Defendant contends that the court erred in submitting the question of punitive damages to the jury. The court charged the jury to the effect that they could allow punitive damages if they found that the operator, in sending the message, was actuated by malice and ill-will: This correctly stated the law. Peterson v. Western Union Tel. Co. 75 Minn. 368, 77 N. W. 985, 43 L.R.A. 581, 74 Am. St. 502. The operator testified that he received and sent the message without knowing or thinking that he had ever known any of the persons concerned in it, and defendant argues from this that he could not have sent it maliciously. W. J. Patón, to whom the message was sent, was a freight conductor on the same railroad for which the operator worked, and plaintiff presented evidence that they had come in conflict concerning their respective duties and authority, and tending to show that ill-will had existed between them. We think the evidence as a whole made a question for the jury on the issue of malice.
Defendant also contends that the verdict is excessive. It is not so unreasonable, in view of the odious nature of the charge contained in the message, as to justify this court in interfering.
A number of errors are assigned in respect to the rulings on the admission of evidence, and in respect to the charge and the refusal to charge, but we find none which require a reversal.
Order affirmed.