In this case we thilik the prosecutor may sue out the writ.
Its right may be sustained upon two grounds, either of which give it sufficient standing under our decisions — first, that it is resident and a taxpayer in the city of Paterson; second, that the resolution sought to be set aside is injurious to it in its business. Middleton v. Robbins, 25 Vroom 566; Stroud v. Consumers Water Co., 27 Id. 422; Tallon v. Hoboken, 30 Id. 383; Hoxsey v. City of Paterson, 10 Id. 489,
Nor do we think £hat the resolution itself is one that the city has the power to adopt. It is in restriction of the rights of the public, and tends to a limitation of the general right of the city officials to contract for printing. It excludes all persons or corporations from contracting with the city not of a specified class, which fact tends to create a monopoly and impose a possible additional burden on the taxpayers.
This view is sustained by a long line of judicial authority, from which a few citations only are necessary. Van Reipen v. Jersey City, 29 Vroom 262; Holden v. City of Alton, 179 Ill. 318; City of Atlanta v. Stein, 36 S. E. Rep. 932.
The writ will be allowed.