112 Misc. 242 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1920
The complaint herein alleges the making of a written agreement on or about June 5, 1919,' for the lease of certain premises for a term commencing on October 1, 1919, and ending on September 30,1921, at the yearly rental of $2,300, payable in equal monthly installments, and that an installment of rent amounting to $191.66 became due and payable on the 1st day of April, 1920, but no part thereof has been paid. The defendant admits all the allegations of the complaint except the legal conclusion that the rent is due and payable. Concededly this denial raises no issue but the answer alleges as a defense that the rent for which the action is brought is “ unjust and unreasonable and the agreement under which the same is sought to be recovered is oppressive ’ ’ and, in support of this statement, the defendant sets forth that prior to October 1, 1919, the rent paid to the plaintiff for the same premises under a written lease for the previous year was $1,350 per annum and that the rent of the demised premises has been increased by agreement more than twenty-five per centum over the rent as it existed one year prior to the date of the agreement under which rent is sought to be recovered in this action and as it existed one year prior to the 1st day of October, 1919. The defendant claims that these facts constitute a defense under the provisions of chapter 136 of the Laws of 1920. The defendant as a counterclaim also seeks under similar allegations to recover the difference between the monthly payments made on the first day of each month from October toi May at the rate of $191.66 and the ‘ ‘ fair and reasonable rent ” for the said premises. The plaintiff has replied to the counterclaim and has now moved for judgment on the pleadings.
At the argument the defendant’s attorney admitted his inability to show any legal basis for his counterclaim. If the statute applies to agreements made in
The question whether the facts alleged set forth a good defense requires more consideration. The statute provides that:
“ Section 1. Unjust, unreasonable and oppressive agreements for the payment of rent having been and being now exacted by landlords from tenants under stress of prevailing conditions whereby the freedom of contract has been impaired and congested housing*245 conditions resulting therefrom have seriously affected and endangered the public welfare, health and morals in certain cities of the state, and a public emergency existing in the judgment of the legislature by reason thereof, it shall be a defense to an action for rent accruing under an agreement for premises in a city of the first class or in a city in a county adjoining a city of the first class occupied for dwelling purposes, other than a room or rooms in a hotel, lodging house or rooming house, that such rent is unjust and unreasonable and that the agreement under which the same is sought to be recovered is oppressive.
“ § 2. Where it appears that the rent has been increased more than twenty-five per centum over the rent as it existed one year prior to the time of the agreement under which the rent is sought to be recovered, such agreement shall be presumptively unjust, unreasonable and oppressive.”
If in fact an emergency exists and conditions have arisen “ which seriously affected and endangered the public welfare, health and morals in the city of New York ” it was not only the right but the duty of the legislature to pass statutes which would tend reasonably to correct the conditions and remove the danger to the public welfare, health and morals. The fact that housing conditions are congested is so well known that the courts .might well take judicial notice of it and certainly have no right to nullify the declaration of the legislature that such conditions exist. The legislature has passed this statute to remedy in part this condition and the court must now consider whether the statute was intended to cover cases where the rent was payable under a lease made before the act was passed and if so, whether the act was constitutional.
It is to be noted that the act does not expressly provide that it shall apply to leases for a definite term
Plaintiff’s motion for judgment is, therefore, granted, with ten dollars costs.
Motion granted, with ten dollars costs.