48 Ga. App. 389 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1934
1. “Actions for injuries done to the person .shall'be brought within two years after the right of action accrues, except for injuries to the reputation which shall be brought within one year.” Civil Code (1910), § 4497. “Actions for injuries to personalty shall be brought within four years after the right of action accrues.” Civil Code, § 4496.
2. The common-law rule that an action for the death of a human being will not lie has been changed by statutes in this State, now embodied in sections 4424 and 4425 of the Civil Code, codifying' the act of 1850 and successive amendments. Those sections prior to the amendment of 1924 (Ga. L. 1924, pp. 60, 61) gave a fight of action for negligent homicide to three classes of persons: (1) a widow, child or children, for the death of the husband or father; (2) a husband, child or children, for the death of the wife Or mother; and (3) a dependent mother or father.for the death of a child. In each of these groups, the statutory right to recover is based' upon a substitution of the party or parties suing in the place of the deceased, and the measure of damages is the full value of. the life to the deceased and not to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. The right of recovery does not depend upon the amount of loss of services or of any property right. Consequently, the essence of the action being the injury to the person of the deceased, Code-section 4497 controls the period of limitation, which is within two years from the death. Atlantic, Valdosta & Western R. Co. v. McDilda, 125 Ga. 468, 471 (54 S. E. 140, 114 Am. St. R. 240); Engle v. Finch, 165 Ga. 131, 132, 134 (139 S. E. 868); Western & Atlantic R. Co. v. Bass, 104 Ga. 390, 392 (30 S. E. 874) ; So. Bell Tel. Co. v. Cassin, 111 Ga. 575, 576-578 (36 S. E. 881, 50 L. R. A. 694); Chapman v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., 20 Ga. App. 251 (2), 254 (92 S. E. 1025); Williams v. Seaboard Air-Line Ry. Co., 33 Ga. App. 164 (2), 165 (125 S. E. 769). The amendment of 1924, however, added a new
3. Under the preceding ruling, it is unnecessary to determine whether or not the provision of Code-section 4376, that “the time between the death of a person and representation taken upon his estate . . shall not be counted against his estate,” but not exceeding five years, would be applicable to an administrator suing-
Judgment reversed.