54 S.E.2d 476 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1949
1. The special grounds of the motion for a new trial are incomplete and require no consideration.
2. (a) There is no evidence in this case to show that the Federal rent-control laws and regulations are applicable, and the issues involved are decided under applicable State law.
(b) Under the evidence, the jury was authorized to find that the tenant was a tenant at sufferance after the expiration of the calendar year and liable for double rent for the premises during such occupancy.
(c) The amount included in the verdict and judgment as double rent for the premises prior to the expiration of the calendar year must be written off, else the judgment of the trial court shall stand reversed.
3. The trial judge did not err in overruling the defendant's motion for a new trial.
1. Special ground 1 of the motion is based on the refusal of the trial judge to permit the defendant to introduce certain official records and the testimony of Robert Maddox, an official in *572
the office of the U.S. Housing Expediter. The contents of the records and the expected testimony of the witness are not shown in this ground of the motion, either literally or in substance, nor is the proffered evidence attached to the motion as an exhibit, nor does it appear wherein the excluded evidence was material and would have benefited the complaining party. This ground of the motion is incomplete. See Patterson v. Farish,
2. On the general grounds of the motion for a new trial the defendant, the plaintiff in error here, contends (a) that the Federal rent-control laws and regulations thereunder are superimposed on the State law, and that there is no evidence that the conditions precedent as required by the Federal laws, among these being the prescribed 60-days notice, were met, and (b) *573 that the evidence will show that the plaintiff in error was a tenant at will, and that no notice as required by the law of this State was given.
The evidence fails to show that the premises in question were subject to the Federal rent-control laws and regulations at the time the plaintiff notified the defendant that she wanted possession of the premises, or at any other time. The Federal laws in regard to rent control are not laws of general application, but are only applicable to certain areas which have been designated by the Price Administrator as defense-rental areas. See 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 901 et seq., § 942 (d); and 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 1881 et seq., § 1892 (d). If the premises in question were subject to the Federal rent-control laws and regulations thereunder, and the defendant desired to avail himself of the provisions of these laws and regulations, he should have introduced evidence during the course of the trial to show the fact of their application to the premises in question, and this court cannot supply that omission by assuming that the premises in question were subject to the Federal rent-control laws. See Savage v. Weeks,
It appears from the evidence that the plaintiff rented the premises in question to the defendant on or about June 22, 1948, for $35 per month, payable in advance; that this stipulated rental was paid for each succeeding month on the 22nd day of the month, in June, July, August, September, October, and November, 1948; that on or about December 6, 1948, the plaintiff made an oral demand for the apartment; that the plaintiff refused a tendered postal money order for $30 for rent' on December 22, 1948, it appearing that the plaintiff desired possession of the premises and would have refused a tender of a larger amount; that a similar tender was made on January 22, 1949, and again refused; and that the defendant voluntarily moved from the premises on February 12, 1949. The dispossessory warrant was issued on January 14, 1949, and while a dispossessory warrant is issued primarily to recover possession of premises (Code, § 61-301), and at the time of the trial in March, 1949, this was already an accomplished fact, still the plaintiff *574
could continue with the proceeding after the defendant vacated the premises, in order to determine whether or not she should receive double rent (Code, Ann. Supp. § 61-305) on account of the continued occupancy of the premises after the expiration of the period for which it was rented. See Salas v. Davis,
The verdict of $116.67 appears to have been based on a finding by the jury that the rental value of the premises was $35 per month, this verdict being double rent for the period of occupancy from December 22, 1948, to February 12, 1949, when the tenant moved from the premises. But under the evidence and the law applicable thereto the tenant was not occupying the premises as a tenant at sufferance prior to the expiration of the calendar year, December 31, 1948, and consequently the amount included in the verdict for double rent from December 22 to December 31, 1948, which would be $21, is contrary to law, and it is ordered that the same be written off the verdict and judgment at or before the time the judgment in the trial court is entered on the remitter from this court. Otherwise, the judgment of the trial court shall stand reversed.
The verdict for double the rental value of the premises, except as above indicated, was authorized by the evidence. *575
3. The trial judge did not err in overruling the defendant's motion for a new trial.
Judgment affirmed with direction. Felton and Worrill, JJ.,concur.