OPINION and ORDER
On оr about June 29, 2016, plaintiff Cindy L. Passiglia, f/k/a Cindy L. Hahn (“plaintiff’ or “Passiglia”), commenced this putative class action against defendants Northwell Health, Inc., f/k/a North Shore-Long Island Jewish Health Care, Inc. (“Northwell, Health” or “NSLIJ”); North Shore University Hospital (“NSUH”); Regional Claims Recovery Service (“RCRS”); and Ingram & Associates LLC (“Ingram”)
1. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Sometime after plaintiff incurred a debt for personal medical services, she “fell behind on payments allegedly owed on the alleged debt[,]” (Amended Complaint [“Am. Compl], ¶¶ 17-18), and her “debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to RCRS and [Ingram] for collection.” (Id., ¶ 19).
RCRS’s initial communication to plaintiff was by letter dated July 1, 2015 (“the RCRS Letter”). (Am. Comрl., ¶¶ 20-21 and Ex. 1). The detachable upper portion of the RCRS Letter, which was to be returned with payment of the debt, inter alia, (i) indicates that the “RCR File No.” is 17672505 and the balance due is three hundred fourteen dollars ($314.00), (ii) contains a return address in Melville, New York; a remittance address in Boston, Massachusetts; a website address of www. regionalclaimsrecovery.com; and a serial number of “17672505 07012015 00031400 9,” and (iii) provides an area for the recipient to provide credit card information as a form of payment. (Id., Ex. 1). Immediately below the detаchable section, the RCRS Letter, inter alia, (i) indicates that the “Provider/Original Creditor” was Paans Medicine, the doctor was Sharmilee V. Shetty, MD, and the treatment date was April 14, 2015; and (ii) contains information about RCRS, including its name, that it is a division of NHLIJ, its aforementioned website, a toll-free number ending in -0302, a telephone number for those who speak Spanish, a fax number with the area code (631), a New York City Department of Consumer Affairs License Number of 0907774, and the phrase, “***WE’RE HERE TO HELP YOU***” in bold type. (Id.)
The body of the RCRS Letter provides:
“We have been asked to assist you in resolving your aсcount as shown above. You may be responsible for the balance due either because you do not have insurance coverage, or the treating physician does not participate in your insurance plan. It is your responsibility to know the terms and limits of your insurance coverage. Please refer to your explanation of benefits (EOB) or call your carrier if you have any questions regarding your obligation for the balance due. Please make' your check payable to Paans Medicine and include your account number on the check or complete and return the credit card information above.
You can also resolve your account by making a payment or providing new insurance information by calling toll free (xxx) xxx-0302 between the hours of 9:00 AM and 5:00 PM or by visiting our website at www.regionalclaimsrecovery. com. Voice mail messages left after hours will be returned the next business day.
Our goal is to help you conclude your account by
• processing available insurance benefits
• establishing a repayment plan that fits within your budget
• offering financial assistance if you fall within certain guidelines
We encourage you to write, call or visit our website. Thank you.”
(Am. Compl., Ex. 1). The bottom of the RCRS Letter contains, inter alia, a validation notice; the phrase, “[] Results through Cooperation and Respect for each other [,] ” in italics; the statement, “North Shore-Long Island Jewish Health Care, Inc. is a part of the North Shore-Long Island Jewish Health System[;]” and the code, “10NREGC011340.” (Id.) (emphasis in original). The names “Regional Claims Recovery Service” or “regionalelaimsre-covery,” or the initials “RCR,” appear in the RCRS Letter nine (9) times, inсluding in the website addresses and the letters in bold type in the “Results through Cooperation and Respect” phrase. (7d)(emphasis in original).
Ingram subsequently contacted plaintiff by letter dated August 14, 2015 (“the Ingram Letter”). (Am. Compl., ¶¶ 22-23 and Ex. 2). The detachable upper portion of the Ingram Letter, which was to be returned with payment of the debt, inter alia, (i) similarly indicates that the “Ingram File Number” is 17672505 and the balance due is three hundred fourteen dollars ($314.00), and provides an area for the recipient to provide credit card information as a form оf payment, but (ii) contains a return address in Franklin, Tennessee; a remittance address in Minneapolis, Minnesota; a website address of https:// www.usapaymentexchange.com/iai3; and a serial number of “17672505 08142015 00031400 3.” (Id., Ex. 2). Immediately below the detachable section, the Ingram Letter, inter alia, (i) also indicates that the “Provider/Original Creditor” was Paans Medicine, the doctor was Sharmilee V. Shetty, MD, and the treatment date was April 14, 2015, but (ii) contains information about Ingram, including its name and logo, a toll-free telephone number ending in - 7679, a fax number with the аrea code (615), and a New York City Department of Consumer Affairs License Number of 1474471-DCA. Like the RCRS Letter, beneath the Ingram information is the phrase, “***WE’RE HERE TO HELP YOU***” in bold type. (Id.)
The body of the Ingram Letter provides: “Sometimes mail gets misplaced and sometimes the timing is bad. We would still like to assist you in resolving your account.
We are required to tell you that this communication is from a debt collector and any information we obtain will be used to collect the debt.
We would certainly appreciate receiving your check or money order payable to: Paans Medicine, or take a moment to complete the following and return the letter to our office, in the enclosed envelope, so that we can promptly review your account and take the appropriate action.
[Options are given to enclose payment; to authorize a credit card charge for the balance designated on the letter; or to provide proof of prior payment, an explanation for non-payment, or a telephone number and “best time to call” in order to receive a telephone call to discuss the account.]
If you still believe that you have insurance coverage for the treatment above, we suggest you contact your carrier and find out what is delaying payment of your claim. After contacting your carrier, either call our office or visit our website to provide the insurance information needed to process your account. Thank you for your coоperation.”
(Am. Compl., Ex. 2). The bottom of the Ingram Letter contains Ingram’s name, the toll-free telephone number ending in -
Both fhe RCRS Letter and the Ingram Letter bear similar typeface, text placement, style, form and credit card graphics.
B. Procedural History
On or about June 29, 2016, plaintiff commenced this putative class action, against Northwell Health, NSUH, RCRS and Ingram (collectively, “defendants”),'and filed an amended complaint asserting fourteen (14) causes of action seeking damages for Ingram’s and RCRS’s respective violations of the FDCPA, and a common law fraud claim against all defendants. Specifically, the amended complaint alleges: (1) that Ingram violated (a) 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g(a)(3), (4) and (5) (first through third causes of action, respectively), (b) 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (sixth and tenth causes of action), and (c) 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (seventh and eleventh' causes of action); (2) that RCRS violated (a) 16 U.S.C. § 1692g (fourth and eight causes of action), and 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (fifth and ninth causes of action); (3) that Ingram and RCRS both violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(10) and (14) and 1692j (twelfth through fourteenth causes of action, respectively); and (4) that all defendants committed fraud (fifteenth cause of action).
With respect to plaintiffs fifteenth cause of action seeking damages for common law fraud, the amended complaint asserts the following allegations:
“207. INGRAM’s August 14, 2015 letter to Plaintiff includes the statement, ‘Sometimes mail gets misplaced ... We would still like to assist you in resolving your account.’
208. Such statement, in what is the first communication from INGRAM, is meant to make Plaintiff believe that the letter is not the the [sic] first communication from INGRAM.
209. Such statement, in what is the first communication from Defendant INGRAM, is meant to make Plaintiff believe that there was prior communication from INGRAM.
210. RCRS’s July 1, 2015 letter to Plaintiff is striking [sic] similar, to INGRAM’s August 14,2015 letter to Plaintiff.
211. Both letters- to Plaintiff bear the same, serial number, ‘17672505 00031400’ [sic].
212. Both letters to Plaintiff bear the same typeface, text placement, style, form and graphiсs,
213; RCRS’s internal file number for Plaintiff is 17672505.
214. INGRAM’s internal file number for Plaintiff is the same, 17672505.
215. The bottom of the RCRS letter to Plaintiff states, TONREGC011340.’
216. The bottom of the INGRAM letter to Plaintiff letter [sic] states, ‘10N-REGC011341 [sic].’
217. Either RCRS and INGRAM are the same company, or INGRAM is impersonating RCRS.
218. RCRS (a division of either NSLIJ or NSUH), INGRAM, NSLIJ and NSUH are working in concert to deceive consumers.
219. Defendants are working in concert to make consumers believe that there was a prior letter from INGRAM.
220. Defendants are working in concert to make consumers believe RCRS and INGRAM are the same company.
221. Defendants’ conduct, as described herein, was meant to make the Plaintiff believe that the letter from'INGRAM was not the the first communication from INGRAM.
222. Defendants’ conduct, as described herein, was done to make consumers believe RCRS and INGRAM are the same company.
223. Defendants’ conduct, as described herein, was done- to make consumers believe RCRS, and INGRAM.are the same company, so that INGRAM would not have to provide consumers with their rights under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3) and 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) 15 .U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5) [sic].
224. Plaintiff believed RCRS and INGRAM were the same company.
225. The purpose of Defendants’ scheme is to discourage debt disputes by not providing notice of the, consumer’s rights under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3).
226. The purpose of Defendants’ scheme is to discourage debt validation requests by not providing notice of the consumer’s rights under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4).
227. The purpose of Defendants’ scheme is to discourage requests for original creditor ■ information by not providing notice of the consumer’s rights under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5).
228. The purpose of Defendants’ scheme is to increase revenue through the discouraging of debt disputes.
229. The purpоse of Defendants’ scheme is to increase revenue through the discouraging of debt validation requests.
230. The purpose of Defendants’ scheme is to increase revenue through the discouraging of requests for original creditor information.
231. Because of Defendants’ conduct, as described herein, Plaintiffs belief that RCRS and INGRAM were the same company was reasonable.
232. Defendants’ conduct, as described herein, was fraudulent.
233. Defendants’ conduct, [sic] is pervasive.
234. Attached hereto as ‘Exhibit 3’ is a small sampling of INGRAM letters meant to look like RCRS [sic]. letter.
235. The letters are identical in all, respects, except that some list INGRAM and some list RCRS.
236. As a result of Defendants’ fraudulent conduct, Plaintiff was damaged in an amount to be determined at trial.”
(Am. Compl., ¶¶ 207-236).
Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that as a result of defendants’ actions, she “suffered emotional distress, worry, aggravation, frustration, depression and confusion[;] ... was caused to be distracted from her work[;] ... lost time at work[;] ... was caused to waste her personal time[;] ... [and] fought with her husband[,] ... resulting] in marital discord[ ] ... [and] divorce.” (Am. Compl., ¶¶ 24-30).
Ingram now moves pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss plaintiffs common law fraud claim (fifteenth cause of action) against 'it, as well as plaintiffs claims seeking “a finding that Defendant’s is [sic] a fraud,” and awarding her actual' and punitive damages, (Am. Compil., ¶236 and p. 19, ¶¶ d, g, h), for failure to state a claim for relief.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
The standard of review on a motion made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is that a plaintiff plead sufficient facts “to state a claim for relief that is plausible .on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal,
In deciding a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must liberally construe the claims, accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Aegis Ins. Servs., Inc. v. 7 World Trade Co., L.P.,
Nonetheless, a plaintiff is not required to plead “specific evidence or extra facts beyond what is needed to make the claim plausible.” Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3,
In deciding a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court must limit itself to the facts alleged in the complaint, which аre accepted as true; to any documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated by reference therein; to matters of which judicial notice may be taken; or to documents upon the terms and effect of which the complaint “relies heavily” and which are, thus, rendered “integral" to the complaint. Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc.,
B. Fraud Claim
“To state a claim for fraud under New York law, a plaintiff must allege (1) a material misrepresentation or omission of fact; (2) which the defendant knew to be false; (3) which the defendant made with the intent to defraud; (4) upon which the plaintiff reasonably relied; and (5) which caused injury to the plaintiff.” Financial Guar. Ins. Co. v. Putnam Advisory Co., LLC,
■ 1. Material Misrepresentation or Omission of Fact
“Not every misrepresentation or omission rises to the level of fraud.[ ] An omission or misrepresentation may be so trifling as to be legally inconsequential .... ” Gaidon v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
The two (2) statements in the Ingram Letter that are challenged by plaintiff are: (i) the first phrase in the sentence, “Sometimes mail gets misplaced and sometimes the timing is bad[;]” and (ii) “We would still like to assist you in resolving your account.” (Am. Compl., ¶ 207 and
Although “a plaintiff may base a fraud claim on a statement of future intention if she can ‘allege facts sufficient to show that the promisor, at the time the time the representation was made, never intended to honor the promise[,]’” Karakus,
2. Reasonable Reliance
“To plead a claim for fraud in the inducement or fraudulent concealment, plaintiff must allege facts to support the claim that it justifiably relied on the alleged misrepresentations.” ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.,
Although plaintiff alleges that she “believed RCRS and [Ingram] were the same company,”. (Am. Compl., ¶ 224), as a result of the purported misrepresentations in the Ingram Letter, the amended complaint is devoid of any facts from which it may reasonably be inferred that plaintiff changed her position in reliance on that belief, i.e., that she did anything, or refrained from doing something, in reliance thereupon, to her detriment. Accordingly, the amended complaint fails to state a plausiblé common law fraud claim under New York law. See, e.g. SRM Global Master Fund Ltd. P’ship v. Bear Stearns Cos. L.L.C.,
3. Injury
Moreover, the Court of Appeals of New York recently held:
“Critically, a false representation does not, without more, give rise to a right of action, either at law or in equity, in favor of the person to whom it is addressed. To give rise, under any circumstances, to a cause of action, either in law or equity, reliance on the false representation must result in injury. [ ] If the .fraud causes no loss, then the plaintiff has suffered no damages ....”
Connaughton v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.,
The amended complaint “is fatally deficient because [plaintiff] did not assert compensable damages resulting from [defendants’] alleged fraud.” Connaughton,
Where, as here, a plaintiff claims only mental or emotional injuries, or damages that are remote, speculative or undet-erminable, or not independent of other causes, the complaint fails to state a plausible fraud claim under New York law. See, e.g. Kregos,
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Ingram’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs common law fraud claims against it pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rulеs of Civil Procedure is granted and plaintiffs common law fraud claims are dismissed in their entirety with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. By letter to the Honorable Arlene R. Lindsay, United States Magistrate Judge, dated May 1, 2017, plaintiff, inter alia, advised the Court that she has settled her claims against Northwell Health, NSUH and RCRS. (Docket Entry ["DE”] 36). •
. The factual allegations in the complaint are assumed to be true for purposes of this motion, “unless contradicted by more specific allegations or documentary evidence,” L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC,
. Even assuming that plaintiffs citation to paragraph 231 of the Amended Complaint was a typographical error, the Amended Complaint only conclusorily asserts, “As a result of Defendants’ fraudulent conduct, Plaintiff was damaged in an amount to be determined at trial.” (Am. Compl., ¶ 236; see also id., ¶ 31), That allegation is insufficient to state a plausible-claim that plaintiff sustained a pecuniary or out-of-pocket loss or injury as a result of defendants' purported fraud.
. In other words, based upon the allegations in the amended complaint, had Ingram not purportedly violated the FDCPA, there would be no harm to plaintiffs. See Warren v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,