Partlow v. StatePartlow v. State
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melanie Ann Dale, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
FARMER, J.
Because the pertinent facts and legal issue are identical, the outcome in this case should be no different than the one in State v. Stapleton, 764 So.2d 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). In each of these cases, the defendant pleaded to a sexual offense without being informed of the sexual offender registration requirement and promptly thereafter moved to withdraw the plea.1 Both defendants stated unequivocally that they would not have entered the plea if they had known of the requirement. In Stapleton the motion was filed within 30 days of the plea, while in this case it was filed even more promptly—just 10 days after the plea and sentencing. In neither case is there any plausible argument of prejudice to the state. Stapleton obviously stands for the proposition that these circumstances amount to gоod cause. As we did in Stapleton, therefore, we hold that this defendant “should have been advised of the known consequences of his plea at the time of the taking of the plea.” 764 So.2d at 888.
Stapleton is itself in keeping with the well established, general policy of Florida
This policy is pertinently demonstrated by Daniels v. State, 716 So.2d 827 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), where we held that the mandatory 2 year revocation of a driver‘s license under
Even accepting the Stapleton conclusion that sexual offender registration is merely a collateral effect, we nevertheless proceed to ask whether it matters to the voluntariness of the plea that sexual offender rеgistration is collateral rather than direct. We do not think it does. As we implicitly determined in Daniels, the real issue is whether a plea to a sexual crime lacking advice of the registration requirеment may with any confidence be thought sufficiently informed—and therefore genuinely voluntary2 —that a trial judge could rightfully refuse to allow it to be withdrawn so soon after the plea was made. Just as wе did in Daniels and Stapleton, we say no and direct the trial court to allow that the plea be withdrawn. But see Benitez v. State, 667 So.2d 476 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (sexual predator registration is collateral consequence of plea which was not required to bе covered in the plea colloquy).
In Nelson v. State, 780 So.2d 294 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), where the facts are identical, the first district affirmed an order refusing to allow the plea to be vacated, holding that Stapleton did not require a reversаl because the issue presented is one of discretion. The Nelson court explained that:
“Because Nelson did not allege any affirmative misrepresentation, but only the failure to advise him of a collaterаl consequence, we conclude that the trial court‘s denial of Nelson‘s motion to withdraw his plea did not result in manifest injustice.”
With respect we disagree. There are several things that a defendant who contemplates pleading guilty or no contest to a crime might be charged with knowing from publication of laws, but we still insist of having the defendant reminded of them before he plеads. Among them are the right to trial by jury, the right to counsel, the right to appeal, notice that the state
The coercive power of law is justifiable only if legal outcomes are predictable.4 Conflicting outcomes on identical legal issues and facts may reasonably be perceived by the public as having been based on the subjective views of judges rather than on the objective force of law. When we аllow different outcomes on identical facts and legal issues, we place an undue burden on public acquiescence of the legal coercion in our decisions. In short, therе are strong prudential reasons to give this defendant the same relief we did under the same circumstances in Stapleton and to disagree with the contrary outcome in Nelson. We do so here and certify conflict.
REVERSED.
STEVENSON, J. concurs.
SHAHOOD, J., dissents with opinion.
SHAHOOD, J., dissenting.
I would affirm the denial of appellant‘s motion to withdraw his plea.
In his motion to withdraw plea, appellant claimed that he was induced into entering the plea because of concerns for his mother‘s health, that he would be denied access to his minor child, or that he was not advised of the sex offender registration requirement. I would affirm, without comment, the first two issues raised by appellant and discuss only the third issue raised.
With respect to the sex offender registration requirement, courts have held that a defendant need not be informed of these designations before entering a plea, because they are collateral, rathеr than direct, consequences resulting from his convictions of certain sexual offenses. See Nelson v. State, 780 So.2d 294 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Donovan v. State, 773 So.2d
In State v. Stapleton, 764 So.2d 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), the trial court granted the defendant‘s motion to withdraw his guilty plea to lewd assault, because he hаd not been informed that he would have to register as a sexual predator under
In Nelson, the defendant appealed from the trial court‘s denial of his motion to withdraw plea on the grounds that he was not informed that upon conviction, he would be designated as еither a sexual offender or sexual predator and that his driver‘s license would reveal that classification.
The Nelson court acknowledged Stapleton, a factually similar case, yet distinguished it by holding that the trial court in Nelson exercised its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw. See Nelson, 780 So.2d at 295. Because Nеlson did not allege any affirmative misrepresentations, but only the failure to advise him of a collateral consequence, the First District concluded that the trial court‘s denial of Nelsоn‘s motion to withdraw his plea did not result in manifest injustice. See id.
Like Nelson, the trial court in this case, in the exercise of its discretion, held that appellant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered his plea with a full understanding of the criminal sanctions against him. Becausе appellant did not allege any affirmative misrepresentation, but only the failure to advise him of a collateral consequence, the trial court‘s denial of his motion to withdraw рlea did not result in a manifest injustice.