182 F. 779 | 5th Cir. | 1910
(after stating the facts as above). “The principle that the right of a foreign corporation to engage in
However this may be, the contract involved in this case was not ; made in Alabama, but was made in Kentucky. It did not provide for j the doing by the purchaser (appellant here) of anything in Alabama I which constituted the doing of business in that state; and the evidence i fails to show that in carrying out the contract the appellant did any- ■ thing in Alabama which constituted the doing of business • within the meaning, or violative of the laws of the state. There is no presumption that the parties made an illegall contract, or contemplated an illegal transaction. No lumber was sold by the purchaser in this case and shipped on his order to any point in Alabama until several months subsequent to the making of the contract, and subsequent to his compliance with the laws in reference to doing business in the state by foreign corporations. Shipments were frequently made to points out of the state prior to such compliance, but we find no evidence that lumber was stored and kept on hand for sale in Alabama. Rumber, under the terms of the contract, was in some instances stacked to dry out before shipment, and when ordered shipped was loaded by the seller (Conecuh Pine Rumber & Manfg. Co.) f. o. b. cars, in accordance with the contract. Such transactions are constantly taking place in this state, as, for instance, the manufacture and sale by cotton mills of their product to foreign corporations; also like transactions in lumber and
But it is contended here that the appellant had an agent in Alabama, who inspected the lumber that was manufactured and stacked by the seller, and that this was doing or transacting business in this state within the meaning of its said laws. We cannot agree with this contention. There was no provision in the contract in reference to said inspection, hut there was a stipulation as to sizes, lengths, and prices of the lumber contracted for, and it may well be that the purchaser, as incidental to his contract, desired to have the lumber which he was receiving under his purchase inspected by his agent that he might be duly advised if the sizes, lengths, etc., were coming up to the stipulations of his contract.
We think the court below erred in holding the contract unenforceable, and in disallowing the claim of the appellant against the bankrupt. The decree appealed from is reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to allow appellant’s claim.