Ron PARSONS, Jr., and George Z. Peterson for themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. The SOUTH DAKOTA LOTTERY COMMISSION and Its Executive Director, Susan Walker; Michael Dacy, Diane Dacy, Scott M. Anshutz, Julie A. Anshutz, and Dacshutz, Inc., d/b/a Mr. “G‘s“; Ionia Klein; and Robin Parsons, Defendants and Appellees.
No. 17994
Supreme Court of South Dakota
Decided Aug. 4, 1993
On Reassignment April 8, 1993
504 N.W.2d 593
Argued March 15, 1993.
Charles H. Whitebread and Christopher Slobogin, Criminal Procedure § 3.03 (2d ed. 1986). Clearly, based upon the findings that the trial court made, not only did the police have probable cause to search the trunk, they also had “facts and circumstances within their knowledge” sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest Davis and Krebs.
4. Finally, I concur in the holding of Issue II, other bad acts evidence, and simply submit that we have now properly overruled this court‘s prior holding in State v. Itzen, 445 N.W.2d 666 (S.D.1989). As I stated therein, “[t]he evidence of the other incidents [was] admissible because [it] tend[s] to prove that defendant committed the third incident.” Id. at 670 (Sabers, J., dissenting). The same reasoning would apply here under the plan or modus operandi exception where identity is in issue.
Arlo D. Sommervold, James E. Moore of Woods, Fuller, Shultz & Smith, Sioux Falls, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Wally Eklund, Charles Rick Johnson, Michael Abourezk and Stephanie Pochop, Johnson, Eklund & Abourezk, Gregory, for defendants and appellees Michael Dacy, Diane Dacy, Scott M. Anshutz, Julie A. Anshutz and Dacshutz, Inc., d/b/a Mr. G‘s.
Lawrence L. Piersol, Cheryle Wiedmeier of Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz & Smith, Sioux Falls, for defendant and appellee Ionia Klein.
HURD, Circuit Judge (on reassignment).
Ron Parsons, Jr. and George Z. Peterson appeal from the trial court‘s order denying their cross-motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment to the South Dakota Lottery Commission, Susan Walker, Ionia Klein, Michael Dacy, Diane Dacy, Scott M. Anshutz, Julie A. Anshutz, Dacshutz, Inc., and Robin Parsons. We affirm.
FACTS
This appeal involves a disputе over the proper ownership of a $12.4 million winning lottery ticket. The underlying facts of this case have previously been before this Court and will be only briefly recounted here. See Dacy v. Gors, 471 N.W.2d 576 (S.D.1991).
Robin Parsons (Robin) was clerking at Mr. G‘s, a convenience store in Gregory, South Dakota, on April 4, 1991. An unknown customer orderеd a $5 “Quick-Pick”1 ticket for the Lotto*America drawing. The customer refused the ticket, buying instead a $5 ticket entitling him to play five different sets of numbers on the April 6th drawing. Robin placed the rejected $5 ticket on the till for sale to the public.
The refused ticket remained unpurchased prior to the April 6th drawing and was discovered by Ionia Klein (Klein) when she arrived to work on April 7, 1991. Realizing that the ticket held the winning numbers, Klein placed $5 in the store cash box and signed the ticket. On April 9, 1991, the South Dakota Lottery Commission (Commission) verified the ticket and declared Klein to be the holder and owner of the ticket.
On April 11, 1991, the owners of Mr. G‘s2 filed suit against Klein alleging that they were the actual holders of the winning ticket and entitled to the prize proceeds. The owners and Klein later entered into a court approved settlement.
In addition on April 25, 1991, Robin filed suit against Klein and the owners of Mr. G‘s claiming she was entitled to ownership of the ticket since she had mistakenly printed it. Her lawsuit was dismissed and is currently on appeal to this Court.
Following discovery, Klein and the owners of Mr. G‘s moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Parsons and Peterson, agreeing that there were no genuine issues of material fact, filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The circuit court denied Parsons’ and Peterson‘s cross-motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Klein and the owners of Mr. G‘s on grounds that Parsons and Petеrson lacked standing to challenge the Commission‘s decisions and that sufficient consideration was given for the winning ticket.
Because we hold that Parsons and Peterson did not have standing to challenge the decision of the Commission, we do not reach the issue of consideration.
ANALYSIS
Generally, for a litigant to have standing to bring an action before the court, the litigant must “show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant.” Gladstone, Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99, 99 S. Ct. 1601, 1608, 60 L. Ed. 2d 66, 76 (1979).
Parsons and Peterson do not argue that they have personally suffered any actual or threatened injury; rather, they allege that they have standing as taxpayers to challenge the distribution of lottery winnings and thus need not suffer a special injury to pursue their action. In South Dakota “a taxpayer need not have a special interest in an action or proceeding nor suffer special injury to himself to entitle him to institute an action to protect public rights.” State v. Kelly, 65 S.D. 345, 347, 274 N.W. 319, 321 (1937). See also Torvinen v. Saunders, 77 S.D. 310, 315, 97 N.W.2d 586, 589 (1958); Lien v. Northwestern Engineering Co., 74 S.D. 476, 479, 54 N.W.2d 472, 474 (1952); White Eagle Oil & Refining Co. v. Gunderson, 48 S.D. 608, 618, 205 N.W. 614, 618 (1925). Thus, to have standing, Parsons’ and Peterson‘s action must seek to protect a “public right.” State ex rel. Adkins v. Lien, 9 S.D. 297, 299, 68 N.W. 748, 749 (1896).
This Court has recognized a “public right” where a plaintiff seeks relief from a public official who is compelled by South Dakоta law (public duty) or where a plaintiff seeks to protect public funds. See Danforth v. City of Yankton, 71 S.D. 406, 413, 25 N.W.2d 50, 54 (1946) (public duty—construction of toll bridge); Kanaly v. State by and through Janklow, 368 N.W.2d 819, 827 (S.D.1985) (public funds—changing state university to minimum security prison). Parsons and Peterson do not assert that they are challenging a public duty; rather, Parsons and Peterson allege their lawsuit involves public funds.
Public funds are those funds which have beеn obtained through taxation and are part of the general funds of the state.
The term “public funds” means funds belonging to the state or to the county or political subdivision of the state; more specifically taxes, customs, moneys, etc., raised by the operation of some general law, and аppropriated by the government to the discharge of its obligations, or for some public or governmental purpose; and in this sense it applies to the funds of every political division of the state wherein taxes are levied for public purposes. The term does not apply to special funds, which are collected or voluntarily contributed, for the sole bene-
fit of the contributors, and of which the state is merely the custodian.
Pokorny v. Wayne County, 322 Mich. 10, 33 N.W.2d 641 (1948) (quoting 50 C.J. Public § 40 (1930)) (emphasis added). See also State v. Igoe, 340 Mo. 1166, 107 S.W.2d 929, 933 (1937); Allen v. City of Omaha, 136 Neb. 620, 286 N.W. 916, 919 (1939). Lottery funds distributed as winnings are not public funds, but rather are special funds collected from lottery players. This action, thus, does not affect every tаxpayer in the state, but rather affects only persons playing the lottery.
In this case the lottery ticket was for the April 6, 1991, Lotto*America drawing. Lotto*America is a game operated by the Multi-State Lottery Association.4 ARSD 48:03:06:02(6). The Commission, per its authority in
Moreover, the prize pool is comprised of ticket sale prоceeds from other states as well as proceeds from South Dakota. Were Klein and the owners of Mr. G‘s required to return the prize proceeds, the money would revert to the multi-state Lotto*America prize pool for redistribution in a new lottery.
In addition, in taxpayer actions, the plaintiffs are required to ask the state attorney general to bring an action on behalf of the public or show why such requеst would be futile. Lien, 74 S.D. at 480, 54 N.W.2d at 474; White Eagle, 48 S.D. at 618, 205 N.W. at 618. A taxpayer is not required to seek the attorney general‘s representation if the attorney is a party to the suit. Id. Such is not the case here. Neither is the attorney general a party to this suit nor was his representation sought by Parsons and Peterson. Thus, this suit is not a taxpayer action and was not properly pursued as such.
Parsons and Peterson do not have standing as taxpayers to challenge the ownership of the winning ticket nor are they real parties in interest with standing to pursue this action. Parsons and Peterson do not seek to recover the prize procеeds for themselves, but rather seek to have the prize proceeds returned to the Lotto*America prize pool. Neither Parsons nor Peterson claim to have any interest in the winning lottery ticket at issue. They want to have the prize proceeds transferred back to the prize рool to provide them with a chance to win the proceeds. A mere expectancy does not give rise to a property interest. See e.g.,
Parsons and Peterson‘s action does not qualify as a taxpayer action nor are Parsons and Peterson real parties in interest.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
HENDERSON, J., concurs.
MILLER, C.J., concurs specially.
WUEST and SABERS, JJ., concur in result.
HURD, Circuit Judge, for AMUNDSON, J., disqualified.
MILLER, Chief Justice (concurring specially).
I respectfully suggest the writers concurring in result miss the point. The money contested by Pаrsons is the prize proceeds, it is not the State‘s share of money collected by Lotto*America retailers. Indeed, the State‘s share has already been remitted to a public fund. There is absolutely no public right to even one cent of the prize proceeds. Public interest in the distribution of the prize money doеs not make the prize money into public funds. It is not a public concern and does not convert public rights or funds. This is a private matter between the Lottery Commission and its declared winner.
SABERS, Justice (concurring in result).
I concur in the result of an affirmance but I do so on the merits rather than on procedure.
1. Procedure or Standing.
I disagree with Circuit Judge Hurd‘s оpinion on standing because this is a public matter. These funds are sufficiently public and Plaintiffs’ right to challenge the disposition of same was sufficiently public. As this court stated in 1937, “[i]t has become the settled law of this state that a taxpayer need not have a special interest in an action or proceedings nor suffer special injury to himself to entitle him to institute an action to protect public rights.” State ex rel. Jensen v. Kelly, 65 S.D. 345, 347, 274 N.W. 319, 321 (1937) (citations omitted). See generally Kanaly v. State, 368 N.W.2d 819 (S.D.1985) (ownership, special interest, or injury is not a prerequisite to litigate a case involving public funds).1
2. Consideration.
According to Susan Walker‘s Affidavit, when a lottery ticket is issued, the price of
“It is elementary that a promise to pay сonstitutes consideration.” State v. Murphy, 74 S.D. 21, 23, 48 N.W.2d 225, 226 (1951). Therefore, Plaintiffs lose on the merits because Mr. G‘s was immediately liable for the $5.00, which exposed them to the risk of losing same and provided the consideration needed.2
WUEST, J., joins this special writing.
