Appellant, William J. Parsons, appeals from the final order of the superior court making the action of appellee board of Commissioners of Chatham County (board), which had voted to discharge appellant from his duties as Chief Tax Assessor for Chatham County, the judgment of the court. Held:
1. We will entertain this appeal on its merits, as there currently exists some authority for direct rather than discretionary appeal of a final order of the superior court making the decision of a board of county commissioners the judgment of the court. Compare
Geron v. Calibre Cos.,
2. Appellant asserts the superior court erred “in selecting the three criteria upon which the commissioners could consider discharge in that there was not one scintilla of evidence to indicate that the Chief Tax Assessor was involved in any way in ascertaining the value of the subject property.” Subject property consists of the three separate pieces of property which appellant was charged with having afforded preferential treatment during re-evaluation for tax purposes. “Without setting forth in detail all of the evidence adduced at the hearing, we have nevertheless reviewed such [direct and circumstantial] evidence, and conclude that it supports [both the findings of the board and of the ruling of the court].”
Kirton v. Biggers,
3. Appellant asserts the superior court erred in ruling that the board was empowered to discharge him from his position as Chief Tax Assessor under the provisions of OCGA § 48-5-295 (b). OCGA § 48-5-295 (b) pertinently provides: “A member of the county board of tax assessors may be removed by the county governing authority only for cause shown for the failure to perform the duties or meet the qualifications imposed upon him by law.”
(a) Appellant’s lack of qualifications is not at issue. Appellant argues the superior court eliminated from consideration for removal any charge except that of favoritism in the evaluation of three pieces of property belonging to a certain taxpayer, and that the only applicable statutory basis for removal is “failure to perform the duties . . . im
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posed upon him by law.” Appellant then concludes “there is not a single bit of evidence which tends to prove that there was a single duty which was not performed by the Chief Tax Assessor. ...” Appellant’s latter conclusion is not supported by the record. There exists sufficient evidence to support the three findings of the board on which discharge of appellant is based. See Division 1 above. At the outset we note that the “duty imposed by law” requirement of OCGA § 48-5-295 (b) refers to any legal duty imposed upon the office holder whether mandatory or directory in nature.
Kirton v. Biggers,
supra at 418 (2). The affording of preferential treatment to the said three pieces of property, as averred and found, during tax re-evaluation, clearly is a violation of the duties imposed by law upon appellant as a tax assessor. Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. Ill (a) pertinently provides that “all taxation shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax.” Uniformity cannot be obtained when preferential treatment by favoritism in evaluation of an individual taxpayer’s property occurs. Additionally, OCGA § 48-5-306 (a) pertinently provides that the county board of tax assessors “shall see that all taxable property within the county is assessed and returned at its fair market value and that fair market values as between the individual taxpayers are
fairly and justly equalized so that each taxpayer shall pay as nearly as possible only his proportionate share of taxes.”
(Emphasis supplied.) And this has been the law of Georgia for more than 50 years.
Gullatt v. Slaton,
(b) Also within this same enumeration of error, appellant has cited cases which in essence raise the issue of adequacy of notice. An adequate notice is required by necessary implication in removal actions under the provisions of OCGA § 48-5-295.
Kirton v. Biggers,
232
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Ga. 223, 226 (1) (
However, in the interest of judicial economy, we conclude that whether the notice specifies the Code section or case citation giving rise to the particular duty imposed by law which is deemed to have been violated by the assessor’s averred conduct is but one factor in determining if the notice is adequate. Notice must be unequivocal, and the reason given for the removal action “ ‘ “must be sufficiently clear to apprise the employee of the nature and circumstances prompting his discharge. [However, i]t is enough if the statement or charges are such that the employee would have sufficient knowledge or
reason to know
the basis on which his removal is sought.” [Cit.] In other words, the charges must be “in terms sufficiently explicit as to enable (the employee) to make an explanation. . . .” ’ ” (Emphasis supplied.)
Kirton v. Biggers,
supra
4. Appellant asserts the superior court erred in allowing irrelevant evidence which is patently prejudicial. The contested evidence includes, inter alia, testimony regarding appellant’s intoxication and conduct while attending certain county-financed activities, his conduct regarding certain female personnel who were employed in his office, and his attempted display of a jar of dog testicles to a female employee. This testimony was relevant at the hearing conducted by the board to matters reasonably included within the scope of the notice. Georgia law favors the admission of any relevant evidence no matter how slight its probative value; and admission of evidence rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.
Whisnant v. State,
Further, assuming arguendo error occurred in allowing the board to consider this testimony at its hearing, such error was rendered
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harmless when the trial court reviewed the board’s findings and conclusions and directed the board that they could only discharge appellant for certain specific grounds unrelated to the evidence here contested. This portion of the court’s order had the same effect as a curative instruction not to consider the evidence of appellant’s excessive drinking and harassment of female employees in determining the ultimate issue of removal. Moreover, the resolution of the board clearly reflects the board’s recognition of the trial court’s holding that discharge of appellant could be based only upon paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the board’s findings and conclusions. These particular findings related to preferential treatment only and not to appellant’s drinking and harassing conduct. Accordingly, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of the contested evidence did not contribute to the board’s decision to dismiss appellant, or otherwise violate appellant’s due process right to a fair hearing. Cf.
Moore v. State,
5. Appellant asserts the superior court erred in not providing a forum under the auspices of the court, but ordered the parties to conduct the hearing before a tribunal of commissioners who had previously voted to discharge the chief tax assessor without a hearing. The hearing procedure utilized in this case met the requirements of law. Compare
Kirton v. Biggers,
supra
6. Appellant asserts the superior court erred in directing the board to base its final determination upon circumstantial evidence which tended to prove either side of the case when there was no di
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rect evidence to substantiate the decision reached by the commissioners and when there was direct evidence refuting the circumstantial evidence. There exists in the record, as to each of the three findings which the superior court determined would justify the board’s decision to discharge appellant, both direct and circumstantial evidence within the meaning of OCGA § 24-1-1 (3) and (4). Appellant’s enumeration of error as crafted is without merit; appellee did not rely solely on circumstantial evidence. Although conflicting evidence was introduced as to appellant’s breach of duty by giving preferential treatment to taxpayers’ properties, in the absence of an abuse of discretion by the board in its decision-making process, this court should not substitute its findings of fact or construction of the evidence for that of the very governmental body having appointment and removal powers of the chief tax assessor (who incidentally also served as and assumed the duties of chief tax appraiser and receiver).
Kirton v. Biggers,
supra,
Appellant’s other assertions are without merit.
Judgment affirmed.