Parrott v. CorleyParrott v. Corley
One of the ways that a plaintiff may demonstrate pretext is by showing that the proferred reason “did not actually motivate the defendant‘s challenged conduct.” Id. at 532. If we take Sharrer‘s affidavit in the light most favorable to Conley, a reasonable jury could certainly conclude that the City of Findlay‘s proferred reason for firing her was pretextual. What the affidavit shows was that Conley was specifically targeted by her employers, who wanted to remove her so badly that they were willing to lie in order to stack the deck against her. The city‘s claims that it fired her for incompetence might very well ring hollow for a jury that believes that the city acted with animus against the only woman working at the Water Pollution Control Plant. In other words, if the City of Findlay truly believed that Conley was incompetent, directing employees to falsify her performance reviews would be unnecessary; in contrast, the falsification of her performance review “casts further doubt on the legitimacy of [the City of Findlay‘s] stated reason.” Clay v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 501 F.3d 695, 713 (6th Cir. 2007). Thus, the Sharrer affidavit established pretext and summary judgment was inappropriate.
Given Conley‘s apparent role in the largest spill in the history of the City of Findlay, I am certainly skeptical of her chances of success at trial. My own skepticism, however, is not cause for ignoring the fact that she has rebutted the city‘s assertions and demonstrated pretext. The decision should properly be left to a jury, not judges, to assess the evidence and decide whether Conley was in fact the victim of discrimination. Under these circumstances, I think that we should reverse the district court‘s grant of summary judgment, and for that reason, I respectfully dissent.
DAVID L. BUNNING, District Judge.
This appeal arises out of litigation between Sandra K. Parrott and Troy Corley. Plaintiff‘s counsel, Jon D. Kreucher, appeals the district court‘s order imposing sanctions on him pursuant to
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant publishes “Corley Guides,” books that highlight free and fun activities in large cities. Parrott v. Corley, No. 05-74552, 2006 WL 2471943, at *1 (E.D.Mich. Aug.24, 2006). Plaintiff began working with Defendant in November of 2004, authoring “write-ups” to be used in the Orange County CorleyGuide. Id. On December 17, 2004, the parties entered into a contract whereby Plaintiff agreed to contribute at least 350 write-ups for inclusion in Free New York City: The Ultimate Guide to the Big Apple. Id. Relevant to this appeal, the contract contained an arbitration clause, which provided that “[a]ll disputes or claims arising out of or relating to this Agreement, or breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration.” Id.
On December 1, 2005, Attorney Kreucher filed a verified complaint on behalf of his client, Sandra K. Parrott. Id. at *2. In her amended complaint, Plaintiff alleged claims for: (1) breach of contract; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) tortious interference with Plaintiff‘s prospective business relationships; (4) statutory infringement of Plaintiff‘s copyrights; (5) unfair trade practice in violation of the
The day before the hearing on Defendant‘s motion, Plaintiff, through her counsel, voluntarily dismissed her Amended Complaint. Id. Thus, the only part of the motion that was left for the district court to address was Defendant‘s request for sanctions under
II. ANALYSIS
The imposition of sanctions pursuant to
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
“An attorney is liable under § 1927 solely for excessive costs resulting from the violative conduct.” Ridder, 109 F.3d at 299.
This Court set forth the standard for imposing fees under § 1927 in Shepherd v. Wellman, 313 F.3d 963, 969 (6th Cir. 2002), providing:
[S]anctions may be awarded against an attorney who “multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously.”
28 U.S.C. § 1927 . We construe “vexatiously multiplying proceedings” to include conduct where “an attorney knows or reasonably should know that a claim pursued is frivolous, or that his or her litigation tactics will needlessly obstruct the litigation of non-frivolous claims.” Jones v. Cont‘l Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1232 (6th Cir. 1986). We have also held that § 1927 sanctions are appropriate where “an attorney has engaged in some sort of conduct that, from an objective standpoint, ‘falls short of the obligations owed by the member of the bar to the court and which, as a result, causes additional expense to the opposing party.‘” Holmes v. City of Massillon, 78 F.3d 1041, 1049 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting In re Ruben, 825 F.2d 977, 984 (6th Cir. 1987)). Simple inadvertence and negligence are not grounds for imposing § 1927 sanctions. See Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288, 298 (6th Cir. 1997).
On the facts of this case, the Court cannot conclude that the district judge abused her discretion by imposing sanctions for “unreasonably multipl[ying] the proceedings by contesting Defendant‘s motion to compel arbitration and simultaneously pursuing a motion for preliminary injunction on claims it should have known were arbitrable“—conduct which clearly falls within the parameters of the conduct prohibited by § 1927. Parrott, 2006 WL 2471943, at *3. The district court was within its discretion to find that Plaintiff‘s voluntary dismissal on the eve of the hearing served as “evidence that Plaintiff‘s counsel knew or should have known that resistance to arbitration ... was frivolous.” Id.
Importantly, the district court did not merely “rubberstamp” the monetary sanction requested by Defendant. Defendant‘s counsel submitted an affidavit, requesting $10,345.77 in attorney fees and costs. Id. The district court reviewed the affidavit and supporting documentation and concluded that Defendant‘s counsel “improperly included fees associated with settlement, review of complaints and other issues unrelated to the excessive costs associated with the motion to compel arbitration and response to Plaintiff‘s motion for a preliminary injunction.” Id. After applying Defendant‘s counsel‘s practice of reducing allowable attorney fees by 30 percent and paralegal or intern fees by 80 percent, the court approved $6,570.75 in sanctions ($3,812.50 in connection with Defendant‘s motion to compel arbitration and $2,758.25 in connection with Defendant‘s response to Plaintiff‘s motion for preliminary injunction). Id. The district court refused to award any excess costs, citing the absence of documentation supporting such a request. Id. This detailed analysis evidences the pains the district court took to arrive at an appropriate monetary sanction and undermines any suggestion that the district court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions on Kreucher.
Kreucher made various other arguments on appeal, only a few of which warrant further comment. For example, he argues that his actions fall exclusively within the conduct proscribed by Rule 11. However, the Court finds that the district court was well within its discretion to impose sanctions under § 1927. Nothing required the
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court imposing sanctions pursuant to
DAVID L. BUNNING
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE