82 U.S. 524 | SCOTUS | 1873
PARROT
v.
WELLS, FARGO & CO.
Supreme Court of United States.
*531 Messrs. R.M. Corwine and B.R. Curtis (with whom was Mr. Quinton Corwine), for the plaintiff in error.
Mr. S.M. Wilson (who argued the case thoroughly on the precedents, English and American), contra.
*534 Mr. Justice FIELD, after stating the facts of the case, delivered the opinion of the court, as follows:
It appears from the record that the court finds, that neither the defendants, nor any of their employés, nor any of the employés of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, who had anything to do with the case of nitro-glycerine, knew the contents of the case, or had any means of such knowledge, or had any reason to suspect its dangerous character, and that they did not know anything about nitro-glycerine, or that it was dangerous. And it also appears that the court finds, that there was no negligence on the part of the defendants in receiving the case, or in their failure to ascertain the dangerous character of the contents; and in view of the condition of their knowledge, of the want of means of knowledge, and the absence of any reasonable ground of suspicion, that there was no negligence in the handling of the case at the time of the explosion.
The question presented to us is, whether upon this state of facts the plaintiff is entitled to recover for the injuries caused by the explosion to his buildings, outside of that portion occupied by the defendants under their lease. For the injuries to that portion the defendants admit their liability, as for waste committed, under the statute. Immediately after the accident they repaired that portion with the sanction of the plaintiff, and placed the premises in a condition as good as they were previously. It appears, however, that a part of the expenses incurred were by mistake paid by the plaintiff in settling for repairs on other buildings. For the part thus paid the court gave judgment for the plaintiff under the first count, and the defendants take no exception to its action in this respect.
To fasten a further liability on the defendants, and hold *535 them for injuries to that portion of the buildings not covered by their lease, it was contended in the court below, and it is urged here, that, as matter of law, they were chargeable with notice of the character and properties of the merchandise in their possession, and of the proper mode of handling and dealing with it, and were consequently guilty of negligence in receiving, introducing, and handling the box containing the nitro-glycerine.
If express carriers are thus chargeable with notice of the contents of packages carried by them, they must have the right to refuse to receive packages offered for carriage without knowledge of their contents. It would, in that case, be unreasonable to require them to accept, as conclusive in every instance, the information given by the owner. They must be at liberty, whenever in doubt, to require, for their satisfaction, an inspection even of the contents as a condition of carrying the packages. This doctrine would be attended in practice with great inconvenience, and would seldom lead to any good. Fortunately the law is not so unreasonable. It does not exact any such knowledge on the part of the carrier, nor permit him, in cases free from suspicion, to require information as to the contents of the packages offered as a condition of carrying them. This was ruled directly by the Common Pleas in England in the case of Crouch v. The London and Northwestern Railway.[*] The proposition that a carrier is, in all cases, entitled to know the nature of the goods contained in the packages offered to him for carriage, is there stated to be unsupported by any authority, and one that would not stand the test of reasoning.
In Brass v. Braitland,[] it was held by the Queen's Bench that it was the duty of the shipper, when he offered goods which were of a dangerous nature to be carried, to give notice of their character to the owner of the ship, the Chief Justice, in delivering the opinion of the court, observing that "it would be strange to suppose that the master or mate, having no reason to suspect that goods offered to him *536 for a general shipment may not be safely stowed away in the hold, must ask every shipper the contents of every package."
The case cited from the Common Pleas recognizes the right of the carrier to refuse to receive packages offered without being made acquainted with their contents, when there is good ground for believing that they contain anything of a dangerous character. It is only when such ground exists, arising from the appearance of the package or other circumstances tending to excite his suspicions, that the carrier is authorized, in the absence of any special legislation on the subject, to require a knowledge of the contents of the packages offered as a condition of receiving them for carriage.
It not, then, being his duty to know the contents of any package offered to him for carriage, when there are no attendant circumstances awakening his suspicious as to their character, there can be no presumption of law that he had such knowledge in any particular case of that kind, and he cannot accordingly be charged as matter of law with notice of the properties and character of packages thus received. The first proposition of the plaintiff, therefore, falls, and the second, which depends upon the first, goes with it.
The defendants, being innocently ignorant of the contents of the case, received in the regular course of their business, were not guilty of negligence in introducing it into their place of business and handling it in the same manner as other packages of similar outward appearance were usually handled. "Negligence" has been defined to be "the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do."[*] It must be determined in all cases by reference to the situation and knowledge of the parties and all the attendant circumstances. What would be extreme care under one condition *537 of knowledge, and one state of circumstances, would be gross negligence with different knowledge and in changed circumstances. The law is reasonable in its judgments in this respect. It does not charge culpable negligence upon any one who takes the usual precautions against accident, which careful and prudent men are accustomed to take under similar circumstances.[*]
The case of Pierce v. Winsor,[] decided by Mr. Justice Clifford, in the Circuit Court of the District of Massachusetts, furnishes a pertinent illustration of this doctrine. There a general ship was put up for freight. Among other freight offered and taken was mastic, an article new in commerce, and which was so affected by the voyage that it injured other parts of the cargo in contact with it, and caused increased expenditure in discharging the vessel. The court held the shipper and not the charterer liable, and observed that "the storage of the mastic was made in the usual way, and it is not disputed it would have been proper, if the article had been what it was supposed to be, when it was received and laden on board. Want of greater care in that behalf is not a fault, because the master had no means of knowledge that the article required any extra care or attention beyond what is usual in respect to other goods."
This action is not brought upon the covenants of the lease; it is in trespass for injuries to the buildings of the plaintiff, and the gist of the action is the negligence of the defendants: unless that be established, they are not liable. The more fact that injury has been caused is not sufficient to hold them. No one is responsible for injuries resulting from unavoidable accident, whilst engaged in a lawful business. A party charging negligence as a ground of action must prove it. He must show that the defendant, by his act or by his omission, has violated some duty incumbent upon him, which has caused the injury complained of.
The cases between passengers and carriers for injuries stand upon a different footing. The contract of the carrier *538 being to carry safely, the proof of the injury usually establishes a primâ facie case, which the carrier must overcome. His contract is shown, primâ facie at least, to have been violated by the injury. Outside of these cases, in which a positive obligation is cast upon the carrier to perform safely a special service, the presumption is that the party has exercised such care as men of ordinary prudence and caution would exercise under similar circumstances, and if he has not, the plaintiff must prove it.
Here no such proof was made, and the case stands as one of unavoidable accident, for the consequences of which the defendants are not responsible. The consequences of all such accidents must be borne by the sufferer as his misfortune.
This principle is recognized and affirmed in a great variety of cases in cases where fire originating in one man's building has extended to and destroyed the property of others; in cases where injuries have been caused by fire ignited by sparks from steamboats or locomotives, or caused by horses running away, or by blasting rocks, and in numerous other cases which will readily occur to every one. The rule deducible from them is, that the measure of care against accident, which one must take to avoid responsibility, is that which a person of ordinary prudence and caution would use if his own interests were to be affected, and the whole risk were his own.[*]
And the principle is not changed whether the injury complained of follows directly or remotely from the act or conduct of the party. The direct or remote consequences of the act or conduct may determine the form of the action, whether it shall be case or trespass, where the forms of the common law are in use, but cannot alter the principle upon which liability is enforced or avoided. In Brown v. Kendall,[] which was before the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, the action was in trespass for an assault and battery. The defendant *539 was trying to part two dogs, fighting, and in raising his stick for that purpose accidentally struck the plaintiff in his eye, injuring it severely. The court, Mr. Chief Justice Shaw delivering the opinion, held that the defendant was doing a lawful and proper act, which he might do by the use of proper and safe means; and that if in so doing, and while using due care and taking all proper precautions necessary to the exigency of the case to avoid hurt to others, the injury to the plaintiff occurred, the defendant was not liable therefore, and that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to establish a want of due care on the part of the defendant. In Harvey v. Dunlap,[*] which was before the Supreme Court of New York, the action was trespass for throwing a stone at the plaintiff's daughter, by which her eye was put out. It did not appear that the injury was inflicted by design or carelessness, but on the contrary that it was accidental, and it was held that the plaintiff could not recover. "No case or principle can be found," said Mr. Justice Nelson, in denying a new trial, "or, if found, can be maintained, subjecting an individual to liability for an act done without fault on his part;" and in this conclusion we all agree.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
NOTES
[*] 14 Common Bench, 291.
[] 6 Ellis & Blackburn, 485.
[*] Blyth v. Birmington Water Works, 11 Exchequer, 784.
[*] Sherman and Redfield, § 6.
[] 2 Clifford, 18.
[*] Hoffman v. Tuolumne County Water Co., 10 California, 413; Wolf v. St. Louis Indep. Water Co., Ib. 541; Todd v. Cochell, 17 Id. 97.
[] 6 Cushing, 295.
[*] Lalor's Reports, 193.
